ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David C. Kolbe Steve Carter
Warsaw, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
David L. Steiner
Deputy Attorney General of
Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
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|ENDRES, Ben, | |)| | |
| | |)| |Supreme Court Cause No. |
| | |)| |50S05-0405-CV-_____ |
|Appellant, | |)| | |
| | |)| | |
|v. | |)| | |
| | |)| |Court of Appeals Cause No. |
|INDIANA STATE POLICE, | |)| |50A05-0210-CV-477 |
| | |)| | |
|Appellee. | | | | |
| | | | | |
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APPEAL FROM THE MARSHALL SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Robert O. Bowen, Judge
Cause No. 50D01-0105-MI-9
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ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
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June 2, 2004
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Per Curiam.
Indiana State Trooper Ben Endres (“Endres”) refused to accept an
assignment as a gaming agent at a riverboat casino, asserting that the
assignment would conflict with his religious convictions. The Indiana
State Police ("State Police") then terminated his employment, and the
Indiana State Police Board (“Police Board”) upheld the termination.
Endres filed a civil action in federal district court against the
State Police, asserting, among other things, that his termination violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
This case reached the United States Circuit Court for the Seventh Circuit,
which determined, among other things, that Endres failed to state a claim
under Title VII. See Endres v. Indiana State Police, 334 F.3d 618 (7th
Cir.2003), reh’g denied with opinion, 349 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied.
Meanwhile, Endres also sought judicial review of the Police Board’s
decision in the Marshall Superior Court, which upheld Endres’s termination.
Endres appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. See Endres v.
Indiana State Police, 794 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so,
the Court of Appeals first concluded that the disposition of his federal
action precluded Endres from relitigating his Title VII claim in this state
court action. See id. at 1093-94. The Court of Appeals also concluded that
his employment termination did not violate his State constitutional right
to religious freedom. See id. at 1094-97. Endres has petitioned this
Court to grant transfer of jurisdiction from the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. See Ind. Appellate Rule 57. We now grant transfer and
assume jurisdiction over this appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A),
With regard to the Title VII claim, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that parties are collaterally estopped from raising issues in state court
that have been finally determined as to the same parties in previous
federal actions. See Endres, 794 N.E.2d at 1094, citing City of Anderson
v. Davis, 743 N.E.2d 359, 365-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied, and
Mendenhall v. City of Indianapolis, 717 N.E.2d 1218, 1225 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999), trans. denied. We summarily affirm the Court of Appeals on this
issue.
With regard to his State constitutional claim, we note, as did the
Court of Appeals, that the appendix submitted by Endres is incomplete and
that there is nothing in the materials submitted by either party to
indicate that Endres offered any legal argument in support of his State
constitutional claim until he filed his motion to correct error in the
trial court. See Endres, 794 N.E.2d at 1091 n.1 and 1094. The Court of
Appeals took the position that, as a matter of “notice pleading,” Endres’s
assertion in his initial complaint that his discharge constituted “a
violation of the United States Constitution and Indiana Constitution each
guaranteeing religious freedom and the free exercise thereof” was
sufficient for Endres to preserve the constitutional issue for review on
appeal.
We find that the mere listing of a contention in a party’s complaint,
with no further attempt to press the contention in the trial court, is
insufficient effort to preserve the matter for appellate review. At a
minimum, a party must show that it gave the trial court a bona fide
opportunity to pass upon the merits of the claim before seeking an opinion
on appeal. The policy reasons behind this requirement—preservation of
judicial resources, opportunity for full development of the record,
utilization of trial court fact-finding expertise, and assurance of a claim
being tested by the adversary process—apply with particular force where, as
here, the claim is a constitutional one. See generally Chidester v. City
of Hobart, 631 N.E.2d 908, 913 (Ind. 1994) (mere “mention” rather than
“debate” of constitutional issues insufficient to preserve the issues for
appellate review, quoting Stilz v. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515, 524 (1877)).
We therefore decline to address this issue because the record and arguments
have not been sufficiently developed for us to decide this important issue
of Indiana constitutional law. See Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 752
(Ind. 2000).
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, BOEHM, AND RUCKER, JJ., concur.