Cinergy Corp. v. Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services, Ltd.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE AND OTHER PLAINTIFFS
George M. Plews Richard A. Smikle Howard B. Epstein
Donna C. Marron Brian J. Paul Theodore A. Keyes
John M. Ketcham Ice Miller LLP Sami B. Groff
Plews Shadley Racher & Braun Indianapolis, Indiana Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana New York, New York
______________________________________________________________________________

In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________

No. 32S05-0604-CV-00151

CINERGY CORPORATION, DUKE ENERGY INDIANA, INC. AND DUKE ENERGY OHIO, INC., 1
Appellants (Defendants),
v.

ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC & GAS INSURANCE SERVICES, LTD., Appellee (Plaintiff),

ST. PAUL SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE COMPANY; AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY;
ALLIANZ UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY.; AMERICAN NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE COM-
PANY; CALIFORNIA UNION INSURANCE COMPANY; EMPLOYERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY;
FIRST STATE INSURANCE COMPANY; GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY; HARBOR INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY; HIGHLANDS INSURANCE COMPANY; INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA; INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY; INTERNATIONAL SURPLUS LINES INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY; LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY; NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COM-
PANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA; REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY; ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY;
SAFETY MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY; TRANSAMERICA PREMIER UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S
LONDON,
(Additional Plaintiffs). 2
_________________________________

Interlocutory Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court, No. 32D02-0010-CP-191
The Honorable David H. Coleman, Judge
_________________________________

1
The defendants originally named in this case were Cinergy Corporation, PSI Energy, Incorporated, and
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company. The defendants subsequently filed a Notice of Name Change advis-
ing that PSI Energy, Incorporated, is now Duke Energy Indiana, Inc., and Cincinnati Gas & Electric
Company is now Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.
2
This appeal challenges the denial of the defendants' motion seeking partial summary judgment against
only one of the plaintiffs, Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services, LTD. Pursuant to Indiana Ap-
pellate Rule 17(A), however, a party of record in the trial court is a party on appeal.
 On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 32A05-0409-CV-474
_________________________________

May 1, 2007

Dickson, Justice.

Incurring enormous defense costs in the course of a federal environmental lawsuit, sev-
eral power companies desire payment of these defense costs, as they are incurred, under the
terms of certain liability insurance policies. The insurance companies, denying liability for such
defense costs, initiated this action for declaratory judgment. The power companies sought partial
summary judgment to compel payment of all past and future defense costs incurred in respond-
ing to the federal lawsuit. We affirm the trial court's denial of the motion because it seeks relief
more extensive than that to which the power companies are entitled.

Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services Limited ("AEGIS"), and twenty-two other
insurance entities filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Cinergy Corporation, PSI
Energy, Incorporated (now Duke Energy Indiana, Inc.), and Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company
(now Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.), power companies insured under policy contracts issued by the
plaintiffs. The complaint seeks to determine the extent of the plaintiffs' insurance obligations
with respect to a federal lawsuit filed against the power companies by the United States, three
states, and several environmental organizations pursuant to the federal Clean Air Act alleging
failure to obtain permits and discharge of excess emissions from power plants resulting in wide-
spread harm to public health and the environment. The power companies filed a motion for par-
tial summary judgment seeking from one of the plaintiffs, AEGIS, over four million dollars in
defense costs (exceeding the self-insured retention amount 3 ) incurred in the federal lawsuit, pre-
judgment interest, and an order directing AEGIS to pay, as incurred, all of the power companies'
future defense costs in defending the federal lawsuit. The trial court denied the power compa-
nies' motion, but certified it for interlocutory appeal. 4 The Court of Appeals accepted the inter-

3
The policies provide excess coverage over the self-insured retentions of $500,000 for two of the policies
and $1,000,000 for one of the policies. Appellees' Br. at 2-3.
4
During the trial court proceedings, at the request of the power companies, the trial court issued an order
declaring certain documents to be confidential and not disclosed to the public. In this appeal, however,

2
locutory appeal and affirmed the trial court's denial of partial summary judgment. Cinergy Corp.
v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 838 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The federal lawsuit is
ongoing. 5 We granted transfer.

