Corcoran v. State

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Susan K. Carpenter Steve Carter
Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Joanna McFadden Stephen R. Creason
Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

Laura L. Volk
Deputy Public Defender
Indianapolis, Indiana
______________________________________________________________________________

In the
Indiana Supreme Court
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No. 02S00-0508-PD-350

JOSEPH E. CORCORAN,
Appellant (Plaintiff below),

v.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Appellee (Defendant below).
_________________________________

Appeal from the Allen Superior Court, No. 02D04-9707-CF-465
The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Judge
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On Direct Appeal
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April 18, 2006

Sullivan, Justice.

Following proceedings that began in 2003 when Joseph Corcoran refused to sign a peti-
tion for post-conviction relief from his sentence of death and that were the subject of earlier deci-
sions of this Court, Corcoran changed his mind and in 2005 signed such a petition. The trial
judge dismissed this latter petition as not having been timely filed, a decision we affirm in this
opinion.

Background

Joseph Corcoran was convicted of four counts of murder in May, 1999, and sentenced to
death. He sought appellate review of his sentence, which was affirmed by this Court. Corcoran
v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 2002). His attorneys subsequently moved to initiate collateral re-
view, and thereafter, the post-conviction court submitted a case management schedule, which we
approved by order dated May 3, 2003, requiring Corcoran to file his petition for post-conviction
relief by September 9, 2003.

Corcoran’s counsel presented an unsigned petition for post-conviction relief on his behalf
on September 9, 2003. The petition went unsigned on Corcoran’s insistence that all efforts at
further appellate review on his behalf be abandoned. The post-conviction court rejected the peti-
tion on the basis of this defect but scheduled a hearing to determine Corcoran’s competency to
waive further review.

Corcoran was found to be competent at that hearing by the post-conviction court, a con-
clusion his counsel appealed to this Court. However, while pending our determination, Corcoran
changed his mind about seeking further review. He asked this Court to dismiss his appeal and
remand the matter to the post-conviction court for further proceedings there. We rejected his re-
quest to dismiss the appeal and went on to find him competent to waive further post-conviction
review. Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655, 662 (Ind. 2005). Without deciding the issue, we also
indicated that since Corcoran had failed to meet the deadline for filing a petition for post-
conviction relief set by the case management schedule, any future attempt would likely be con-
sidered time-barred. Corcoran v. State, 827 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. 2005).

Corcoran did subsequently tender a signed petition for post-conviction relief to the post-
conviction court on February 10, 2005, which that court dismissed as untimely. He then filed a

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notice of appeal and brief with this Court for our consideration. We affirm the decision of the
court below.

Discussion

Corcoran advances two arguments in his appeal to this Court. First, he contends that his
February, 2005, petition for post-conviction relief was timely and that the post-conviction court’s
dismissal was inappropriate as “it related back to the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed
September 9, 2003.” Br. of Appellant at 6. He also contends that the post-conviction court’s
dismissal of his petition violated his rights to equal protection and due process of law since he
was not given notice that his failure to file a signed petition on September 9, 2003, would fore-
close any further opportunities for collateral review and because he “was treated differently than
other civil litigants [when] the trial court dismissed his February 10, 2005 petition rather than
relating it back to the September 9, 2003 petition.” Id. at 14.

I

Corcoran initially contends that his signed February 10, 2005, petition is timely and “re-
late[s] back to the [unsigned] petition filed on September 9, 2003 because the two petitions con-
tained the same core of operative facts.” Id. at 5. He cites authority from the United States Su-
preme Court’s decision in Mayle v. Felix, 125 S.Ct. 2562, 2574 (2005), to assert “[s]o long as
the original and amended petitions state claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts,
relation back will be in order.” Corcoran’s argument and reliance on Felix for support is incor-
rect, however, in that any attempt to invoke the doctrine of relation back must be predicated on a
timely original petition. Corcoran’s relation back claim does not meet this threshold require-
ment.

