ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
P. Stephen Miller Steve Carter
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
John C. Bohdan James B. Martin
Glasser and Ebbs Deputy Attorney General
Fort Wayne, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
JOSEPH E. CORCORAN, )
)
Appellant (Defendant), )
)
v. ) Cause No. 02S00-9805-DP-293
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee (Plaintiff). )
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Judge
Cause No. 02D04-9707-CF-465
September 5, 2002
SHEPARD, Chief Justice
Joseph E. Corcoran was under stress because his sister’s upcoming
marriage would necessitate his moving out of her house. And his brother
said Corcoran could not move in with him.
He awoke one afternoon to hear his brother and others downstairs
talking about him. Irritated, he loaded his rifle and went downstairs to
intimidate them, but as Corcoran said later, “It just didn’t happen that
way.” (R. at 1988.) Corcoran killed his brother, his sister’s fiancé, and
two other men in the ensuing incident.
We affirm the trial court’s sentence of death.
Facts & Procedural History
This case returns to us following a remand. Corcoran v. State, 739
N.E.2d 649 (Ind. 2000). We directed the trial court to reconsider its
earlier sentence and sentencing order.
At trial, the State charged Corcoran with four counts of murder and
requested the death penalty. The jury found Corcoran guilty of all four
counts and recommended the death penalty. The trial court imposed it. We
found a significant possibility that the trial judge’s original sentencing
order relied on non-statutory aggravators in imposing the death penalty and
remanded for the trial court to re-determine whether to impose death based
only on statutory aggravating circumstances. Corcoran, 739 N.E.2d at 657.
After re-weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the
quadruple murder, the trial court issued a revised sentencing order and
again imposed the death sentence. In response to our remand order, the
trial judge stated:
The Court, having evaluated and balanced all these
circumstances, finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances. The Court again finds that the mental or
emotional disturbance suffered by [Corcoran] did not affect his
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law.
The Court, having considered the jury’s recommendation that the
death penalty be imposed, now finds that such a sentence is supported
by the facts and the evidence, and the character of [Corcoran], and
therefore orders that [Corcoran] be executed pursuant to Indiana law .
. . .
(Supp. R. at 49.)
Corcoran argues on appeal that the trial court improperly considered
non-statutory aggravators and failed to consider all proffered mitigators.
(Appellant’s Br. at 2-3.) We will also consider Corcoran’s final claim
from his original direct appeal: whether the death sentence is manifestly
unreasonable.[1]
I. Aggravating & Mitigating Circumstances
Corcoran points to the following portion of the revised sentencing
order to support his argument that the trial court again improperly
considered non-statutory aggravators:
The trial Court, in balancing the proved aggravators and mitigators,
emphasizes to the Supreme Court that it only relied upon those proven
statutory aggravators. The trial Court’s remarks at the sentencing
hearing, and the language in the original sentencing order explain why
such high weight was given to the statutory aggravator of multiple
murder, and further support the trial Court’s personal conclusion that
the sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender and these
crimes.
(Supp. R. at 48-49.) He also argues that the revised sentencing order is
deficient because the trial court found as proven only four of the ten
mitigating circumstances he put forward. (Appellant’s Br. at 8-9.)
In Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1262 (Ind. 1995), after remand,
659 N.E.2d 480 (Ind. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 933 (1996), we held that
a court must offer a detailed explanation of the factors and the weighing
process that lead to a death sentence. For guidance, we set out the
following steps:
The trial court's statement of reasons (i) must identify each
mitigating and aggravating circumstance found, (ii) must include the
specific facts and reasons which lead the court to find the existence
of each such circumstance, (iii) must articulate that the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in
determination of the sentence, and (iv) must set forth the trial
court's personal conclusion that the sentence is appropriate
punishment for this offender and this crime.
Id. (citations omitted).
When imposing a death sentence, a trial court must limit its
consideration of aggravating circumstances to those listed in the death
penalty statute, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b) (West 2000). Stephenson v.
State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 500 (Ind. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 905
(2002). To satisfy the specificity requirement of Harrison, the sentencing
order must “explicitly indicate which mitigating circumstances the trial
court found . . . [and] explain the specific facts and reasons that led the
court to find the existence of whatever mitigating circumstances it did
find.” Holsinger v. State, 750 N.E.2d 354, 362 (Ind. 2001).