On interlocutory appeal, the power companies contend there are no determinative issues
of material fact and that, as a matter of law, the policy provisions require AEGIS to pay the
power companies' costs for defense of the federal lawsuit, and to pay such defense costs as they
are incurred by the power companies. AEGIS contends that its policies provide no coverage for
the claims made against the power companies in the federal suit, and thus it has no duty to pay
defense costs. It also contends, in the alternative, that any such defense costs are not payable as
incurred but rather only when "the loss occurs and is determined to be covered." Appellees' Br.
at 9.

A party seeking appellate reversal of the denial of summary judgment must demonstrate
that "the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule
56(C); see also Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Ind. 2005); Worman Enter.,
Inc. v. Boone County Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 805 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. 2004). In ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, a court may grant such judgment for any other party upon any
issues raised by the motion. T.R. 56(B). Generally, the interpretation of an insurance policy pre-
sents a question of law and is thus appropriate for summary judgment. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v.
Guzorek, 690 N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ind. 1997). If summary judgment turns on the interpretation of a
written document, any ambiguity that arises must be resolvable without the aid of the fact-finder.

the power companies filed as a public record in the office of the Supreme Court Clerk the appendix, ap-
pellants' brief, appellants' reply brief, petition to transfer, and amended reply brief in support of petition to
transfer, all without any designation or request for confidentiality. This opinion does not discuss any
facts not contained in such public submissions.
5
The litigation has included an interlocutory appeal of the federal trial court's grant of the government's
motion for partial summary judgment regarding the "purely legal question of what is the appropriate
method of determining whether a physical change at a source has caused an increase in emissions for pur-
poses of [New Source Review under the Clean Air Act]." United States v. Cinergy Corp., 384 F.Supp.2d
1272, 1274 (S.D. Ind. 2005), aff'd, 458 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, No. 06-8 50 (U.S. Apr. 16,
2007), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/041607pzor.pdf.

3
finder. Plumlee v. Monroe Guar. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d 350, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. de-
nied; Kutche Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Anderson Banking Co., 597 N.E.2d
1307, 1309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. not sought. Clear and unambiguous language in insur-
ance policy contracts, like other contracts, should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. All-
state Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1054 (Ind. 2001). But where the policy language
is ambiguous, insurance contracts are to be construed strictly against the insurer and the language
must be viewed from the standpoint of the insured. Id. at 1056. Thus, ambiguous terms will be
construed in favor of the insured, but for purposes of summary judgment, only if the ambiguity
exists by reason of the language used and not because of extrinsic facts. See McCae Mgmt.
Corp. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 553 N.E.2d 884, 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied.

AEGIS issued to each defendant a substantially similar "Excess Liability Insurance Pol-
icy" wherein AEGIS agreed to indemnify the respective insured power company:
for any and all sums which the INSURED shall become legally obligated to pay as UL-
TIMATE NET LOSS by reason of the liability imposed upon the INSURED by law or li-
ability assumed by the INSURED under CONTRACT, including the INSURED'S
proportionate share of any liability arising in any manner whatsoever out of the
operations or existence of any JOINT VENTURE in which the INSURED has an interest,
for damages because of BODILY INJURY . . . or PROPERTY DAMAGE caused by an
OCCURRENCE.

Appellants' App'x. at 382, 409, 442. 6

The term "ultimate net loss" is defined in the 1984-85 policies issued to PSI Incorporated
and the Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company to mean, in relevant part:
the total of the following sums with respect to each OCCURRENCE or WRONGFUL
ACT to which this POLICY applies;
(1) all sums which the INSURED shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
either by adjudication or compromise with the consent of the COMPANY, after
making proper deductions for all recoveries and salvages collectible and for other
insurance that is in excess of the UNDERLYING LIMITS; and
(2) all expenses incurred by the INSURED in the investigation, negotiation, settle-
ment and defense of any claim or suit seeking such damages, excluding all sala-
ries of employees and office expense of the INSURED.

6
Words and phrases in all capital letters "have special meanings set forth" in the Definitions section of
each policy. Appellants' App'x. at 442.