A

Indiana’s doctrine of relation back is governed by Ind. Trial Rule 15(C). While our Trial
Rules generally only govern procedure and practice in civil cases, we have considered their ap-

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plicability in post-conviction proceedings on a case-by-case basis where the Indiana Rules of
Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies are silent. See, e.g., Van Meter v. State, 650 N.E.2d
1138 (Ind. 1995) (holding that T.R. 60(B) was inapplicable in post-conviction proceeding);
Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117 (Ind. 1995) (applying T.R. 52(A) in a post-conviction pro-
ceeding); State ex rel. Whitehead v. Madison Circuit Court, 626 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. 1993) (con-
cluding T.R. 76(B) was inapplicable to post-conviction proceeding); Mickens v. State, 596
N.E.2d 1379 (Ind. 1992) (finding that T.R. 59(G) was applicable in post-conviction proceeding).
Our analysis in this case will proceed without deciding whether Trial Rule 15(C) is applicable to
Post-Conviction proceedings.

Trial Rule 15(C) states, “[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended plead-
ing arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.” Since an
amended petition that is submitted after a statutory or court ordered deadline is reliant on a pro-
cedurally sound original petition, it then follows that an amended petition “will only be consid-
ered timely if the original pleading was timely.” Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc. v. Ind.
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 496 N.E.2d 1345, 1347 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). Stated differently, where
“there was no timely filing [of an original petition], there is nothing which an amended pleading
could relate back to.” Id. See also Comm’r Ind. Dep’t Envtl. Mgmt. v. Jennings Nw. Reg’l
Util., 760 N.E.2d 184, 187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Gary Cmty Mental Health Ctr.); Hoo-
sier Envtl. Council v. Dep’t Natural Res., 673 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (same),
transfer denied, 683 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. 1997). Thus, an amended petition must be predicated on a
timely filed original petition in addition to arising out of the same conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence as that originally proffered. Corcoran’s February 10, 2005 petition failed to meet this
standard.

Corcoran, as we have already noted, was required to file his petition for post-conviction
relief by September 9, 2003, in accordance with the trial court’s case management schedule,
which had been explicitly approved by this Court. Corcoran’s counsel instead submitted an un-
signed petition on September 9, 2003. Corcoran himself filed nothing; his counsel’s submission

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was not authorized by him. There simply was no original petition for the purpose of providing
the requisite predicate for an amended pleading.

Corcoran’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s Felix decision is misplaced. In Felix, peti-
tioner Jacoby Lee Felix filed a timely petition for federal habeas corpus relief. Five months after
the one-year time limit for filing for habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 United States Code section 2224(d)(1) had elapsed, Felix
filed an amended petition that added a new claim for relief. Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct. 2562, 66
(2005). He argued that his amended claim was timely as it related back to the original petition.

In point of fact, the Supreme Court rejected Felix’s argument on the basis that his
amended claims did not arise from a common core of operative facts as those asserted in his
original petition. Id. at 2571. To the extent relevant to Corcoran’s situation, the Court noted that
relation back is permissible only where “the claims added by amendment arise from the same
core facts as the timely filed claims. . . .” Id. (emphasis added).

Corcoran cannot rely on Felix. Corcoran did not file a petition for post-conviction relief.
Under that circumstance, no subsequent filing could relate back. Accordingly, we find that be-
cause Corcoran’s February 10, 2005 petition lacks a timely filed predicate, it has nothing to re-
late back to and does not invoke that doctrine.

B

The February 10, 2005 petition was not an amendment to the September 9, 2003, petition
at all but rather was an attempt by Corcoran to file an original petition. After a filing deadline
has elapsed, a party is not permitted to amend a petition to cure its procedural defects. See State
ex rel. Hodges v. Kosciusko Circuit Court, 402 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. 1980) (concluding that a peti-
tion could not be amended after its filing deadline had passed to correct defects). Corcoran was
given the opportunity to tender a signed petition to the post-conviction court on September 9,
2003. Corcoran’s failure to present a signed petition to the court on that date rendered any sub-

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sequent attempt untimely and ineffective for the purpose of further pursuing post-conviction re-
lief.

