ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
George C. Patrick Sharon Funcheon Murphy
Crown Point, IN Indianapolis, IN
______________________________________________________________________________
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________
No. 93S02-0511-EX-605
KRSTE PRENTOSKI,
Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
FIVE STAR PAINTING, INC.,
Appellee (Defendant below).
_________________________________
Appeal from the Full Worker’s Compensation Board, No. C-144134
_________________________________
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 93A02-0410-EX-815
_________________________________
November 23, 2005
Per curiam.
A Single Hearing Member of the Worker’s Compensation Board dismissed Krste Pren-
toski’s second application for adjustment of benefits after finding it untimely under Indiana Code
Section 22-3-3-27(c). That subsection provides, “[A]pplications for increased permanent partial
impairment are barred unless filed within one (1) year from the last day for which compensation
was paid[.]” Ind. Code § 22-3-3-27(c) (emphasis added). The Full Board affirmed. Later, the
Court of Appeals affirmed after agreeing the application was untimely because it was not filed
within one year after the last date for which compensation was paid, even though it was filed
within one year after the date on which Prentoski received a lump-sum payment from his em-
ployer’s insurance carrier for permanent partial impairment benefits that the Board determined
were owed to him. Prentoski v. Five Star Painting, Inc., 827 N.E.2d 98, 102-03 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005). Prentoski petitioned to transfer.
A long line of Court of Appeals opinions has interpreted the language in Indiana Code
Section 22-3-3-27(c) and similarly worded predecessor statutes to mean that the limitations pe-
riod begins running on the last date “for which” compensation was paid rather than on some
other date. See, e.g., Gibson v. Indus. Bd., 176 Ind. App. 489, 376 N.E.2d 502, 504 (1978)
(“[T]he Legislature did not choose a specified period of time after the date of the injury, or after
the date of the award, or after the last payment of compensation. . . . Rather, the Legislature
chose the last day for which compensation was paid.”); Lambert v. Powers, 76 Ind. App. 77, 131
N.E. 420, 421 (1921) (“Time for filing such application does not run from the date of the award
. . . but from the end of the compensation period fixed by the award.”). However, as Judge Sul-
livan notes in his concurring opinion, a few opinions have initially quoted the statute correctly
but then referred imprecisely to “the last date that [the employee] received” benefits under an
earlier award, Luz v. Hart Schaffner & Marx, 771 N.E.2d 1230, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans.
denied; or “‘the last day on which compensation was paid[.]’” Halteman Swim Club v. Duguid,
757 N.E.2d 1017, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Gregg v. Sun Oil Co., 180 Ind. App. 379,
388 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1979); Berry v. Anaconda Corp., 534 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989) (same).
To clarify, we agree the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the statute of limitations in the pre-
sent case correctly focused on the last date “for which” compensation was paid rather than the
last date “on which” compensation was paid. We therefore grant transfer, adopt that portion of
the opinion of the Court of Appeals that addresses the statute of limitations, and incorporate it by
reference. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(1). We summarily affirm the part of the opinion of the
Court of Appeals that addresses whether a hearing was required on Five Star’s motion to dismiss.
See App. R. 58(A)(2).
All Justices concur.
2
3