|Attorney for the respondent |Attorney for the Indiana Supreme Court|
|No appearance for the respondent |Disciplinary Commission |
| |Donald R. Lundberg, Executive |
| |Secretary |
| |Indianapolis, Indiana |
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________
No. 49S00-0401-DI-28
IN THE MATTER OF
CLIFTON BRUCE DAVIDSON, JR.,
Respondent.
________________________________
Disciplinary Action
________________________________
August 31, 2004
Per Curiam.
The Disciplinary Commission has charged the respondent, Clifton Bruce
Davidson, Jr., with six counts of attorney misconduct. Specifically, the
Commission alleges that clients hired the respondent to represent them in
various matters for which he accepted retainers and/or filing fees. After
taking his clients’ money, the respondent took little or no action on his
clients’ behalves and failed to respond to their inquiries about their
cases. Ultimately, the respondent abandoned his law practice. Today we
find, as did the hearing officer, that the respondent violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law and for this misconduct should be
disbarred.
This action began on March 17, 2004, when the Disciplinary Commission
filed a Verified Complaint for Disciplinary Action pursuant to Ind.
Admission and Discipline Rule 23(12). This Court appointed a hearing
officer pursuant to Admis.Disc.R. 23(11)(b) to hear this matter. The
respondent failed to appear or to answer the Verified Complaint and on May
23, 2004, the Commission filed an Affidavit and Application for Judgment on
the Complaint, pursuant to Admis.Disc.R. 23(14)(c). Pursuant to that
pleading, the hearing officer filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on May 26, 2004. The hearing officer’s report is now before us for final
resolution as the final arbiters of misconduct and sanction. Matter of
Morris, 656 N.E.2d 257 (Ind. 1995).
In related proceedings, on January 15, 2004, the Commission filed a
Verified Emergency Petition for Order of Interim Suspension pursuant to
Admis.Disc.R. 23(11.1) and a Verified Petition to Show Cause Why the
Respondent Should Not be Suspended for Failure to Cooperate with the
Disciplinary Process. This Court suspended the respondent on an interim
emergency basis on March 26, 2004, and suspended the respondent on May 10,
2004 for his failure to cooperate with the disciplinary process. Both of
these suspensions remain in effect.
The respondent’s admission to this state’s bar in 2001 confers
disciplinary jurisdiction over this matter. Under Count 1 of the Verified
Compliant, we now find that a client hired the respondent in July 2003 to
file a discrimination suit against her employer and her union. Pursuant to
a written attorney services contact, she paid the respondent $150 for the
filing fee. The respondent neither filed suit nor responded to the
client’s numerous subsequent letters inquiring as to the status of the
contemplated action. The client scheduled a meeting with the respondent at
his office in November 2003, but the respondent cancelled the meeting.
Under Count 2, we find that in October 2003, a client hired the
respondent to handle an employment discrimination matter. The client paid
the respondent $800 towards a $1,500 retainer. The respondent did not file
suit as requested by the client. Thereafter, the client was unable to
contact the respondent, even to pay the balance of the retainer.
Under Count 3, we find that a client hired the respondent in July
2003 to handle a domestic relations matter. The client agreed to pay a $400
non-refundable retainer fee and $200 per hour for the respondent’s services
pursuant to a written fee agreement. The respondent filed a dissolution
action on August 15, 2003. Thereafter, the client was unable to reach the
respondent for information about his case and in January 2004, discovered
the respondent had abandoned his law office.
Under Count 4, we find that in March 2003, a client hired the
respondent to handle an employment claim against the United States Postal
Service. The client paid the respondent a $2,000 non-refundable retainer
fee. Afterwards, the respondent did not file suit on the client’s behalf
and did not communicate with the client about the status of the case. In
December 2003, the client wrote to the respondent demanding a refund of his
money, but the respondent failed to respond.
Under Count 5, we find that a client hired the respondent in
September 2003 to handle a claim against a fellow employee and the client’s
employer. The client paid a $1,000 non-refundable retainer fee. After
hiring the respondent, the client was unsuccessful in attempts to contact
the respondent and the respondent did not communicate with the client.
