Miller v. State

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ann M. Sutton Karen Freeman-Wilson
Marion County Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Arthur Thaddeus Perry
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

In The
INDIANA SUPREME COURT

RONNIE G. MILLER )
Defendant-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 49S00-9908-CR-445
)
STATE OF INDIANA )
Plaintiff-Appellee. )
________________________________________________

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Gary Miller, Judge[1]
Cause No. 49G05-9508-CF-110486
________________________________________________

On Direct Appeal

June 26, 2002

DICKSON, Justice

The defendant, Ronnie G. Miller, was convicted of murder and criminal
deviate conduct in the 1995 death of 71-year-old Anna Pennington,[2] who
was beaten, sexually attacked, and strangled to death in her office where
she managed an Indianapolis residence converted into eight apartments. The
State had sought the death penalty but the trial court dismissed the death
penalty count before trial because it found the defendant to be mentally
retarded.[3] Following the jury's verdict, the defendant was sentenced to
sixty-five years for murder and twenty years for criminal deviate conduct,
with the sentences to be served consecutively. In this appeal, we address
the following claimed trial court errors: (1) admitting his statement that
police obtained by coercion and manipulation; (2) excluding the testimony
of a social psychological expert in coerced confessions; (3) convicting him
on insufficient evidence. Concluding that the exclusion of expert
testimony was reversible error, we reverse and remand for new trial.

1. Voluntariness of Statement
The defendant contends that his statement to the police should have
been suppressed because it was the result of coercion, manipulation, and
fabricated evidence, in combination with his vulnerable mental state. The
defendant argues that the "totality of the circumstances creates a full
picture of the unwitting mentally retarded defendant being led down the
path to his own detriment, the path being paved by lies and coercion." Br.
of Appellant at 17.
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress "the
statement of the defendant made during the interrogation of the defendant
on August 6-7, 1995." Record at 266. The defendant's extensive supporting
brief requested the court to "suppress the entirety of his statements made
on August 6 and August 7, 1995 to Det. Craig Converse." Record at 309.
The trial court denied the motion. During trial, when the State was
questioning Detective Converse regarding his preliminary interview of the
defendant before the videotaped interview, the defense objected, expressly
referring to its objections previously presented. Record at 2320, 2323.
When the State offered the videotape and its transcript into evidence, the
defendant objected "based on reasons made previously known to the Court,
and incorporat[ing] by reference prior hearings and argument in support of
the objection." Record at 2375. The objections were denied. The grounds
asserted in this appeal were timely raised at trial.
The decision to admit the defendant's statements is a matter of
discretion of the trial court after considering the totality of the
circumstances. Kahlenbeck v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (Ind. 1999).
"When reviewing a challenge to the trial court's decision, we do not
reweigh the evidence but instead examine the record for substantial,
probative evidence of voluntariness." Schmitt v. State, 730 N.E.2d 147,
148 (Ind. 2000); see also Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 510 (Ind. 1997).
It is the State's burden to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant voluntarily waived his rights, and that the defendant's
confession was voluntarily given." Schmitt, 730 N.E.2d at 148.[4] In
looking at the totality of the circumstances from all the evidence, many
factors may be considered including:
the crucial element of police coercion, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 484 (1986); the length
of the interrogation, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-54, 64
S.Ct. 921, 926-27, 88 L.Ed. 1192, 1199 (1944); its location, see Reck
v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 1546-47, 6 L.Ed.2d 948, 954
(1961); its continuity, Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561, 74 S.Ct.
716, 719, 98 L.Ed. 948, 952 (1954); the defendant's maturity, Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-601, 68 S.Ct. 302, 303-04, 92 L.Ed. 224, 228
(1948)(opinion of Douglas, J.); education, Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S.
707, 712, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 1341, 18 L.Ed.2d 423, 428 (1967); physical
condition, Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 520-21, 88 S.Ct.
1152, 54, 20 L.Ed.2d 77, 79-80 (1968)(per curiam); and mental health,
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196, 77 S.Ct. 281, 284, 1 L.Ed.2d 246,
250 (1957).

Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1754, 123 L.Ed.2d
407, 420 (1993); see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct.
1420, 1424-25, 22 L.Ed. 2d 684, 693 (1969)(considering duration, maturity,
intelligence, police deception, and rights communicated to defendant);
Light v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1073, 1077-79 (Ind. 1989)(considering duration,
education and intelligence, and police conduct); Kahlenbeck, 719 N.E.2d at
1216-17 (considering duration, maturity, intelligence, intoxication,
advisement of rights, and police deception); Carter v. State, 490 N.E.2d
288, 290-91 (Ind. 1986)(considering advisement of rights, maturity,
intelligence, and length of interrogation).[5] We must determine, in light
of the totality of circumstances, whether the police conduct overbore the
defendant's will, thus rendering his statement involuntary. Henry v.
State, 738 N.E.2d 663, 665 (Ind. 2000).
The evidence indicates that, after being told by friends that the
local television news broadcast his name in connection with a recent
murder, the defendant voluntarily went to the police station to "get it
cleared up." Record at 2203. The defendant arrived at 5:30 p.m. and was
placed in an interview room and the door was closed. The interview room
door automatically locks from the outside when closed. The detective on
duty periodically checked on the defendant to see if he needed anything.
The defendant was not formally arrested at this time. After the defendant
had waited approximately two hours, Indianapolis Police Detective Craig
Converse, who was assigned to the case, arrived and began talking to the
defendant.
For about one hour, Detective Converse gathered background and
preliminary information from the defendant. When the defendant initially
denied being at the apartment house where the victim was murdered, which
was contrary to the information developed in the police investigation,
Detective Converse considered the defendant to be a suspect and orally
informed the defendant of his rights. No waiver of rights was signed at
this time. Detective Converse's ensuing questioning became more focused
and included confronting the defendant with speculation and assertions that
misstated or exaggerated information known to the detective. Specifically,
Detective Converse told the defendant that witnesses had seen the defendant
in the hallway outside the victim's first floor office. But Detective
Converse only knew that a witness saw the defendant in the upstairs
hallway, and that no witness had stated that the defendant was seen outside
the first floor office. In the course of further interrogation, Detective
Converse presented the defendant with a fabricated fingerprint card and
computer printout and represented that the defendant's fingerprints had
been found in the victim's office. In fact, while fingerprints had been
recovered at the scene, they had not yet been identified at the time of the
interrogation. Detective Converse also showed the defendant the police
report that stated that the victim died of natural causes. Detective
Converse, knowing that the report was erroneous, nevertheless suggested to
the defendant that the death could have been an accident. During the
entire period of questioning, the defendant was given breaks for drinks,
snacks, and to use the restroom. Just before 1:00 a.m., the defendant
acknowledged that he had encountered the victim in her office on the night
of her death, that he pushed open the door to her office, she told him to
"Get the hell out," and that she then backed up, started to fall, and that
he reached out and the subsequent injuries happened. Record at 2369.
At this point, about 1:00 a.m., Detective Converse and the defendant
took a 45-minute break, during which time the defendant was provided with a
soda and the opportunity to use the rest room. He then was left alone in
the room until approximately 1:45 a.m., when Detective Converse informed
the defendant that he was under arrest and that Detective Converse wanted
"to put this on tape," to which the defendant responded "okay." Record at
2371.
At the beginning of the videotaped interview, Detective Converse
again advised the defendant of his rights, one by one, and after reading
each, asked the defendant if he understood it. As to each right, the
defendant acknowledged his understanding. In response to the detective's
concluding question "What does it mean to you when I tell you your rights?"
the defendant responded, "It means that if I didn't want to, you know, say
anything, that I can talk to an attorney or I could, you know, come on with
(inaudible) you know, to get this cleared up." Record at 2381. After then
reminding the defendant that he was under arrest and charged with murder,
Detective Converse questioned the defendant about the incident. In the
ensuing videotaped interview the defendant admitted that, on the day of the
killing, he entered the apartment house intending to contact an
acquaintance. He entered the structure and knocked on his friend's first
floor apartment door. Getting no response, he turned and saw the victim
standing in her office door and then closing the door. The defendant then
went upstairs to contact another person and, upon his return downstairs to
leave the building, he saw the office door again closing. Believing that
the victim was trying to overhear his conversations, the defendant pushed
open the office door, and the victim said, "Get out of here." Record at
2394. He offered the following description of the occurrence to Detective
Converse:
She was standing there, she said, "Get out of here," and started to go
back the other way and she was falling and when I, I guess I was
trying to keep her from falling and my hand reaction of my hand
touched her face and then my chin hit her either when she was going
down I was trying to catch her and my fingers must have hit her face
and, you know, . . . . damn.

