ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
JOHN P. WILSON STEVE CARTER
Wilson, Green & Cecere Attorney General of Indiana
Greenwood, Indiana
ROBIN HODAPP-GILLMAN
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
_______________________________________________________
FERNANDO C. GRIFFITH )
)
Appellant (Defendant Below) )
)
v. ) Supreme Court Cause No.
) 41S00-0109-CR-438
STATE OF INDIANA )
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below) )
____________________________________________________________________________
__
DIRECT APPEAL FROM THE JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable K. Mark Loyd, Judge
Cause No. 41C01-0005-CF-00114
May 16, 2003
SHEPARD, Chief Justice
While in police custody, appellant Fernando Griffith confessed that he
burglarized the residence of Lloyd and Judy Georges, murdered the couple,
and set fire to their home. He contends that his confession should have
been suppressed because the authorities were tardy in presenting him to a
magistrate after his arrest.
We agree that this delay exceeded acceptable limits, but conclude that
the trial court correctly declined to suppress the confession, which was
given well after Griffith’s initial court appearance, during an interview
which he requested.
Statement of the Facts and Procedural History
The Greenwood Fire Department responded to a fire at the home of
Lloyd and Judy Georges early on May 19, 2000. Investigators discovered the
bodies of Lloyd and Judy, and autopsies confirmed that stab wounds were the
cause of death. Investigators further determined the fire was
intentionally set with an accelerant. Jewelry was missing from the house
along with Lloyd’s wallet. The Georges’ car was also missing from the
garage.
The Greenwood police learned that a witness saw a black male carrying
a gas can in the front yard of the Georges’ house and walking into the
front door of their home. A neighbor informed police that he saw the
Georges’ car pulling out of their garage the same morning around 5:05 a.m.
The police found the car ablaze a few days later and ruled it arson because
accelerant was used to fuel the fire.
Assisting the Greenwood Police, Indianapolis Officer Jack Tindall and
Detective Thomas Richard Tudor went to Griffith’s apartment building around
10:15 p.m. on May 21st, where they noticed that Griffith smelled of burnt
smoke and had band-aids on his hands and fingers. At Detective Tudor’s
direction, Officer Tindall transported Griffith to the Greenwood Police
Department where Officer John Laut noticed the strong smoke odor and the
band-aids while booking Griffith. Upon further inspection, Laut found one
of Lloyd’s rings in Griffith’s pocket. Griffith was arrested between 10:20
p.m. and 11:10 p.m.
Greenwood Detective Patti Cummings directed Officer Tindall to bring
Griffith to the interrogation room for questioning. When Griffith arrived,
Detective Cummings advised him of his Miranda rights during the early
morning hours of May 22. Griffith was held at the Greenwood Police
Department before transport to the Johnson County Jail, which caused his
name to be excluded from the jail population list of suspects who were to
appear before the Magistrate within forty-eight hours. Later that day,
police transported Griffith to the Johnson County Jail.
Hollis Kehrt was also arrested in connection with the present case.
On May 23rd, the Greenwood Police, a captain from the Johnson County Jail,
and the Johnson County Prosecutor wired Kehrt and placed him in the cell
with Griffith to obtain “incriminating information” about the Georges’
murder. Police placed Kehrt in the cell with Griffith before he appeared
before a magistrate. The police were unable to collect any information,
however, because they could not decipher any data from the wire.
The following day, police asked Griffith’s girlfriend Jamie Young to
make a controlled call in an effort to obtain incriminating information
from Griffith. Though police instructed Young not to reveal that the call
was controlled, she immediately did so, and Griffith revealed nothing.
The Greenwood Police prepared a probable cause affidavit on May 22nd,
and revised it on May 23rd. On May 24th, Magistrate Craig Lawson conducted
an initial hearing and determined that probable cause existed for
Griffith’s arrest.
The following day, Griffith’s wife Elizabeth phoned Greenwood police
and told them that Griffith wanted to speak with them. One day later, a
judge granted an order to draw a sample of Griffith’s blood. While en
route to the hospital for the blood draw, Griffith confirmed that he wanted
to speak with the Greenwood police.
At the later meeting with the Greenwood police, officers informed
Griffith of his rights, including his right to counsel and right to remain
silent, and Griffith signed a waiver. Griffith then confessed to the
murder of Lloyd and Judy Georges and the burglary and arson of their home.
