Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee
Timothy J. O’Connor Steve Carter
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General
Cynthia Ploughe
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________
No. 49S04-0305-CR-209
Rita D. Thompson,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellees (Plaintiff below).
_________________________________
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49F09-0102-DF-036615
The Honorable Evan Goodman, Judge
_________________________________
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A04-0205-
CR-215
_________________________________
March 23, 2004
Shepard, Chief Justice.
Rita Thompson was convicted of residential entry. She admits
committing the crime but argues that she presented uncontroverted expert
evidence that she was legally insane at the time and therefore should have
been found not guilty by reason of insanity. We conclude that, as with
other evidence presented by either the State or the defense, a finder of
fact is entitled to decide whether to credit the opinions of experts on
insanity. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
Facts
Thompson does have a history of mental illness, a fact that manifested
itself on February 12, 2001, when she went to the home of family friend
Alisha Beeler to use the bath. After some time in the house, Thompson
began to talk strangely to the children. Beeler knew Thompson was mentally
ill, and when Thompson later went to her car for some bath items, Beeler
locked the door behind her. When Thompson came back to the door, Beeler
told her to leave. Thompson became irate and began kicking the door and
then the window. The window broke, and Thompson entered the house by
climbing through it. Thompson and Beeler exchanged words, then Thompson
collected her things and departed through the front door.
When police arrived at the scene, Thompson was driving away in her own
vehicle. Officers stopped her and obtained her general information but
then released her as only a suspect. Meanwhile, another officer
interviewed Beeler and learned the foregoing facts. Thompson then
telephoned Beeler several times, threatening to “shoot up” Beeler and her
house. Thompson was taken into custody at her home about an hour and a
half after the initial incident.
The State charged Thompson with residential entry, a class D felony,
Ind. Code Ann.
§ 35-43-2-1.5 (West 1998). She was released on bond and subsequently
committed acts on February 14 that led to her being charged with one count
of battery, a class C felony, and three counts of criminal recklessness,
class D felonies. These charges were tried in a separate case docketed in
a different courtroom.
In this case, Thompson pled not guilty by reason of insanity and
waived her right to a jury trial. The parties submitted the matter to the
trial judge on the basis of stipulated evidence. The evidence included (1)
a stipulation to the truth of the facts as stated in the probable cause
affidavit, including that Thompson committed the charged acts, (2) the
reports of the court-appointed psychiatrists that were prepared for the
trial resulting from Thompson’s acts on February 14, and (3) documents from
previous emergency detention and commitment proceedings unrelated to these
events.
The court found Thompson guilty but mentally ill and sentenced her to
the maximum three years. Thompson appealed the trial court’s rejection of
her insanity defense, and the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that in
the absence of evidence to contradict Thompson’s expert testimony, she was
entitled to an acquittal. Thompson v. State, 782 N.E.2d 451 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003). We granted transfer.
Proof of Insanity
Because Thompson admits to committing the alleged offense, the only
issue before us is whether the record supported the trial court’s finding
that Thompson was guilty but mentally ill rather than not guilty by reason
of insanity.
Pursuant to Indiana Code Annotated § 35-41-3-6 (West 1998), “A person
is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result
of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness
of the conduct at the time of the offense.” The section defines “mental
disease or defect” as “a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly
and demonstrably impairs a person’s perception, but the term does not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful or antisocial
conduct.” Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-3-6(b).
The “insanity defense” is an affirmative defense for which the burden
of proof is on the defendant. The State must prove the offense, including
mens rea, beyond a reasonable doubt but need not disprove insanity. Ind.
Code Ann. § 35-41-4-1 (West 1998). “This Court has held that although the
State is required to prove the defendant committed the act ‘knowingly’ this
is not tantamount to requiring the State to prove that the defendant was
‘sane.’” Lyon v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1368, 1370 (Ind. 1993). As we said
more recently:
[A]lthough [the defendant] offered evidence of mental illness,
the State has no obligation to offer evidence which disproves
mental illness in order to meet its burden of proving [the
defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. To require the
State to disprove mental illness would shift the burden of proof
of insanity, controverting the General Assembly's placement of
that burden on the defendant.
Garner v. State, 704 N.E.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Ind. 1998) (citations omitted).
To avoid responsibility for the crime proven by the State, the defendant
must establish the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code
Ann. § 35-41-4-1(b).