Record at 2395. The defendant then stated that he didn't push her, but
that as she went down, she pulled him down and his face fell on top of her,
and he hit her with his chin or his head. When Detective Converse told the
defendant that when the police arrived, the victim's pants were pulled down
and that an autopsy indicated that there was penetration in her vagina,
indicating that she was raped, the defendant responded, "Well, she wasn't
raped by me, sir. I wouldn't, you know, do nothing like that to no older
lady." Record at 2407-08. Shortly thereafter, at approximately 2:35 a.m.,
the interview was terminated at the request of the defendant who indicated
that he wanted to talk to an attorney. Record at 1188. At no time during
the videotaped portion of the interview did Detective Converse use or refer
to any of the speculation, misstatements, or exaggerated information that
he asserted during the questioning that preceded the videotaped interview.
At the time of his interrogation, the defendant was forty-years-old
and employed, he spoke normally, he did not appear to be incoherent or
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Record at 1162-63, 1325. There
is no allegation or indication that police knew that he was mentally
retarded. The defendant's prior criminal history evidences his familiarity
with the criminal justice system. Record at 1354-56. He was twice orally
advised of his rights prior to his videotaped statement, and once again at
the commencement of his videotaped statement, which advisement he
acknowledged and expressly waived. He further demonstrated his awareness
of rights when he later requested that the interview stop because he wanted
to talk to an attorney.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, expressly noting its
earlier determination that the defendant was mentally retarded, but finding
that he freely, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his rights and gave
his statement to police.[6]
The police interrogation facts are strikingly similar to those in
Henry, in which the officers falsely told Henry that his fingerprints were
found at the scene of the crime and that a witness identified him as the
person who killed the victim. 738 N.E.2d at 664. In addition, "Henry
actually gave two incriminating statements: the first, unrecorded and
accompanied by police deceit; the second, audiotaped with no hint of police
deception. It was the second audiotaped confession that was admitted into
evidence." Id. at 665. In Henry, we found no error in the admission of the
confession.
Similarly here, considering the totality of the substantial probative
evidence of volunariness shown by the record, we find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights, and that his
incriminatory statements admitted in evidence were voluntarily given. The
trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress and
overruling his trial objections to the admission of his statements in
evidence.

2. Exclusion of Testimony of Defendant's Expert

The defendant contends that the trial court erroneously excluded the
testimony of Dr. Richard Ofshe, a psychologist called by the defense as an
expert in the field of "social psychology of police interrogation and false
confessions." Br. of Appellant at 17.
On the first day of trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking
an order prohibiting the defendant's expert and lay witnesses from
testifying about various matters, including "the interrogation process used
in this defendant's case," and "the truthfulness of the defendant's
statements/confession given in this case." Record at 408. Following a
brief discussion with counsel, the trial court stated that it would
preliminarily grant the motion as to all witnesses, but that when the
defense's expert witness arrived, the court would hear the expert's
testimony out of the jury's presence, reconsider the motion, and rule on
it. Record at 1411-12.
The motion was then reconsidered near the end of the evidence. Out of
the jury's presence, the defense questioned Dr. Ofshe regarding the matters
it sought to have Dr. Ofshe present to the jury. When the trial court,
during the testimony of Dr. Ofshe, expressed concern that his testimony
would imply by innuendo that Detective Converse's interrogation of the
defendant produced a coerced confession, Record at 2830-31, Dr. Ofshe
explained:
The nature of the testimony is going to be: one, about the general way
in which police interrogation works which fits the description that
Converse gave about the tactics that he used; second, it will be about
those things that can lead to someone giving a false confession; and
third, it will be about how to take the undisputed record of the
interrogation, the recorded part of it and analyze it, in terms of
trying to figure out what is – what the indicia of a true or false
confession might be – and thereby for the jurors to reach their
decision about how much weight to give it. My role is only to point
out what things ought to be considered.