4
Id. at 387, 414.

In the 1999-2000 policy issued to Cinergy Corp., "ultimate net loss" is merely defined to
mean "the total INDEMNITY and DEFENSE COSTS with respect to each OCCURRENCE to
which this POLICY applies." Id. at 448. The policy also provides the following definitions for
"indemnity" and "defense costs," in relevant part:
The term "INDEMNITY" shall mean all sums which the INSURED shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages, including punitive damages where permitted by law, either
by adjudication or compromise with the consent of the COMPANY, after making proper
deductions for all recoveries and salvages collectible . . . .

The term "DEFENSE COSTS" shall mean all expenses incurred by the INSURED in the
investigation, negotiation, settlement and defense of any CLAIM or in the investigation
of any OCCURRENCE or circumstances of which NOTICE OF CIRCUMSTANCES has
been given, excluding all salaries, wages and benefit expenses of employees and office
expenses of the INSURED; . . . .
Id. at 445.

The 1999-2000 AEGIS insurance policy issued to Cinergy Corp. defines "claim" to mean
"any demand or suit against any INSURED for damages because of BODILY INJURY . . . or
PROPERTY DAMAGE." Id. at 444. And it defines "occurrence" to mean, in relevant part:
"with respect to BODILY INJURY and PROPERTY DAMAGE, an accident, event or continu-
ous or repeated exposure to conditions neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
INSURED." Id. at 447. The 1984-1985 AEGIS insurance policies issued to PSI Incorporated
and to the Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company defines "occurrence" to mean, in relevant part:
The term "OCCURRENCE" shall mean an accident, event or continuous or repeated ex-
posure to conditions which result in BODILY INJURY . . . or PROPERTY DAMAGE,
subject to the following clarifications:
(1) all injury, damage or loss of use and all claims for injury, damage or loss of use aris-
ing out of the same accident, the same event or exposure to substantially the same general
conditions shall be considered as arising out of and comprising a single OCCURRENCE.
Id. at 386, 413. All three insurance policies similarly define the term "bodily injury" to mean, in
relevant part, "bodily injury, mental anguish, mental illness, emotional upset, sickness or disease
sustained by any person . . . including death at any time resulting therefrom." Id. at 444, 384,
411. Likewise, "property damage" in each of the policies means, in relevant part, "physical [in-
jury or damage] to or destruction of tangible property . . . including the loss of use thereof " if

5
caused by an occurrence to which the policy applies. Id. at 387, 414, 448.

Notwithstanding the language referring to defense costs as part of "ultimate net loss,"
none of the policies impose upon AEGIS a separate duty to defend. To the contrary, the policies
expressly provide that AEGIS "shall not be called upon to assume charge of the settlement or
defense" of any claim, suit, or proceeding. Id. at 392, 419, 452.

1. Coverage for Defense Costs

The power companies contend that the policy provisions require AEGIS to pay the power
companies' costs for defense of the federal lawsuit. They argue that the obligation to pay defense
costs is not limited just to such costs attributable to the defense of claims that actually result in a
liability against the insured covered by the AEGIS policy, but rather "also the costs of defending
against claims or suits 'seeking' to impose liability," that is, "defense costs for potentially covered
claims." Appellants' Reply Br. at 1.

AEGIS responds that its policies require payment of defense costs only if the insured is
"legally obligated to pay a judgment or settlement in the underlying action," Appellee's Br. at 8,
and that it need not pay defense costs "unless and until the loss occurs and is determined to be
covered (and the self-insured retention is exhausted)." Id. at 9. AEGIS argues that it has "no
contractual requirement to pay defense costs for disputed claims." Id. In the alternative, AEGIS
also asserts that the companies have failed to establish that the underlying claims in the federal
lawsuit fall within their claim of "potentially covered."

The parties' dispute centers on the construction of the policy language that requires AE-
GIS to indemnify the respective power companies for sums the companies "become legally obli-
gated to pay as ULTIMATE NET LOSS." Appellants' App'x. at 382, 409, 442. The claimed
AEGIS liability for defense costs arises from the policies' definitions of "ultimate net loss." This
is defined in the 1984-85 policies to specifically include, as to each occurrence to which the pol-
icy applies, "all expenses incurred . . . in the investigation, negotiation, settlement and defense of
any claim or suit" seeking damages. Id. at 387, 414. In the 2000-2001 policy, "ultimate net loss"

6
is defined to include "defense costs," which is then separately defined to mean: "all expenses in-
curred . . . in the investigation, negotiation, settlement and defense" of any claim. Id. at 445.