Whether or not a defendant can appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct is a question for the trier of fact. A convicted defendant who
claims his insanity defense should have prevailed at trial is in the
position of one appealing from a negative judgment, and we will reverse
only when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion
that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed. Robinette v.
State, 741 N.E.2d 1162 (Ind. 2001); Rogers v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind.
1987). We will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of
witnesses but will consider only the evidence most favorable to the
judgment and the reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Metzler v. State, 540 N.E.2d 606 (Ind. 1989).
Although expert “opinions provide a strong justification for raising
the insanity defense, we have never held expert testimony to be
conclusive.” Cate v. State, 644 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind. 1994). Cases like
Thompson’s have often turned on the proposition that the trier of fact is
free to disregard the testimony of experts and rely upon the testimony of
lay witnesses. Garner, 704 N.E.2d at 1014; Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60,
63-64 (Ind. 1995); Rogers, 514 N.E.2d at 1261. Indeed, we have noted that
testimony regarding behavior before, during, and after a crime may be more
indicative of actual mental health at time of the crime than mental exams
conducted weeks or months later. Barany, 658 N.E.2d at 64.
Conflicting lay testimony is not required, however, for the trier of
fact to reject expert testimony. As a general rule, factfinders are not
required to believe a witness’s testimony even when it is uncontradicted.
If judges and juries can disbelieve uncontradicted testimony about facts,
they are surely entitled to decide whether to accept or reject testimony
that represents a witness’s opinion. The psychiatrists’ reports in this
case merely offer their opinions about Thompson’s state of mind two days
after she committed the crime at issue. As it happens, the trial judge to
whom these opinions and the remainder of the evidence were submitted is
among the most knowledgeable of Indiana’s judicial officers on mental
health matters. He was not persuaded, and we can think of little reason to
second-guess that judgment.
The State contends that “non-medical evidence of [Thompson’s] sanity”
could be “gleaned from the affidavit.” (Appellee’s Br. 5.) Specifically,
it cites Thompson’s removal of only her own possessions from Beeler’s home
as indicating her “awareness of the propriety of taking only what belonged
to her” and hence her “awareness of right and wrong.” Id. It further
argues that because the officers who stopped Thompson when she was leaving
the scene “felt comfortable releasing her,” they must have felt “she was
sufficiently lucid to be allowed to go about her business.” Id. The Court
of Appeals rejected the State’s argument, correctly stating that “in
reviewing the judgment, we review only the ‘reasonable inferences’ to be
drawn from the facts” and finding that there were other “more reasonable”
inferences that could be drawn from those facts. Thompson, 782 N.E.2d at
454 (citation omitted).
The question, however, is whether the inferences supporting the
judgment were reasonable, not whether there were other “more reasonable”
inferences that could have been made. “Reaching alternative inferences
such as this is a function of the trier of fact, not this Court. We cannot
reverse the conviction merely because this inference is a plausible one
that might have been drawn from the evidence.” Askew v. State, 439 N.E.2d
1350, 1352 (Ind. 1982). As we said in Metzler v. State:
Triers of fact determine not only the facts presented to them
and their credibility, but any reasonable inferences from facts
established either by direct or circumstantial evidence. It is
not necessary that the court find the circumstantial evidence
excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. It need only
be demonstrated that inferences may reasonably be drawn which
support the finding of guilt.
540 N.E.2d at 610 (citations omitted).
In Cate, we upheld the jury’s determination that the defendant was not
legally insane despite unanimous expert testimony to the contrary, saying
that the evidence was not uncontroverted because the defendant’s lucidity
after his arrest, conflicting claims about his motivation, and an incentive
to lie provided “at least the minimal evidentiary justification [necessary]
for the jury to find him sane enough to be held legally accountable for his
actions.” 644 N.E.2d at 548. Similarly, in this case two experts
submitted reports indicating that they believed that, due to her mental
illness, Thompson could not appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions when
she kicked in Beeler’s window and entered the house. The trial judge was
not persuaded by these opinions, however, in light of the rest of the
record. When Thompson was released from the hospital on February 9, only
days before the incident, she had no active psychotic symptoms, no
homicidal or suicidal ideations, and was calm and pleasant without
agitation. (Tr. at 12).