Record at 2831-32. The defense then called Detective Converse to the stand
and questioned him about the defendant's interrogation, and then recalled
Dr. Ofshe, asking him whether Detective Converse's testimony provided "any
characteristics . . . or phenomena of false confessions or police
interrogation in your area of study . . . ." Record at 2865. Dr. Ofshe
replied:
He identified the two principle things that go into the analysis of
police interrogation. . . . First, he talks about the use of the
fingerprints, for example. That's what I refer to in my writings as
an evidence ploy, bringing before someone information that contradicts
what they have previously been saying, that places them in involvement
at a the crime scene, whether that evidence is true or that evidence
is false, it is what – what I refer to as an evidence ploy, so as not
to restrict it to whether it's true or false. It's an evidence ploy
because it's used tactically. It is used tactically in order to move
the person off the position that they had previously been maintaining
by showing them that it's hopeless to maintain that you aren't
involved in this. And the use of evidence ploys is the principal way
in which someone who is – initially says, "I didn't do it; I wasn't
there" is gotten to recognize that it's hopeless to maintain that
position, and that's crucial to understanding how it is you get
someone to say, "Okay, I did it." The second thing that Converse
described was the use of his pointing out that this was just a natural
death and he used the word "accident" in that. That's again a
motivational tactic. The object is to make the suspect believe that
the police officer is willing to believe a characterization of what
happened that is less heinous, less morally reprehensible and also
carries the implication of—of a less serious and perhaps even
borderline or perhaps even carrying no punishment uh—for having
committed the acts because it's sometimes characterized as self-
defense, for example. So Converse has already illustrated the two
principal components of modern police interrogation. The other things
uh – I'm also aware that he acknowledges he was friendly. He tried to
develop rapport. He tries to—to tell Mr. Miller that he only wants to
get to the truth and he confronts Mr. Miller when he believes or knows
that Mr. Miller is lying with evidence ploys designed to move him in
the direction of admitting that he was there.

Record at 2865-67. After the evidence on the motion was completed, the
trial court concluded that there was no dispute in the evidence regarding
"the officer's interrogation," Record at 2869, and expressed concern that
the witness's testimony would be "questioning the truth and veracity of a
witness, . . . the police officer," Record at 2870. It ruled, "I'm not
going to permit the testimony for that reason." Id. The defendant
supplemented the hearing on the State's motion in limine with an offer to
prove. Record at 2903-3147. This offer included further testimony from
Dr. Ofshe regarding his expertise and extensive writings in the area of
police interrogation and false confession and a description of modern
police interrogation technique. Dr. Ofshe described evidence ploys based
on psychological principals used to "drive [a suspect's] confidence down to
the point where they think it is virtually certain" that they will be
arrested, tried, and convicted. Record at 2911. He also explained the
tactic of "maximization/minimization" or "the accident strategy" which is
"intended to make it easier for the person to say 'I did it.'" Record at
2913-15. Dr. Ofshe then stated that "police are trained to try to get
corroboration in the post-admission narrative," explaining the efforts to
obtain details from the suspect that are consistent with the known facts of
the crime. Record at 2916. Dr. Ofshe testified, "There are innumerable
demonstrated cases of people confessing to crimes, being convicted, and
subsequently being exonerated." Record at 2928. He also asserted that the
"mentally handicapped are more suggestible and more likely to give a false
confession," stating that they are "easier to manipulate," less able to
appreciate long-range consequences, easier to persuade to see the facts as
asserted by the interrogator, and easier "to get to give both true and
false confessions." Record at 2928-29.
Because the trial court did not reverse his earlier ruling, Dr. Ofshe
did not present any testimony to the jury.
The defendant argues on appeal that, notwithstanding the trial court's
finding that there was no factual dispute regarding the interrogating
officer's techniques, "there was nothing to explain to the jury why
someone, confronted with lies, would then falsely admit to a crime." Br.
of Appellant at 10. The defendant urges that even when a trial court
determines a defendant's statement to be sufficiently voluntary for
admission in evidence, the defendant may still dispute its voluntariness to
the jury. He asserts that "[t]he interrogation process, including its
psychological ramifications, is not within the common knowledge of ordinary
persons." Br. of Appellant at 18. Acknowledging that there is no
evidentiary dispute regarding whether Detective Converse confronted the
defendant with speculation and assertions that misstated or exaggerated
information known to police, the defendant argues that he was entitled to
present expert testimony regarding the psychology of false confessions that
would enable the jury to understand why the mentally retarded defendant
"would succumb to the lies" even though he was innocent. Br. of Appellant
at 19.
The State argues that the court properly excluded the testimony
because the facts of the interrogation were not in dispute and because the
jury would understand the expert's testimony to pertain to Det. Converse's
interrogation of the defendant in this case. In the alternative, the State
argues that the exclusion of the proffered evidence was harmless.
We first observe that a trial court's determination that a defendant's
statement was voluntary and admissible does not preclude the defense from
challenging its weight and credibility.
[T]he trial court must make a preliminary factual determination of
voluntariness when assessing the statement's admissibility. The jury,
however, remains the final arbiter of all factual issues under Article
1, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution. Even if the court
preliminarily determines that the statement is voluntary and admits it
for the jury's consideration, then the defendant is still entitled to
dispute the volunariness of the statement once it is presented to the
jury. Although the court has previously determined voluntariness in
connection with the statement's admissibility, the jury may find that
the statement was involuntarily given. If the jury makes such a
determination, then it should give the statement no weight in deciding
the defendant's guilt or innocence.