Synthesizing the policies' insuring agreements with their respective definitions of capital-
ized words and phrases is a daunting task, replete with often confusing, redundant, and some-
times circular concepts. Mindful of our obligation to construe any ambiguities and confusing
language strictly against the insurer, we conclude that, as to the issue of AEGIS's responsibility
for the power companies' defense costs under the circumstances here presented, all three policies
impose essentially the same obligation. After the self-insured retention amounts specified in the
policies are satisfied, AEGIS is responsible for expenses incurred by the power companies in the
investigation, negotiation, settlement, and defense of any claim or suit seeking damages because
of or resulting in bodily injury or property damage with respect to any accident, event, or con-
tinuous or repeated exposure to conditions. The essential controversy is thus whether the federal
lawsuit against the power companies is such a suit—one that seeks damages because of or result-
ing in bodily injury or property damage with respect to any accident, event, or continuous or re-
peated exposure to conditions. The power companies cannot succeed in their summary judgment
motion if the resolution of this question depends upon disputed factual issues.

As an initial matter, with respect to AEGIS's claim that its responsibility for defense costs
does not exist as to disputed claims and arises only when it becomes obligated to pay a judgment
or settlement in the underlying action, we disagree. To the extent that AEGIS may have a re-
sponsibility with respect to defense costs, such obligation is independent of whether or not the
plaintiffs in the federal lawsuit are ultimately successful in obtaining a judgment or settlement
against the power companies. The language of each policy imposes upon AEGIS the separate
responsibility for defense costs for claims or suits seeking damages for occurrences that result in
bodily injury or property damage. The language common to the policies clearly distinguishes the
AEGIS obligation to pay "all sums which the INSURED shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages" from its obligation to pay "all expenses incurred by the INSURED" in the defense of
claims to which the policy applies. Id. at 387, 414, 445. This obligation to pay defense costs
exists regardless of whether the federal lawsuit eventually results in a judgment or settlement
against the power companies.

7
 To further resist the power companies' request for payment of their defense costs as in-
curred, AEGIS contends that its policies are only "indemnity," not "direct pay," contracts. Ap-
pellee's Br. at 21. And AEGIS also asserts that its obligations to the power companies apply
only to the "'total' indemnity and defense costs," id. at 16, and that there is "no coverage" until
the power companies can calculate the total of both the damages imposed by the federal lawsuit
and the defense expenses eventually incurred in defending the lawsuit, id. at 17-18. Notwith-
standing the initial AEGIS agreement "to indemnify" 7 and the policies' use of the word "total" 8
to refer to indemnity or the sums included in "ultimate net loss," the policies also expressly re-
quire AEGIS to pay for "any and all sums" 9 that the power companies become legally obligated
to pay as "expenses incurred" 10 in the investigation, negotiation, settlement and defense of the
federal lawsuit. The separate specification of "any" sums leads the policy reader to understand
that AEGIS not only will pay "all" sums but also individual component sums that the power
companies become obligated to pay as defense costs. Furthermore, the policy speaks of such
costs that the power companies "become legally obligated to pay" and "as expenses incurred."
There is no dispute that such defense costs are in fact incurred by the power companies as legal
services are rendered and billed to them, at which point the companies become legally obligated
to pay such costs. We find that an ambiguity thus arises and that the language must be construed
to impose upon AEGIS the "direct pay" responsibility for covered defense costs as incurred by
the power companies. Unresolved, however, is the extent of covered defense costs and whether
the power companies are entitled to the relief sought in their motion for partial summary judg-
ment.

The nature of the underlying federal lawsuit, as reflected by the record before us, is "a
civil action" brought against the power companies "for injunctive relief and the assessment of
civil penalties for violations" of various provisions of the Clean Air Act, federally-enforceable

7
Id. at 382, 409, 442.
8
Id. at 387, 414, 448.
9
Id. at 382, 409, 442 (emphasis added).
10
Id. at 387, 414, 445.

8
State Implementation Plans developed by Indiana and Ohio, and a 1998 administrative consent
order. Appellants' App'x. at 227.