“We require such specificity in a sentencing order or statement of
reasons for imposing a sentence to insure the trial court considered only
proper matters when imposing sentence, thus safeguarding against the
imposition of sentences which are arbitrary or capricious, and to enable
the appellate court to determine the reasonableness of the sentence
imposed.” Harrison, 644 N.E.2d at 1262 (citation omitted)
When we remand criminal cases to trial courts for new sentencing
orders, a trial court’s responsibility is to “produce a new sentencing
order that responds to the concerns this Court has raised.” O’Connell v.
State, 742 N.E.2d 943, 952-53 (Ind. 2001). Our sole concern here was the
possibility that the trial court relied on non-statutory aggravators, so it
fulfilled its responsibility by “issuing a new sentencing order without
taking further action.” Id. at 953.
We are now satisfied that the trial court has relied on only
aggravators listed in Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b). In response to our
remand, the trial court stated, “[I]n balancing the proved aggravators and
mitigators, [the trial court] emphasizes to the Supreme Court that it only
relied upon those proven statutory aggravators.” (Supp. R. at 48-49.)
There is no lack of clarity in this statement and no plausible reason to
believe it untrue.
As for the trial court’s consideration of mitigating circumstances,
Corcoran proffered ten mitigators, but the court found that he proved only
four. (Supp. R. at 47-48.) The Court then stated:
The Court finds that the Defendant has proved the mitigating
circumstance that he was under the influence of a mental or emotional
disturbance at the time the murders were committed on July 26, 1997.
The Court gives this mitigating circumstance medium weight. Dr.
Engum’s opinion at trial was consistent with the opinions of the Court
appointed experts that the Defendant suffered from a personality
disorder, either paranoid personality disorder, or schizotypal
personality disorder.
The Defendant requests the Court to consider as a further
mitigating circumstance the fact he cooperated fully with
investigating authorities, reducing the potential for additional harm
and furthering the State’s case against himself. The Court does
believe this to be a mitigating circumstance. The Defendant did in
fact cooperate with the police and gave a videotaped confession of his
involvement. At no time did he deceive or hinder the investigative
process by making false or misleading statements. However, as he was
the only adult left alive in the house, it would not have been
difficult for the police to investigate and determine who was
responsible. The Court therefore assigns this mitigator a low weight.
The Defendant’s eighth mitigator is his lack of a significant
criminal history. The Defendant has a 1993 conviction for Criminal
Mischief as a Class A Misdemeanor. He has no juvenile adjudications.
The Court assigns this mitigator a low weight.
Finally, the Defendant’s remorse is advanced as a mitigating
circumstance. The Defendant has indicated such remorse in a letter to
the Court. The Court assigns this mitigator a low weight.
(Supp. R. at 47-48.)
Corcoran’s argument that the trial court did not consider six of the
proffered mitigating circumstances is without merit. As the mitigating
circumstances were not the focus of our concern, we are not surprised that
the trial court’s second order analyzed only those aggravating and
mitigating circumstances it found pertinent to the task on remand.
The trial judge had in fact analyzed Corcoran’s proffered mitigators
in the course of its original sentencing. Our review of the record also
persuades us that the trial court properly rejected the remaining factors
in the original sentencing order. (R. at 2574-78.) Corcoran claimed first
that his mental disease affected his capacity to appreciate or conform his
conduct. (R. at 2574.) As we discuss in greater detail below, the trial
court did not err in rejecting it.
In a related vein, Corcoran also asked the court to consider the fact
that he shielded his young niece from the bloodshed as a mitigator. (R. at
2575.) But this fact cuts both ways. His actions demonstrate a keen
awareness of the events that were to follow, and suggest to us that his
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was not inhibited.
Third, Corcoran argues that his mental disease prevented him from
competently assisting in his defense, stemming primarily from his refusal
of favorable plea recommendations offered by the State. (R. at 2574,
2909.) The State’s pleas would have kept Corcoran in jail for life, but
Corcoran rejected each. He chose instead to exercise his constitutional
right to a jury trial, therefore creating the potential for a lesser
sentence, a favorable jury recommendation, or an outright acquittal.
Corcoran’s choice will not act simultaneously as a mitigator for his
benefit.
The remaining three factors are also without merit. Corcoran was
twenty-two at the time of the murders, and offered his age as a mitigator.