Thereafter, the State charged Griffith with two counts of murder, one
count of burglary as a class B felony, and one count of arson, a class B
felony. A jury found him guilty of all counts. The court sentenced
Griffith to life without parole for the murders, and two consecutive
eighteen-year sentences for the counts of burglary and arson.
Griffith initiated this direct appeal, claiming (1) that the police
did not have probable cause to arrest him without a warrant, (2) that the
delay in taking him before a magistrate made his confession involuntary,
and (3) that he had an Equal Protection right to counsel before being
charged.
This Court reviews all challenges on a question of law under a de novo
standard. We review denial of motions to suppress as a matter of
sufficiency. Goodner v. State, 714 N.E.2d 638 (Ind. 1999). In reviewing
the trial court's ruling on the validity of a warrantless arrest, we
consider the evidence favorable to the trial court's ruling and any
uncontradicted substantial evidence to the contrary to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. Vance v. State, 620
N.E.2d 687 (Ind. 1993).
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of
evidence, and we will disturb its rulings only where it is shown that the
court abused that discretion. Wilkinson v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1267 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. We view the circumstances in their totality
and, without reweighing evidence and considering conflicting evidence most
favorable to the trial court's ruling, determine if there was substantial
evidence of probative value to support the trial court's ruling. Id.
Warrantless Arrest
Griffith first claims that the trial court should have suppressed his
confession because it was the product of a warrantless arrest without
probable cause.
Probable cause adequate to support a warrantless arrest exists when,
at the time of the arrest, the officer has knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe
that the suspect committed a criminal act. Borkholder v. State, 544 N.E.2d
571 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-33-1-1(a) (West 1998). The
amount of evidence necessary to meet the probable cause requirement for a
warrantless arrest is determined on a case-by-case basis. Peterson v.
State, 674 N.E.2d 528 (Ind. 1996).
Probable cause can rest on collective information known to the law
enforcement organization as a whole, and not solely on the personal
knowledge of the arresting officer. See Manson v. State, 249 Ind. 53, 229
N.E.2d 801 (1967). The police force is considered a unit. Where there is a
police-channel communication to the arresting officer, he acts in good
faith thereon, and such knowledge and information exist within the
department, the arrest is based on probable cause. See Whiteley v. Warden,
401 U.S. 560 (1971); see also Francis v. State, 161 Ind. App. 371, 316
N.E.2d 416 (1974).
The evidence here indicates that Lloyd recently told a friend that his
relationship with Griffith, who he called “Val,” had become dire because he
refused to purchase a vehicle for Griffith. Griffith’s son confirmed that
Val was Griffith. A neighbor reported that Lloyd argued with a black man
who fit Griffith’s description on his porch on the day of the fire. The
Georges’ car was missing and found ablaze two days later. A witness saw a
black male carrying a gas can in the Georges’ front yard and walk into the
front door of their home. Furthermore, upon approaching Griffith’s
apartment, Officer Tindall immediately smelled the strong odor of smoke on
Griffith and noticed band-aids on Griffith’s hands and fingers. He also
found one of Lloyd’s rings in Griffith’s pocket.
The arresting officers had probable cause to believe that Griffith
murdered the Georges and committed burglary and arson. The arrest was thus
valid.
Delay in Presentation to Magistrate
In his second motion to suppress his confession, Griffith asserted
that the delay between his arrest and the probable cause hearing violated
his rights under the United States Constitution.
An individual detained following a warrantless arrest is entitled to a
“prompt” judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to any
further restraint on his liberty. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114
(1975). The promptness requirement is satisfied under Gerstein when the
“administrative steps incident to arrest” are completed. Id. In Riverside
v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (citations omitted), the Court was
more specific about the Gerstein standard: “a jurisdiction that provides
judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will,
as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.”
The law of Due Process acknowledges that delays cannot always be
avoided,[1] but the government must justify such delays. “Where an
arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within
48 hours, … the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the
existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.”
Id. at 57. The fact that in a particular case it may take longer than
forty-eight hours to consolidate pretrial proceedings does not qualify as
an extraordinary circumstance. Id.