The trier of fact was entitled to prefer this evidence to psychiatric
examinations conducted weeks or months later. In the course of the
sentencing hearing, the judge provided some insight into why he did so. He
cited Thompson’s history of avoiding criminal responsibility through her
illness, her conflicting stories about what happened to her medication, her
decision to use illegal drugs and drink alcohol while on her medication,
and lies she told one of the examining psychiatrists regarding that use of
drugs and alcohol. The judge had concluded that she knew her actions were
wrong but was using her illness to manipulate the system. (Tr. at 39-44).
“The evidence on the issue of insanity clearly was in conflict and
did not lead inexorably to a single conclusion.” Rogers, 514 N.E.2d at
1261. We find that based on the evidence presented, the trier of fact
could have found that Thompson was mentally ill but able to distinguish
right from wrong.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court.
Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
Sullivan, J., concurs with separate opinion.
Sullivan, Justice, concurring.
This case has some history that I think is worth reciting. As the
majority opinion says, the expert opinions in this case were unanimous that
Rita Thompson was insane when she committed the crimes at issue here.[1]
The Court of Appeals found this evidence "uncontradicted" and reversed her
conviction. 782 N.E.2d 451 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
On the same day that the Court of Appeals decided Thompson's appeal,
the same panel of the Court of Appeals also rendered an opinion in the case
of Michael L. Moler, Moler v. State, 782 N.E.2d 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
trans. denied 792 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. 2003). As in Thompson, the expert
opinions in Moler's case were unanimous that he was insane when he
committed the crimes at issue. However, there was also lay evidence in
Moler that contradicted the experts' opinions. The Court of Appeals
reluctantly rejected Moler's claim that because the experts' opinions that
he was insane were uncontradicted, there was insufficient evidence to
convict him. I say reluctantly because the Court of Appeals said in Moler:
Barany [v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. 1995)], has made it very
difficult even for defendants with well-documented mental illnesses to
successfully raise the insanity defense. Under the rule of Barany,
even if all expert testimony regarding a defendant's state of mind
points to the fact that the defendant could not have appreciated the
wrongfulness of his actions at the time of a crime, the jury is free
to disregard the experts' opinions in favor of lay evidence of the
defendant's demeanor before and after the crime.
782 N.E.2d at 454. Barany was still another case where the expert opinions
were unanimous that Barany was insane when he committed the crimes at
issue. But like Moler, there was lay evidence that contradicted the
experts' opinions. Based on all the evidence presented, Justice DeBruler's
opinion said:
The jury could have decided that this testimony about appellant's
behavior was more indicative of his actual mental health at the time
of the killing than medical
examinations conducted four weeks after the arrest. Given this
conflicting evidence, we will not invade the jury's fact-finding
province.
658 N.E.2d at 64.
It is probably not coincidence that the same panel of the Court of
Appeals decided two cases involving exactly the same issues on exactly the
same day, one in favor of the State and the other in favor of the
defendant. The Court of Appeals likely expected petitions to transfer with
respect to both cases to reach our Court at the same time. However, Moler
reached our court and we disposed of it (denying Moler's petition to
transfer by vote of 3-2) prior to receiving the petition to transfer in
Thompson. At such, we did not consider them together.
Moler, of course, constituted a direct request by the Court of Appeals
for us to constrict the rule of Barany. Because a vote to deny a petition
for transfer does not constitute a vote on the merits, that issue remained
open even after Moler's petition to transfer was denied. But today we
unambiguously reaffirm the rule of Barany.
There may be a temptation to read into today's opinion -- because we
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals -- a suggestion that Barany
has been expanded and that psychiatric testimony is even less weighty than
before. I do not believe that to be the Court's intent. It seems to me
that the law would require us, even under today's opinion, to set aside a
conviction where (1) there was unanimous credible, expert testimony that a
defendant was insane at the time of the crime at issue and (2) there was no
other evidence of probative value from which a conflicting inference could
be drawn. Said differently, there will be insufficient evidence to convict
where (1) there is unanimous credible, expert testimony that a defendant is
insane at the time of the crime at issue and (2) there is no other evidence
of probative value from which a conflicting inference can be drawn. But we
find that there was such evidence here.
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[1] The majority says that the "psychiatrists' reports in this case merely
offer their opinions about Thompson's state of mind two days after she
committed the crime at issue." The Court of Appeals held that the state
had stipulated that the reports were "equally applicable" to the date of
the crime.