Under Count 6, we find that in June of 2002, a client hired the
respondent to pursue a wage claim against his employer. The respondent
filed suit in September 2003. Court records indicate no further activity
thereafter and reflect that a summons was never filed. In November 2003,
the respondent notified the client that the employer would be sending a
check to settle the wage claim. The respondent’s representation that the
claim was settled was false. The client did not receive a settlement check
and the employer never paid any funds to settle the client’s claim. The
client has been unable to contact the respondent since his case was filed.
We find further that sometime during November of 2003 the respondent
abandoned his law office without notifying his clients and without leaving
contact information for his clients. On January 16, 2004, the Commission
filed a verified petition pursuant to Admis.Disc.R. 23(27) seeking the
appointment of an attorney to inventory the respondent’s files and take
such action as appropriate to protect the interests of the respondent and
his clients. The respondent failed to appear or contest the proceedings
and on January 23, 2004, the Marion Circuit Court appointed a Reviewing
Master to take possession of and inventory the respondent’s client files.
We find that, by his misconduct in Counts 1-6, the respondent
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence in
representing his clients; 1.4(a) by failing to keep his clients reasonably
informed about the status on their cases and not responding to their
reasonable requests for information; Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(b) by failing to
explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit his clients to
make informed decisions regarding representation; Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(d) by
terminating representation of his clients without taking steps reasonably
practicable to protect his clients’ interests; Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) by
committing criminal acts, to wit: theft and/or conversion by receiving
client funds for a filing fee and legal services and retaining the money
without filing suit or performing legal services; and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c)
by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation.
Having found misconduct, we must now assess an appropriate sanction.
In so doing, we examine the nature of the misconduct, the actual or
potential injury flowing from the misconduct, the respondent’s state of
mind, the duty of this Court to preserve the integrity of the profession,
the potential injury to the public in permitting the respondent to continue
in the profession, and any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Matter
of Drozda, 653 N.E.2d 991(Ind.1995). The hearing officer recommended that
the respondent be disbarred.
The respondent engaged in a serious pattern of neglect of his clients
and eventually abandoned his practice altogether. In so doing, he converted
clients’ retainer fees and filing fees. Disbarment is appropriate in
instances of knowing conversion of client funds where the client is harmed
or where a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct involving fraud or
theft. American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
4.1, 4.61, 5.11. Disbarment has been imposed where lawyers serially
neglected client matters and where lawyers engaged in patterns of deception
and conversion of client funds. See e.g. Matter of Jarrett, 657 N.E.2d 106
(Ind.1995) (disbarment for pattern of dereliction of duty, abandonment of
client's interests and blatant disregard of financial responsibilities),
Matter of Good, 632 N.E.2d 719 (Ind.1994) (disbarment for conflict of
interest, failure to preserve client's property, dishonesty, fraud and
deceit), Matter of Meacham, 630 N.E.2d 564 (Ind.1994) (disbarment for
continuing pattern of intentionally deceptive conduct designed to convert
clients' money to attorney's own use), Matter of Williams, 764 N.E.2d 613
(Ind.2002) (six counts of client neglect, along with failure to cooperate
with the Commission), Matter of Radford, 746 N.E.2d 977 (Ind.2001) (14
counts of neglect of client matters and willful deception of clients).
The respondent in the present case absconded with his client’s money,
abandoned his practice without warning, and failed to respond to any of the
subsequent disciplinary proceedings. For the protection of the public and
to ensure the integrity of the bar, we find that the respondent’s
misconduct deserves the most severe punishment and that he should be
disbarred.
It is, therefore, ordered that the respondent, Clifton Bruce Davidson,
Jr., is hereby disbarred. The Clerk is directed to strike his name from the
Roll of Attorneys.
The Clerk of this Court is further directed to provide notice of this
order in accordance with Admis.Disc.R. 23(3)(d), and to the Hon. Robert W.
Freese, and to provide the clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, the clerk of each of the United States District Courts
of this state, and the clerks of the United States Bankruptcy Courts in
this state with the last know address of the respondent as reflected in the
records of the Clerk.
Costs of this proceeding are assessed against the respondent.
All Justices concur.