Corcoran argues that the post-conviction court’s actions at his December 19, 2003, com-
petency hearing indicate that the September 9, 2003, deadline provided for by the case manage-
ment schedule was not fixed and could be altered at that court’s discretion. At his December 19,
2003, hearing the post-conviction court offered Corcoran a final opportunity to sign a petition for
post-conviction relief, although he had missed the deadline set by the case management sched-
ule. On this basis, Corcoran asserts that the post-conviction court “gave the appearance that the
‘deadline’ to file the post-conviction petition was not unalterable.” Reply Br. of Appellant at 9.

It is true that under the terms of this Court’s case management order in this case, the post-
conviction court was given the authority to extend certain of the deadlines in the order, including
the September 9, 2003, filing deadline. (Counsel knew this. On August 27, 2003, Corcoran
sought a 30-day extension but the post-conviction court denied that request two days later.) In
that sense, the September 9 deadline might not have been “unalterable,” even after it had passed.
But even if the deadline could have been changed after it had passed, it would have been only for
good cause shown. No cause is given here other than Corcoran having changed his mind. For
the reasons given elsewhere in this and our prior opinion, that cause is not sufficient. The post-
conviction court properly dismissed Corcoran’s February 10, 2005, filing as untimely.

C

Alternatively, Corcoran asks this Court to now accept his petition as a successive petition
for post-conviction relief. We decline to do so for the same public policy reasons set forth in
Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655, 663-64 (Ind. 2005). Just as we concluded that the public in-
terest in achieving finality outweighs the benefits of mandating automatic post-conviction re-
view, we also find that the public interest in achieving finality in this case outweighs the benefit
of further review. We have afforded Corcoran considerable review of his sentence, see Corcoran
v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 2002) (“Corcoran II”); Corcoran v. State, 739 N.E.2d 649 (Ind.
2000) (“Corcoran I”), and the post-conviction court’s competency determination. See Corcoran

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v. State, 827 N.E.2d 542 (Ind. 2005) (“Corcoran IV”); Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655 (Ind.
2005) (“Corcoran III”). The public interest in achieving finality at this stage weighs heavily
against further review.

II

A

Corcoran’s due process and equal protection arguments do not require extended treat-
ment. In his due process claim, Corcoran argues he was denied his right to due process of law
because he had no notice of “new” procedural rules requiring a petition for post-conviction relief
to be filed by the date set forth in the case management schedule. We addressed this contention
in Corcoran IV stating:
There is nothing new about our holding that a person who seeks
post-conviction relief in a capital case must file a signed petition
by the date set forth in the case management schedule. This has
been the rule in our state for approximately 15 years. Ind. Crim.
Rule 24(H) (1990). Counsel’s action in this case—filing the un-
signed petition on the date set forth in the case management sched-
ule—indicates that they were well aware of the requirement.

Corcoran, 827 N.E.2d at 545. We continue to adhere to the above reasoning and conclusion.

B

Corcoran’s equal protection argument claims that he was denied this right and was
impermissibly “treated differently than other civil litigants [when] the trial court dismissed his
February 10, 2005 petition rather than relating it back to the September 9, 2003 petition.” Ap-
pellant’s Br. at 14. We find this assertion to be a restatement of Corcoran’s earlier relation back
argument discussed in Part I. As we have already determined that, under Indiana caselaw consis-
tently applied to other civil litigants, Corcoran’s February 10, 2005, petition could not relate
back to his unsigned September 9, 2003, petition under T.R. 15(C) for the reasons set forth su-
pra. Thus, we find no basis to his equal protection claim.

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 Conclusion

We affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of Joseph Corcoran’s February 10, 2005
petition for post-conviction relief. We hold that the February 10, 2005 petition does not relate
back to the unverified September 9, 2003 petition as the latter was not timely filed.

The Court takes judicial notice of the stay of Corcoran’s sentence entered by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana and so will not set an execution date at
this time, notwithstanding the requirements of Ind. Criminal Rule 24(H) and Indiana Code Sec-
tion 35-50-2-9.

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, and Boehm, JJ., concur. Rucker, J., dissents without separate opin-
ion.

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