Following twenty-eight pages of introductory explanatory material and general allega-
tions, the federal complaint presents sixteen separate detailed claims for relief, each consisting of
numerous rhetorical paragraphs alleging specific violations and locations and asserting that each
such violation subjects the power companies to injunctive relief and civil penalties. Id. at 241-
252. The complaint concludes with a final section titled "Prayer for Relief," which we condense
and summarize as requesting that the federal trial court take the following action:
(a) permanently enjoin the power companies from operating or constructing various
power plants "except in accordance with the Clean Air Act and any applicable
regulatory requirements" or the administrative consent order;
(b) order the power companies "to remedy their past violations by, inter alia, requiring
the Defendants to install, as appropriate, the best available control technology, the
best available technology, or technology to achieve the lowest achievable emis-
sions rate on each boiler unit" at various power plants, and "to take such other
measures as are necessary to bring the Defendants' plants into compliance" with
provisions of the Act and the State Implementation Plans, "including emission
offsets, if necessary," and to otherwise comply with the Act;
(c) order the power companies "to take other appropriate actions to remedy, mitigate, and
offset the harm to public health and the environment caused by the violations of
the Clean Air Act";
(d) order the power companies "to apply for permits that are in conformity" with re-
quirements of the Act and the State Implementation Plans;
(e) order the power companies "to conduct audits of their operations to determine if any
additional modifications have occurred which would require them to meet" vari-
ous statutory and regulatory requirements;
(f) assess "a civil penalty . . . of up to $25,000 per day for each violation of the Clean Air
Act and the applicable regulations, and $27,500 per day for each such violation on
or after January 30, 1997";
(g) award costs of the action; and

9
 (h) grant "such other relief as the Court deems just and proper."
Id. at 252-53.

The power companies argue that the federal lawsuit seeks "damages" within the meaning
of the AEGIS policies. In both their trial court submissions in support of the motion for partial
summary judgment, and in their briefs on appeal, the power companies emphasize language in
the federal complaint that alleges that the companies' prior conduct has already caused extensive
damage to human health and welfare, to the environment, and to historic buildings and monu-
ments. Id. at 137, 141; Appellants Br. at 4-6. Primarily focusing upon the "Prayer for Relief"
section of the federal complaint, the power companies argue that the federal lawsuit seeks to re-
quire them to "remedy, mitigate, and offset the harm to public health and the environment caused
by the violations of the Clean Air Act" and further that the lawsuit thus seeks to impose upon the
power companies "the cost of government mandated injunctive remedies to remediate or contain
further environmental harm." Id. at 25-26. Citing several cases from Indiana and other states,
the power companies assert that such compliance costs constitute "damages" covered by the
AEGIS policies.

In response, AEGIS focuses upon the sixteen detailed claims for relief, not the final
"Prayer for Relief" section, and contends that its insurance policies "simply do not provide cov-
erage for any of the claims asserted" in the federal lawsuit. Appellee's Br. at 30. AEGIS de-
scribes the lawsuit as seeking "to force [the power companies] to comply with statutory require-
ments that it apply for certain permits before constructing projects at its facilities, and where
necessary, install modern pollution control technology as part of the construction." Id. at 39-40.
AEGIS argues that this is not the same as seeking compliance with statutory cleanup require-
ments nor seeking costs of containing currently leaking pollutants from spreading (as distin-
guished from keeping future emissions from being discharged). Id. at 40. AEGIS asserts that
none of the separately enumerated sixteen claims for relief seek damages for bodily injury or
property damage but rather only "seek injunctive relief in the form of modifications to [the
power companies'] facilities including the replacement and installation of major components
such as the superheater, economizer, wall tubes, coal bunker, waterwall tubing, high temperature
reheater, condenser tubing, turbine blades, and other turbine equipment," which are "equipment

10
intended to reduce emissions of pollutants before they are emitted." Id. at 33.

There is essential agreement among the parties, however, that the primary thrust of the
federal lawsuit is to require the power companies to incur the costs of installing government-
mandated equipment intended to reduce future emissions of pollutants and prevent future envi-
ronmental harm. Their principal disagreement is thus whether the costs of installing such
equipment fall within the policies' coverage for damages because of or resulting in bodily injury
or property damage with respect to any accident, event, or continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions.