Morgan v. State, 648 N.E.2d 1164, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)(The discussion
of this issue by the opinion of the Court of Appeals was expressly approved
and adopted in Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Ind. 1996).).
Expert testimony is appropriate when it addresses issues not within the
common knowledge and experience of ordinary persons and would aid the jury.
Ind.Evidence Rule 704(a). "When [jurors] are faced with evidence that
falls outside common experience, we allow specialists to supplement the
jurors' insight." Carter v. State, 754 N.E.2d 877, 882 (Ind. 2001)(finding
experts may not testify, however, "to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or
innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether
a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions." Evid.R.
704(b)). "We expect jurors to draw upon their own personal knowledge and
experience in assessing credibility and deciding guilt or innocence."
Carter, 754 N.E.2d at 882. In Carter, we held that a psychologist's
testimony that autistic children find it difficult to deceive "came close
to, but did not cross the line into impermissible Rule 704(b) vouching.
Id. at 883-84.
The testimony of Dr. Ofshe regarding police interrogation was also at
issue in Callis v. State, 684 N.E.2d 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), in which the
trial court issued a pre-trial order limiting his testimony regarding the
circumstances of the defendant's police statements by prohibiting him from
testifying as "to the defendant's intent, guilt or innocence, or the truth
or falsity of whether a witness has testified truthfully, or to legal
conclusions." Id. at 239. At the trial of Callis, Dr. Ofshe testified
without objection about false confessions generally, but the trial court
sustained the State's objection when he was asked his opinion about the
interrogation process in Callis's case. In Callis's offer of proof, Dr.
Ofshe testified that "there was a 'great dispute between the accounts' of
Callis and the witnessing officers, that 'we have three different versions
of an inculpatory statement . . . all of which are denied by Mr. Callis,"
and that "[s]omeone is telling the truth and someone is lying, and there's
no way to reconcile those two things.'" Id. (citations omitted). The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, stating:
We conclude that the trial court properly admitted Ofshe's testimony
regarding the phenomenon of coerced confessions and properly excluded
his opinion about Callis's interrogation. As can be seen in Callis's
offer of proof, the aim of Ofshe's excluded testimony was to express
an opinion as to which witness was telling the truth about Callis's
statements. Such testimony is not admissible pursuant to Evid. R.
704(b).