(R. at 2575, 2915.) Although chronological age is not the end of the
inquiry for young adults, considering both the seriousness of this crime
and the fact that Corcoran is well past the age of sixteen where the law
requires special treatment, we find no abuse of discretion. See Monegan v.
State, 756 N.E.2d 499, 504-05 (Ind. 2001). The fifth rejected factor was
Corcoran’s good behavior in jail prior to sentencing. (R. at 2575.) We
agree with the trial court that this is expected of persons who are
incarcerated. See Walter v. State, 727 N.E.2d 443, 448-49 (Ind. 2000).
Even if it is an appropriate mitigator, its weight is modest and we find no
abuse of discretion here either. Finally, Corcoran asserted that his
admission of guilt through all phases of the legal process should be a
mitigating circumstance. (R. at 2575.) Of course, Corcoran did not admit
his guilt in the sense that one does in pleading guilty. Corcoran demanded
a jury trial and subjected the victims’ families and loved ones to a trial.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find this
mitigator.
In accordance with our guidance in Harrison and Holsinger, the trial
court explicitly identified the proven mitigating circumstances and listed
the specific facts and reasons that led the court to find their existence.
The trial court fulfilled its resentencing duties.
II. The Propriety of the Death Sentence
We also address Corcoran’s final argument from his original appeal
that his sentence is manifestly unreasonable. (Appellant’s Br. at 55.)
Although Article VII, § 4 of the Indiana Constitution authorizes us to
review and revise sentences, we will do so only when the sentence is
“manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). When reviewing
death sentences, this standard stands more as a guidepost for our appellate
review than an immovable pillar supporting a sentence decision. See
Spranger v. State, 498 N.E.2d 931, 947 n.2 (Ind. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1033 (1987).
The nature of the offense is clear; Corcoran and his defense team do
not dispute the events. (R. at 1994-95, State’s Exh. 77; R. at 2175-76;
Appellant’s Br. at 55.) On July 26, 1997, Corcoran was lying on his
bedroom floor and heard men’s voices. He became upset because he thought
the men were talking about him and took a semi-automatic rifle downstairs
to confront them. In the living room were four men, including Corcoran’s
brother and future brother-in-law, both of whom lived in the house with
Corcoran.
Corcoran shot and killed Jim Corcoran, Scott Turner and Timothy
Bricker at close range. The final victim, Doug Stillwell, tried to escape,
but Corcoran chased him into the kitchen and shot him in the head.
Despite these uncontested facts, Corcoran argues vehemently that his
mental health should be of utmost significance in determining his sentence.
Seven qualified doctors analyzed Corcoran, (R. at 2904-08, Def.’s Pre-
Sent. Memo. at 20-25), and while they offered varying opinions, (R. at
2907, Def.’s Pre-Sent. Memo. at 20-25), it appears that the consensus was
that Corcoran suffered from schizotypal or paranoid personality disorder.
(R. at 2306; 2309-10, Def.’s Exh. C; 2904; 2908; Def.’s Pre-Sent. Memo. at
20-25.)
In Corcoran’s pre-sentencing memorandum, the defense presented the
opinions of two doctors who interviewed Corcoran in 1999, two years after
the murders, and diagnosed him as suffering from “schizophrenia, paranoid
type.” (Def.’s Pre-Sent. Memo. at 23.) Moreover, Dr. Engum, who testified
at the penalty phase of the trial, originally opined that Corcoran suffered
from schizotypal personality disorder and later changed his opinion, “with
[the benefit of] hindsight,” to suggest that progression to schizophrenia
was “possible.” (Def.’s Pre-Sent. Memo. at 22.)
The trial court expressed understandable concern with these diagnoses.
Each was performed two years after the murders and with the knowledge of
the jury’s death sentence recommendation. (R. at 2905-06; Def.’s Pre-Sent.
Memo. at 22-25.) As Dr. Engum stated, “[A]n estimated 10 to 20 percent of
patients with Schizotypal personality disorder eventually progress to full-
blown schizophrenia.” (Def.’s Pre-Sent. Memo. at 22.) Whether or not
Corcoran had progressed to schizophrenia two years after the crime is
immaterial; rather, we are concerned with his mental state at the time of
the murders, which consensus says and the trial court found to be
schizotypal personality disorder. (R. at 2904.) Corcoran does not assert
on appeal that his subsequent mental illness prevents the imposition of the
death penalty.