Prior Indiana appellate decisions have concluded that similar insurance policies provide
coverage to insureds facing governmental environmental lawsuits. In Hartford Accident & In-
dem. Co. v. Dana Corp., 690 N.E.2d 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied, the court held that
"the ordinary meaning of the term 'damages' in a [comprehensive general liability] policy in-
cludes EPA or state-mandated cleanup and response costs, and that the trial court properly so
concluded." Id. at 298. The court expressly concluded "that the ordinary meaning of 'damages'
is so broad that it encompasses . . . environmental response costs." Id. (quoting Farmland Indus.,
Inc., v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Mo. 1997)). Rejecting the insurer's claim "that
preventive measures such as containment costs, where no environmental contamination has yet
occurred, are not damages," the court stated that the "cost of containment as a remedial action
taken to prevent further release of hazardous substances would be considered damages." Hart-
ford v. Dana, 690 N.E.2d at 298.

A subsequent case, Travelers Indem. Co. v. Summit Corp., 715 N.E.2d 926 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999), trans. not sought, involved a coverage dispute under a comprehensive general liability
policy for the costs of complying with an order by the Environmental Protection Agency and
other environmental agencies directing the insured to clean up contaminants at various sites.
Applying Hartford v. Dana, the court held that the undefined term "damages" in a comprehensive
general liability insurance policy "includes environmental cleanup and response costs," and the
word "suit" in the liability insurance policy "includes environmental administrative actions." Id.
at 933-34.

11
 Policy language in various liability insurance contracts has likewise been construed to re-
quire coverage for environmental cleanup in several other cases. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1056 (Ind. 2001) (policy exclusion for damage to insured's prop-
erty held not to preclude coverage for contamination cleanup liability to third parties resulting
from that damage); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 662 N.E.2d 945, 947-49 (Ind. 1996) ("pollution
exclusion" in garage liability insurance policy held not to exclude coverage for "sudden and ac-
cidental" discharges and for losses arising out of "discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, re-
lease or escape of 'pollutants,'" including any liquid or gaseous irritant or contaminant); Seymour
Mfg. Co. v . Commercial Union Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 891, 892 (Ind. 1996)) ("sudden and acci-
dental" and "pollutant" in liability coverage policy construed against the insured in favor of cov-
erage for EPA action to recover environmental cleanup and other costs); Great Lakes Chem.
Corp. v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 638 N.E.2d 847, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (construing "pol-
lution exclusion" not to exclude coverage for damage actions brought by various persons and
communities against the insured claiming soil and groundwater contamination), trans. granted
but Court of Appeals opinion reinstated by 698 N.E.2d 1192 (Ind. 1998).

The power companies also refer to other jurisdictions in concluding that the term "dam-
ages" in comprehensive general liability policies includes preventive measures and compliance
costs where defendants have allegedly violated environmental regulatory statutes resulting in
property damage or bodily injury. Appellants' Br. at 27-28 (citing Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 118 F.3d 1263, 1271 (8th Cir. 1997); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court,
274 Cal. Rptr. 820, 845, 799 P.2d 1253, 1278 (1990); A.Y. McDonald Indus. v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 611, 623 (Iowa 1991); Brown Group, Inc. v. George F. Brown & Sons,
Inc., 963 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)).

AEGIS disputes the applicability of Indiana precedent, asserting that none of the cases
concern whether liability coverage for "'bodily injury' . . . or 'property damage' provides coverage
for a claim seeking injunctive relief ordering a defendant to make modifications to its own facil-
ity and cease operating in violation of a statute." Appellee's Br. at 38. AEGIS also asserts that
"none of the cases cited concern air pollution or violations of the PSD [Prevention of Significant

12
Deterioration] or NSR [New Source Review] provisions of the CAA [Clean Air Act]." Id. It
argues that the cases dealing with emission of industrial waste all involved damage when the
wastes settled on persons and properties, as opposed to emission in the air as alleged here. AE-
GIS distinguishes the federal claims in this case with cases where "damages" have included gov-
ernment-mandated cleanup costs, explaining that "[t]he claims here . . . do not allege cleanup
costs or preventive measures ordered as part of the clean up of a spill," but rather "the underlying
claims here seek to force [the power companies] to comply with statutory requirements that it
apply for certain permits before constructing projects at its facilities, and where necessary, install
modern pollution control technology as part of the construction." Id. at 39-40.