The facts show that approximately sixty-three hours passed between
Griffith’s arrest and his appearance before the magistrate for a
determination of probable cause. Thus, the burden shifted to the State to
demonstrate a bona fide emergency or extraordinary circumstance. Because
Griffith was not included on the jail population list, his appearance
before a magistrate was delayed. Of course, Riverside stands for the
proposition that preliminary paperwork and pretrial proceedings do not
constitute an extraordinary circumstance. The State is thus correct to
acknowledge that the detention for sixty-three hours prior to a probable
cause hearing was unreasonable under the Riverside analysis.
Whether this requires suppression of Griffith’s confession is another
matter. Even where a confession occurs before the defendant sees a
magistrate, suppression may not be the inevitable remedy. Powell v.
Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 84 (1994) (delay in presentation to judge was
unconstitutionally delayed, but “[i]t does not necessarily follow, however,
that Powell must ‘be set free’”).
The trial court in this case ordered suppression of any evidence
gained after the forty-eight hours elapsed but before the probable cause
hearing occurred. (App. at 585.) Griffith’s confession, however, did not
occur until two days after he saw the magistrate. And it occurred because
he asked to speak with officers from the Greenwood Police Department.
We think it plain enough that Griffith’s confession was not the
product of delay in bringing him before the magistrate and that the trial
court correctly declined to suppress it.
Was the Confession Coerced?
Griffith further argues that his confession was obtained in violation
of his rights against self-incrimination.
Admissibility of a confession is governed determining from the
totality of the circumstances whether or not it was made voluntarily.
Light v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. 1989). Standard indicators for
voluntariness include whether the confession was freely self-determined,
the product of a rational intellect and free will, without compulsion or
inducement of any sort, and whether the accused's will was overborne.
Johnson v. State, 250 Ind. 283, 235 N.E.2d 688 (1968). Although the State
at trial was required to prove the voluntariness of Griffith’s statement
beyond a reasonable doubt, we review the question on appeal as we do other
sufficiency matters. We do not weigh the evidence, but rather determine
whether there was substantial probative evidence to support the trial
court's finding. See Works v. State, 266 Ind. 250, 362 N.E.2d 144 (1977).
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Griffith’s confession was voluntary. Griffith signed a waiver after police
informed him of his Miranda rights. While being held, Griffith asked his
wife to inform police that he wished to speak with them.
Griffith never invoked his right to remain silent, as he now argues.
He simply commented, “I might as well not say anything more,” in response
to the police not striking any deals with Griffith for his information.
(Appellant’s App. at 95-96.) Yet, he continued to disclose information
after this statement during the interrogation. Griffith’s statement, like
that of the defendant in Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509, 514-15 (Ind.
1997) who told police during interrogation, “I am through with this,” does
not constitute an invocation of silence.
We therefore hold that Griffith’s confession was voluntary.
Denial of Counsel
Griffith finally contends that his confession should be suppressed
because the court did not appoint counsel for him during the probable cause
hearing or at the time he confessed. Griffith contends this violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Griffith acknowledges that the Sixth Amendment right to appointed
counsel at public expense attaches at the moment an information or
indictment is filed (something Magistrate Lawson told Griffith during the
probable cause hearing). Griffith says a person of means could hire
counsel to assist him in the hours before formal charges are filed and that
depriving him of such help denies him equal protection and due process.
As Justice Kennedy has observed, “The Fourteenth Amendment’s promise
that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must
coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for
one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or
persons.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). The line for court-
appointed counsel has been drawn where it has been drawn. Griffith does
not contend he suffered any damage by virtue of what occurred during his
preliminary hearing, and when he asked to speak with the police and
eventually confessed, he did so with the full knowledge that legal help at
public expense was just at the horizon.
The trial court was right to deny Griffith’s request to suppress his
confessions on these grounds.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
DICKSON, SULLIVAN, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] See e.g. Riverside, 500 U.S. at 55. (“Examples of delays include delays
caused by paperwork and logistical problems. Records will have to be
reviewed, charging documents drafted, appearance of counsel arranged, and
appropriate bail determined. On weekends, when the number of arrests is
often higher and available resources tend to be limited, arraignments may
get pushed back even further. In our view, the Fourth Amendment permits
reasonable postponement of a probable cause determination while the police
cope with the everyday problems of processing suspects through an overly
burdened criminal justice system.”)