In addition to monitoring Corcoran’s demeanor throughout trial, the
court listened to and considered each of the doctor’s reports. The trial
judge said:
The Court is not convinced that [Corcoran]’s affliction meets the
legal definition of mental disease or defect. The Court notes that
even the well respected psychiatrists and psychologists opinions (not
only those who examined [Corcoran], but those contained in the
literature submitted in the Sentencing Memorandums) can be viewed as
ambiguous. The Court notes that all seven (7) Doctors offered
differing opinions as to [Corcoran] and Dr. Spink admitted psychiatry
is not an exact science and there are no black and white rules. The
literature, and Dr. Engum’s original opinion consider schizotypal or
paranoid personality disorders to be maladaptive lifestyles. The
facts reflect that [Corcoran] had the presence of mind to shield his
young niece upstairs from the carnage he inflicted on innocent victims
downstairs in the house on Bayer Avenue. He knew immediately what he
had done, he knew at the time what he was doing, and he knew that what
he was doing was wrong.
(R. at 2576.)
The trial judge’s consideration of the evidence about Corcoran’s
mental health reflected a fair amount of care; she concluded that he
suffered from schizotypal personality disorder. (R. at 2904, 2907.) In
other words, Corcoran was genetically predisposed to be a “loner” or
“hermit.” (R. at 2240, 2333.) The professional analysis of Corcoran
portrayed him as a person with “social and interpersonal deficits” who
experiences “discomfort with, and reduced capacity for close
relationships.” (R. at 2309, Def.’s Exh. C.)
We are satisfied that the trial court’s decision that a quadruple
killing was weightier than the proffered mitigation of Corcoran’s mental
health led the trial court to an appropriate sentence.
Conclusion
We affirm the sentence of the trial court.
Dickson, Sullivan, and Boehm, JJ., concur.
Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
JOSEPH E. CORCORAN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
) Supreme Court Cause Number
v. ) 02S00-9805-DP-293
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
September 5, 2002
RUCKER, Justice, dissenting
I respectfully dissent because I do not believe a sentence of death is
appropriate for a person suffering a severe mental illness. Recently the
Supreme Court held that the executions of mentally retarded criminals are
“cruel and unusual punishments” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Atkins v. Virginia, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S. Ct.
2242, 2252 (2002). There has been no argument in this case that Corcoran
is mentally retarded.1 However, the underlying rationale for prohibiting
executions of the mentally retarded is just as compelling for prohibiting
executions of the seriously mentally ill, namely evolving standards of
decency.
In that regard I associate myself with the dissenting opinion of
Justice Pfeifer of the Ohio Supreme Court who noted:
Mental illness is a medical disease. Every year we learn more about
it and the way it manifests itself in the mind of the sufferer. At
this time, we do not and cannot know what is going on in the mind of a
person with mental illness. As a society, we have always treated
those with mental illness differently from those without. In the
interest of human dignity, we must continue to do so. . . . I believe
that executing a convict with a severe mental illness is a cruel and
unusual punishment.
Ohio v. Scott, 748 N.E.2d 11, 20 (Ohio 2001) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1034 (2001). Addressing the federal constitutional
claim the Supreme Court noted, “pursuant to our narrowing jurisprudence,
which seeks to ensure that only the most deserving of execution are put to
death, an exclusion for the mentally retarded is appropriate.” Atkins, ___
U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 2251. Apart from the federal constitution,
Indiana has its own constitutional provision against cruel and unusual
punishment.[2] Because Indiana’s constitution affords even greater
protection than its federal counterpart, I would hold that a seriously
mentally ill person is not among those most deserving to be put to death.
To do so in my view violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment provision of
the Indiana Constitution. Because Corcoran is obviously severely mentally
ill, he should be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, not
death.
-----------------------
[1] Because we found Corcoran’s claim regarding the trial court’s
consideration of non-statutory aggravators dispositive, we did not reach
this issue in his original appeal. See Corcoran, 739 N.E.2d at 651, 658
n.7.
1 By statute, Indiana prohibits the execution of the mentally
retarded. See Ind. Code § 35-36-9-6.
[2] See Ind. Const. art. I, § 16 (providing “Excessive bail shall not
be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual
punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to
the nature of the offense.”).