AEGIS urges that "damages" under its policies should not apply to "prophylactic meas-
ures taken to limit the release of emissions." Id. at 40. Citing AIU Ins. Co. and A.Y. McDonald
Indus., two of the same cases cited by the power companies in support of their position, AEGIS
argues that the expenses incurred under environmental injunctions that are prophylactic in nature
to prevent future emissions should not be considered property damage and thus not covered.

In A.Y.McDonald Indus., a brass foundry dumped sand containing lead on the foundry
site. Following a complaint by the EPA, an administrative hearing, and an appeal, the foundry
and several government agencies entered into a consent order requiring the installation of a clay
cap over specified land, expansion of a groundwater monitoring system, and implementation of a
postclosure plan for thirty-years. The foundry's subsequent action for declaratory relief against
several insurers was removed to federal court, which then certified to the Iowa Supreme Court
questions regarding the construction of insurance policies and coverage for response costs and
penalties. The court noted that "[n]early all" of the state appellate courts agree that "response or
cleanup costs incurred under environmental protection statutes are indeed covered" by similar
policies. A.Y.McDonald Indus, 475 N.W.2d at 615. After an extensive survey of state and fed-
eral authority, it held that "response costs for preventative measures employed after pollution has
taken place are incurred 'because of property damage'" under the CGL policies. Id. at 624. But
"costs incurred to pay for preventative measures taken in advance of pollution are not incurred
'because of property damage.'" Id.

13
 A similar approach was followed in AIU Ins. Co., which addressed the coverage provided
under comprehensive general liability insurance policies for relief sought against the insured by
lawsuits seeking injunctions compelling the termination of hazardous waste disposal, removal of
contaminants already present, and reimbursement for costs of investigating, monitoring, and ini-
tiating hazardous waste cleanup. 51 Cal. 3d at 815-16, 799 P.2d at 1260. The court emphasized
that these third-party suits "rest on allegations of past and present damage to land and water," and
thus are "for remedial and mitigative actions" as distinguished from reimbursement for "prophy-
lactic purposes." Id. at 832-33, 799 P.2d at 1272. Acknowledging that "prophylactic costs—
incurred to pay for measures taken in advance of any release of hazardous waste—are not in-
curred 'because of property damage,'" id. at 843, 799 P.2d at 1279, the California Supreme Court
held that the relief sought was not wholly prophylactic in nature, and thus the costs of injunctive
relief in question were covered damages under the liability policies, id. at 843-44, 799 P.2d at
1280.

The distinction between remedial and prophylactic remedies as a basis for determining
coverage has been acknowledged with approval in several other opinions. See, e.g., Energy-
North Natural Gas, Inc. v. Century Indem. Co., 452 F.3d 44, 56 (1st Cir. 2006); Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 S.W.3d 830, 838-39 (Ky. 2005); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Aaron, 112 Md.
App. 472, 487, 685 A.2d 858, 865 (1996); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 123
Wn.2d 891, 905, 874 P.2d 142, 150 (1994); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Wn.2d
869, 886, 784 P.2d 507, 516 (1990); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau., 264
Wis.2d 60, 92-93, 665 N.W.2d 257, 274 (2003).

Notwithstanding the federal lawsuit's various references to seeking relief that would
"remedy" past violations and harm to public health, the power companies acknowledge that the
injunctive remedy sought by the federal lawsuit is "to force Cinergy to install equipment to con-
tain any further excess emissions and allow the environment to recover." Appellants' Br. at 26
(emphasis added). The federal lawsuit is directed at preventing future public harm, not at obtain-
ing control, mitigation, or compensation for past or existing environmentally hazardous emis-
sions.

14
 The responsibilities of AEGIS under its policies for "ultimate net loss," including the
power companies' defense costs, is conditioned by the requirement that such loss be for damages
because of bodily injury or property damage "caused by an OCCURRENCE." Appellants' Ap-
p'x. at 382, 409, 442 (emphasis added). Under all three policies the term "occurrence" means "an
accident, event, or continuous or repeated exposure to conditions." 11 Id. at 386, 413, 447. Due
to this occurrence requirement, the policy thus applies only if damages claimed by the power
companies, the costs associated with the installation of equipment to contain further excess emis-
sions, constitute damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an accident,
event, or exposure to conditions. The clear and unmistakable import of the phrase "caused by" is
that the accident, event, or exposure to conditions must have preceded the damages claimed—
here, the costs of installing emission control equipment.

