ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Robert W. Hammerle Steve Carter
Joseph M. Cleary Attorney General of Indiana
Hammerle & Allen
Indianapolis, Indiana George P. Sherman
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
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In the
Indiana Supreme Court
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No. 49S04-0510-CR-475
JERRY REYES,
Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA
Appellee (Defendant below).
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Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division Room 4
No. 49G04-0207-MR-193968
The Honorable Patricia J. Gifford, Judge
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On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A04-0406-CR-351
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June 14, 2006
Rucker, Justice.
Jerry Reyes seeks transfer from an opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming his sentence
for voluntary manslaughter as a Class B felony. He pleaded guilty to this offense and in
exchange the State dismissed a murder charge. The plea agreement provided in pertinent part
that, “[t]he sentence shall be within the range of ten to twenty years and will be determined by
the court at the sentencing hearing.” App. at 203. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Reyes to
twenty years—the maximum allowed under the agreement. On review Reyes raised three related
issues including whether his sentence was inappropriate within the meaning of Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B). The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court but declined to address
this latter issue. Citing Gist v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), and Mann v.
State, 742 N.E.2d 1025, 1026 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), the court held, “when a defendant’s plea
provides for a specific sentencing range, implicit in the defendant’s agreement is his concession
that a sentence within that range is appropriate.” Reyes v. State, 828 N.E.2d 420, 426 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005). In an opinion handed down today we disagreed with this proposition and held
instead that Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)
articulates a standard of review designed as guidance for appellate
courts. . . . Of course a defendant must persuade the appellate
court that his or her sentence has met this inappropriateness
standard of review. But to say that a defendant has acquiesced in
his or her sentence or has implicitly agreed that the sentence is
appropriate undermines in our view the scope of authority set forth
in Article VII, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution. We thus
disapprove of language in Gist, Mann, and their progeny providing
otherwise.
Childress v. State, No. 61S01-0510-CR-484, ___N.E.2d___, ___, slip op. at 9 (Ind. June 14,
2006). Accordingly, we proceed to address Reyes’ inappropriateness claim. Otherwise, we
summarily affirm the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides, “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by
statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Regarding
the nature of the offense, the presumptive sentence 1 is the starting point the Legislature has
selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Ruiz v. State, 818 N.E.2d 927, 929
(Ind. 2004); Lander v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1208, 1214-15 (Ind. 2002). The presumptive sentence
1
Subsequent to the date Reyes was sentenced the Legislature amended Indiana’s sentencing statutes to
provide for “advisory sentences” rather than “presumptive sentences.” See Pub. L. No. 71-2005, § 5
(codified at Ind. Code § 35-50-2-1.3) (2005)).
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(or now advisory sentence) for a Class B felony is ten years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-5. Although the
nature of the offense may justify a presumptive sentence under some circumstances, those
circumstances are not present here. The record shows that the victim’s killing was particularly
brutal. Reyes bludgeoned, strangled, and poisoned the victim in the sanctity of the victim’s own
home. Tr. at 10-11, 14. As for the character of the offender, Reyes is a medical doctor with no
criminal history. But he also led a clandestine life that among other things included extensive
use of illegal drugs. Indeed the victim, a sixty-two year old man, was a part of Reyes’ circle of
friends and Reyes used his friendship with the victim to gain access to his home. The record
shows that on the night of the killing Reyes went to the victim’s home to “settle a dispute” or
“reason with [him].” Tr. at 11, 13. And Reyes brought with him a syringe filled with a drug
later identified as doxepin. The autopsy performed on the victim revealed a needle puncture on
his right arm and a lethal dose of the drug in his system. The record supports a conclusion that
Reyes’ character can best be described as dishonest, secretive, and manipulative. We are not
persuaded that the nature of the offense or character of the offender justifies revising Reyes’
sentence.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.
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