Attorney for Appellant Attorney for Appellee
Aric J. Rutkowski Aladean M. DeRose
The Blanford Law Office South Bend,
Indiana
South Bend, Indiana
____________________________________________________________________________
__
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
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No. 71S05-0312-JV-597
In Re The Paternity of A.B.
Lisa Marie Pedraza,
Appellant (Petitioner below),
v.
Brian Gasperson,
Appellees (Respondent below).
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Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate Court, No. 71J01-0208-JP-635
The Honorable Peter J. Nemeth, Judge
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On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 71A05-0302-
JV-93
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August 26, 2004
Dickson, Justice.
This appeal challenges the trial court's dismissal of a paternity
action for lack of personal jurisdiction over the alleged father. In a
memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded.
We granted transfer and now affirm the trial court.
The mother, Lisa Marie Pedraza, filed a petition to establish
paternity, child support, and parenting time, alleging Brian Gasperson was
the biological father of her infant child, A.B. The alleged father filed a
motion to dismiss, alleging lack of in personam jurisdiction. In its order
granting the motion, the trial court summarized the relevant facts as
follows:
The facts are without dispute. Mr. Gasperson has never had
contact with the State of Indiana. [A.B.] was not conceived here nor
was she born here. She does, however, live here now and has lived
here for more than six months. Mr. Gasperson has never visited
nor lived in Indiana.
Appellant's Appendix at 4.[1] The trial court held that, although it had
subject matter jurisdiction to decide paternity cases, and the authority to
hear this case because Indiana was A.B.'s home state under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Law ("UCCJL"), Ind. Code § 31-17-3-3, it did not
have personal jurisdiction over the alleged father, a non-resident of this
state, because of the absence of sufficient minimal contacts required by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Indiana Trial Rule
4.4.
In her appeal, the mother does not challenge the trial court's factual
findings but contends that the trial court properly had jurisdiction to
issue an order establishing paternity and to determine custody and
parenting time by reason of the UCCJL because A.B. had been an Indiana
resident for more than six months and that it is in the child's best
interest for the trial court to assume jurisdiction. Citing Matter of
Paternity of Robinaugh, 616 N.E.2d 409 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), she urges that
her paternity action, as a proceeding relating to custody and the
adjudication of status, is an exception to the minimum contacts requirement
normally associated with personal jurisdiction. The mother presents no
argument that she complied with Indiana Trial Rule 4.4, which specifies the
grounds for Indiana courts to exercise jurisdiction over non-residents.
In Robinaugh, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a mother's
motion to dismiss an Indiana paternity action filed by the alleged
biological father seeking to establish his paternity and for custody of an
infant child. Acknowledging that the child was born and remained a
resident of Indiana, the mother asserted that both she and the alleged
father were residents of Arizona where she became pregnant with the child.
She argued that Indiana did not have personal jurisdiction over her because
her single venture into Indiana to give birth to the child did not satisfy
the "minimum contacts" requirements of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Because
custody was being sought in the paternity action, the Court of Appeals held
that the action was subject to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Law,
and stated: "[c]ustody proceedings are adjudications of status, and as such
are an exception to the minimum contacts requirements normally associated
with discussions of personal jurisdiction." Robinaugh, 616 N.E.2d at 411.
Because transfer was not sought, we did not review this opinion.
Five years later, however, we decided Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d
1152, 1154 (Ind. 1998), a paternity action, and held that a judgment
entered without minimum contacts violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. We stated:
A court simply has no power over persons who have no contact with
their territory, unless and until there is a response or an appearance
and the lack of personal jurisdiction is not protested. Accordingly,
if Stidham is correct that no minimum contacts existed, then the
Indiana trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him and
its effort to exer-
cise that power was a nullity.
Id. at 1155. Robinaugh was not discussed in Stidham.
We further note that the UCCJL does not expressly refer to paternity
actions but arguably applies to them as proceedings relating to custody and
the adjudication of status. In contrast, however, the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act ("UIFSA"), enacted in 1997, explicitly applies to
proceedings "to determine paternity," Ind. Code § 31-18-2-1, and permits an
Indiana tribunal to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only
upon satisfaction with eight enumerated conditions intended to satisfy due
process requirements.[2] Id.
Even if we did not have the clarification provided by the UISFA
regarding in personam jurisdiction in paternity cases, the UCCJL cannot be
deemed to supersede the due process protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Upon this issue, Robinbaugh was incorrectly decided. We note,
however, that the facts presented in Robinaugh would likely support Indiana
jurisdiction under the UISFA in the event the mother had "resided in
Indiana with the child" or if "the child resides in Indiana as a result of
the acts or directives of the [mother]." Ind. Code § 31-18-2-1(3), (5).
In the present case, the trial court concluded:
Before an Indiana court can exercise jurisdiction of a nonresident, a
plaintiff must satisfy both the long-arm statute, Ind. Trial Rule 4.4
and due process. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that certain minimum contacts exist between a nonresident
defendant and a plaintiff before personal jurisdiction is proper.
Although even merely engaging in sexual intercourse leading to
conception is a sufficient contact in a paternity suit to confer
personal jurisdiction under T.R. 4.4 and due process, a contact even
this minimal is lacking here. For this reason, then, Respondent's
motion to
dismiss is granted.
Appellant's Appendix at 5-6 (citations omitted). The trial court was
correct.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] In greater detail, the facts are that A.B. was conceived in
Missouri where the mother and the alleged father were both employed. The
mother moved to Indiana, and A.B. was born in St. Joseph County, Indiana.
For a brief time thereafter, the mother and A.B. resided in Niles,
Michigan, but soon returned to St. Joseph County, Indiana. In August of
2001 the mother filed a paternity action in Missouri. In August, 2002, the
mother dismissed the Missouri action and filed this paternity action in St.
Joseph County, Indiana. At the time she filed this appeal, the mother's
Appellant's Case Summary indicates that she resides in St. Louis, Missouri.
The alleged father is a resident of Texas.
[2] The UIFSA, Ind. Code § 31-18-2-1, provides:
In a proceeding…an Indiana tribunal may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident individual or the individual's guardian or
conservator if:
1) the individual is personally served with notice in Indiana;
2) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of Indiana by:
A) consent;
B) entering an appearance, except for the purpose of
contesting jurisdiction; or
C) filing a responsive document having the effect of
waiving contest to personal jurisdiction;
3) the individual resided in Indiana with the child;
4) the individual resided in Indiana and has provided prenatal
expenses or support for the child;
5) the child resides in Indiana as a result of the acts or directives
of the individual;
6) the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in Indiana and the
child:
A) has been conceived by the act of intercourse; or
B) may have been conceived by the act of intercourse if
the proceeding is to establish paternity;
7) the individual asserted paternity of the child in the putative
father registry administered by the state department of health
under IC 31-19-5; or
8) there is any other basis consistent with the Constitution of the
State of Indiana and the Constitution of the United States for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.