But what the power companies here claim to be covered, the installation costs for equip-
ment to prevent future emissions, is not caused by the happening of an accident, event, or expo-
sure to conditions but rather result from the prevention of such an occurrence. We cannot read
the policy requirement that covered damages result from the happening of an occurrence to mean
that coverage extends to damages that result from the prevention of an occurrence. Notwith-
standing our preference to construe ambiguous insurance policy language strictly and against the
insurer, we discern no ambiguity here that would permit the occurrence requirement reasonably
to be understood to allow coverage for damages in the form of installation costs for government-
mandated equipment intended to reduce future emissions of pollutants and to prevent future en-
vironmental harm.

As noted above, Indiana precedent holds that the undefined term "damages" in a compre-
hensive general liability policy "includes environmental cleanup and response costs." Travelers
Indem. Co., 715 N.E.2d at 934 (quoting Hartford v. Dana, 690 N.E.2d at 297-98). Each of these
cases, however, involve expenses related not to preventing emissions or discharges of environ-

11
In the 1984-85 policies, but not the 1999-2000 policy, this definitional phrase is followed by the lan-
guage: "which result in BODILY INJURY . . . or PROPERTY DAMAGE." Id. at 386, 413 (emphasis
added). In contrast, the 1999-2000 policy prefaces the definitional phrase by "with respect to BODILY
INJURY and PROPERTY DAMAGE" and adds the following words at the end of the definitional phrase:
"neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the INSURED." Id. at 447. These differences are
of no consequence to our analysis.

15
mental hazards that may be produced in the future but to the cleanup costs for prior environ-
mental damage or the containment costs to prevent release of existing hazardous substances.
The apparently broad declaration in Hartford v. Dana that damages could include costs "to pre-
vent further release of hazardous substances" must be construed in the context of the full sen-
tence in which it appears: "The cost of containment as a remedial action taken to prevent further
release of hazardous substances would be considered damages." 690 N.E.2d at 298 (emphasis
added).

We hold that "ultimate net loss," as used in the AEGIS insurance policies at issue, does
not impose upon AEGIS any responsibility to pay for sums that the power companies may be-
come legally obligated to pay as "ultimate net loss" for the costs of installing government man-
dated equipment intended to reduce future emissions of pollutants and to prevent resulting future
environmental harm. AEGIS is not thus responsible for the power companies' costs of defending
against claims or suits seeking to impose such liability.

The power companies' motion for partial summary judgment seeks an order requiring
AEGIS to pay all the defense costs the power companies incur in defending the federal lawsuit.
The motion for partial summary judgment is not limited to seeking costs incurred only in the de-
fense of any federal lawsuit claims seeking damages unrelated to equipment installation intended
to reduce future emissions. The power companies make no argument addressing the apportion-
ment of defense costs in the event the federal lawsuit seeks various relief, only some of which
would constitute damages and defense costs covered by the AEGIS policies. 12 Because the
power companies were not entitled to the relief sought in their motion for summary judgment,
we decline to find error in the trial court's decision to deny the motion.

Conclusion

12
Although the power companies argue that AEGIS is required to pay defense costs for potentially cov-
ered claims, this assertion does not address the apportionment of defense costs between covered and non-
covered claims for relief in the federal lawsuit. Rather, when speaking of potentially covered claims, the
power companies are referring to the AEGIS policies' separate obligation to provide defense costs,
regardless whether the federal plaintiffs are ultimately successful. Appellants' Br. at 9-13; Appellants'
Reply Br. at 20-25. We have addressed this issue supra, agreeing with the power companies.

16
 In this interlocutory appeal, the power companies are challenging the denial of their mo-
tion for partial summary judgment, which sought an order directing AEGIS to pay as incurred
the power companies' expenses in the defense of a federal lawsuit seeking primarily to compel
the companies to install equipment to reduce future emissions of pollutants and to prevent result-
ing future environmental harm. Because the AEGIS insurance policies do not provide coverage
for the costs of installing such equipment, the trial court did not err in denying partial summary
judgment seeking to compel payment of all costs incurred by the power companies in defending
all claims in the federal lawsuit. We affirm the trial court.

Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.

17