684 N.E.2d at 239-40. We understand Callis to prohibit expert opinion
testimony regarding the truth or falsity of one or more witnesses'
testimony, but it does not generally prohibit expert testimony regarding
police techniques used in a particular interrogation.
In the present case, the fact that the content of the interrogation
was not in dispute is not a proper basis on which to exclude Dr. Ofshe's
testimony. The defendant's trial strategy clearly included his challenge
to the voluntariness of the incriminatory statements in his videotaped
police interview. The trial court's threshold determination of sufficient
voluntariness for admissibility of the videotape did not preclude the
defendant's challenge to its weight and credibility at trial. From our
review of the circumstances in the present case, the general substance of
Dr. Ofshe's testimony would have assisted the jury regarding the psychology
of relevant aspects of police interrogation and the interrogation of
mentally retarded persons, topics outside common knowledge and experience.
In the event that some of Dr. Ofshe's testimony to the jury would have
invaded Rule 704(b)'s prohibition of opinion testimony as to the truth or
falsity of the defendant's statements, the trial court could have sustained
individualized objections at trial. We hold that excluding the proffered
expert testimony in its entirety deprived the defendant of the opportunity
to present a defense.
The State argues that the exclusion of Dr. Ofshe's testimony was
harmless because the defendant's presence in the victim's office was
established by evidence that his fingerprint was found in what appeared to
be blood on a plastic bag at the scene. This is not inconsequential
evidence. We note, however, that during final argument the State placed
great emphasis upon the defendant's videotaped statements, including
replaying part of the videotape to the jury and directing the jury's
attention to a point during the videotape where "the defendant puts his
hands up to Detective Converse's head and shows you how he strangled Anna
Pennington." Record at 3187. Given the prominence of the defendant's
statement in the State's case and the unique circumstances present, we find
that the erroneous exclusion of the whole of Dr. Ofshe's testimony affected
the substantial rights of the defendant. The defendant is entitled to a
new trial.[7]

3. Insufficiency of the Evidence

The defendant contends that the evidence at trial is insufficient to
support either of his convictions.[8]
In addressing a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court
must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
supporting the judgment, without weighing evidence or assessing witness
credibility, and determine therefrom whether a reasonable trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Marcum v.
State, 725 N.E.2d 852, 863 (Ind. 2000).
The petite 71-year-old victim suffered multiple blunt force injuries
to the head and neck and died from manual strangulation. The victim's
pants were pulled down and the autopsy revealed evidence of sexual assault
in the form of injuries to the vagina. The defendant was identified as
being at the apartment house shortly before the victim was found. The
defendant's statement to police admitted his presence at the murder scene
near the time of the crimes, his anger at the victim for eavesdropping on
his conversations, his entry into the victim's office despite her telling
him to leave, and his physical contact with her and her falling to the
floor with him on top of her. Further, the defendant's fingerprint was
found at the scene of the murder.
The defendant maintains that the testimony of the resident
identifying him as present in the apartment building was inconsistent and
suspicious. The inconsistencies in the testimony were brought out at trial
and were factual issues for the jury to resolve. Challenging the probative
value of the matching fingerprint fount at the scene, the defendant argues
that the fingerprint was initially determined to be insufficient for
comparison but through additional testing was identified as the
defendant's; that the police department's policy of requiring only seven of
a potential 150 characteristics and the fact that the print matched eight
of the characteristics is insufficient evidence of a match; that while
eleven prints were lifted from the scene, only the defendant's and the
victim's prints were ordered to be compared to the crime scene prints; and
that the other ten prints discovered were not identified. These facts and
issues were raised at trial for consideration by the jury.
We conclude that from the evidence presented a reasonable jury could
find the defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded
for a new trial or further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN and RUCKER, JJ., concur. BOEHM, J.,
concurs with separate opinion.

BOEHM, Justice, concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to note
that the admissibility of Dr. Ofshe’s testimony under Indiana Evidence Rule
702 was not addressed by Miller or the State. Jurisdictions that have
considered the admissibility of expert testimony as to false confessions
under various versions of Evidence Rule 702 have split on that issue.
Compare United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 1995); United States
v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1997); Boyer v. Florida, 2002 Fla.
App. LEXIS 6278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 9, 2002) with People v. Son, No.
D032612, 2000 Cal. App. LEXIS 209 (Cal. Ct. App. March 21, 2000); Kansas v.
Cobb, 43 P.3d 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002); New Jersey v. Free, No. A-5275-
00T2F, 2002 N.J. Super. LEXIS 249 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 24, 2002).

