ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ryan W. Redmon Steve Carter
Seymour, Indiana Attorney General
Joby Jerrells
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
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In the
Indiana Supreme Court
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No. 40S01-0602-CR-64
ROBERT TRIMBLE,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
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Appeal from the Jennings Superior Court, No. 40D01-0302-CM-116
The Honorable James Funke, Jr., Judge
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On Petition for Rehearing
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May 24, 2006
Boehm, Justice.
Trimble was convicted after a bench trial of cruelty to an animal, a Class B misdemeanor,
and harboring a non-immunized dog, a Class C infraction. The Court of Appeals reversed,
finding that the State’s evidence was gathered in violation of the federal and Indiana
constitutions. Trimble v. State, 816 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Because of this
disposition, the Court of Appeals did not address two other issues Trimble raised on appeal. We
granted transfer and affirmed the trial court’s finding that the evidence was not obtained in
violation of Trimble’s constitutional rights and was therefore admissible. Trimble v. State, 842
N.E.2d 798, 804 (Ind. 2006). Trimble seeks rehearing. He correctly points out that neither the
Court of Appeals nor this Court has addressed his other two issues.
Trimble first argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he abandoned or
neglected Butchie, a Doberman Pinscher left in his care. He does not challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain his conviction for harboring a non-immunized dog. As an appellate
court, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Wilson v. State,
770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002). If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the
conclusion of the trier of fact then the verdict will not be disturbed. Id. We believe that the
evidence of Butchie’s starved appearance, injured leg, and frost bitten extremities was sufficient
to allow the trial judge to discount Trimble’s testimony and infer that Trimble was responsible
for feeding and caring for Butchie, and that he failed to do so.
Trimble also argues that the trial court required him to prove his innocence in violation of
his due process rights. In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979), the Supreme Court
of the United States held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of a crime.
Trimble contends that comments from the trial judge after the State’s case-in-chief demonstrate
that the trial court placed the burden on him to prove his innocence of abandoning or neglecting
Butchie.
At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, and in response to Trimble’s motion for a
directed verdict, the trial judge expressed his “wavering” on whether Trimble knowingly or
intentionally tortured or mutilated Butchie and commented that Trimble would need to proffer
evidence to rebut the State’s claim of neglect. On appeal we presume that the trial court applied
the correct burden of proof onto the State. See Moran v. State, 622 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 1993).
In ruling on Trimble’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge acknowledged that the State
had offered sufficient evidence to prove Trimble’s guilt but said that he would reserve his
decision until after Trimble presented his defense. We do not take the trial court’s statement as
shifting the burden of proof from the State to Trimble. Rather, it simply expressed the
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conclusion that the evidence offered by the State in its case-in-chief was sufficient to deny a
directed verdict for the defendant and require the defense to put on its case.
Trimble’s Petition for Rehearing is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ. concur.
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