-----------------------
[1] The Record indicates that some of the proceedings were conducted
by W.T. Robinette, identified variously as Master Commissioner and Judge
pro tem.
[2] The jury found the defendant guilty of separate charges of murder
and felony murder. At sentencing the trial court merged the felony murder
count into the murder conviction.

[3] The State may not seek the death penalty against a mentally
retarded individual. Ind.Code § 35-36-9-6. For this purpose, "mentally
retarded individual" is defined as "an individual who, before becoming
twenty-two (22) years of age, manifests: (1) [s]ignificantly subaverage
intellectual functioning; and (2) [s]ubstantial impairment of adaptive
behavior; that is documented in a court ordered evaluative report."
Ind.Code § 35-36-9-2. After a hearing and consideration of the opinions of
several expert witnesses, the trial court found that significant subaverage
intellectual functioning "equates with an IQ of approximately 70 to 75 or
below. . . ." Record at 264A. The court dismissed the State's request for
the death sentence, concluding that the defendant "has significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning in that experts trained in the field of
intelligence testing administered traditional standardized tests to him and
concluded that his intellectual functioning was at 67 [which] confirms
measurements taken of him in grade school prior to the age of twenty-two
(22) years." Id.
[4] Indiana courts require the State to prove the voluntariness of a
confession beyond a reasonable doubt, unlike federal decisions, which
require only proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Henry v. State,
738 N.E.2d 663, 664 n.1 (Ind. 2000).

[5] In regard to police conduct, we note that police deception does
not automatically render a confession inadmissible. Kahlenbeck, 719 N.E.2d
at 1217. We have repeatedly stated that police deception during an
interview is one factor to consider in the totality of the circumstances.
Id. (citing Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 441 (Ind. 1999))(finding that
the admitted police deception of falsely claiming possessing certain
evidence during interrogation did not render the defendant's statement
involuntary when the defendant had been read his rights, indicated that he
understood them, was a mature individual of normal intelligence and had not
been interrogated for an inordinate amount of time); see also Carter, 490
N.E.2d at 290-91 (finding the defendant’s statement voluntary even though
police falsely told the defendant that the victim was still alive because
the defendant had been apprised of his rights, indicated he understood, was
a mature individual of normal intelligence, and was not interrogated for an
inordinate amount of time). We also note that not all police interrogation
statements of conjecture, presented as fact, constitute police deception.
See Ellis v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 801 (Ind. 1999). In Ellis, we
determined that if the police have a good faith basis for their technical
falsehood, then their action will not be deemed deceptive. Id. (where
police had observed footprints at the crime scene, telling the suspect
during interrogation that they had evidence of a shoe print which would be
similar to his was not deceptive even though they had no actual evidence,
and threatening to arrest suspect's brother and sister if suspect did not
cooperate was not deceptive when suspect's siblings were already in
custody).

[6] The trial court entered the following findings in denying the
defendant's motion to suppress:
3. Although this Court has found that Mr. Miller is a mentally
retarded person pursuant to I.C. 35-36-9-5, the Court finds that he
understood all of his legal rights as described to him and that he
freely, voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights and gave the
police a statement.
4. Det. Converse's deceit to Mr. Miller regarding the nature of
the evidence in the detective's possession which occurred after the
reading of the "Miranda" warnings does not amount to improper coercion
which would negate Mr. Miller's free will giving the statement.

Record at 342.

[7] Because of this result, we do not address the defendant's claim of
trial error in the admission of hearsay evidence from a deceased person.

[8] We review this claim because, if the evidence is found to be
insufficient to convict the defendant, he is entitled to have his
convictions reversed, and he could not be retried. See Stahl v. State, 686
N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ind. 1997); Vest v. State, 621 N.E.2d 1094, 1096-97 (Ind.
1993).