Attorneys for Appellant
Steve Carter
Attorney General of Indiana
Stephen R. Creason
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee
Monica Foster
Indianapolis, Indiana
Rhonda Long-Sharp
Indianapolis, Indiana
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IN THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
CHARLES E. BARKER,
Appellee (Defendant below).
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Supreme Court case no.
49S00-0110-DP-461
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ON INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Grant W. Hawkins, Judge
Case No. 49G05-9308-CF-095544
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April 26, 2002
Per Curiam
Appellant, the State of Indiana, brings this interlocutory appeal
from a trial court order declaring that Indiana’s death penalty statute,
Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9, is unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). We elected to accept jurisdiction and granted
transfer pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 56(A).[1] For the reasons
explained more fully in Saylor v. State, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. 2002), we
reverse the trial court.
Barker stands convicted, by jury, of two murders, kidnapping,
confinement, burglary, and carrying a handgun without a license. At the
completion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury recommended the
death penalty be imposed. The trial court followed the jury's
recommendation and imposed a death sentence. The convictions were affirmed
on direct appeal, but the death sentence was reversed because the jury had
not been instructed that life without parole was a possible sentence.
Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 934 (Ind. 1998). The case was remanded
for a new penalty phase proceeding. Id.
Before the new penalty phase was scheduled to begin, the United
States Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466. Barker
moved to dismiss the death penalty request. He argued that Indiana’s death
penalty statute was unconstitutional in light of Apprendi because the
statute allowed a person to be sentenced to death in instances where a jury
did not find that the State had proved an aggravating circumstance that
rendered a defendant eligible for the death penalty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [2] The trial court agreed that this component of the statute
rendered it unconstitutional after Apprendi, and granted Barker’s motion to
dismiss the death penalty request.
We addressed the effect of Apprendi in Saylor, and concluded that
Indiana’s death penalty statute remains constitutional. ___ N.E.2d at ___.
Accordingly, the trial court’s order declaring Indiana’s death penalty
scheme unconstitutional is reversed. This case is remanded for a new
penalty phase as we previously directed in Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d at
934.
Shepard, C.J., Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
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[1] The trial court entered its order, then certified the matter for
interlocutory appeal as described in Appellate Rule 14(B)(1). The State
moved the Court of Appeals to accept jurisdiction in accordance with
Appellate Rules 5(B) and 14(B)(2), and contemporaneously moved this Court
to assume jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal pursuant to Appellate
Rule 56(A). The State also noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to
Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(b).
[2] The statute stated that the jury could recommend a death sentence only
if it found that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt at least
one of the aggravating circumstance that made a defendant eligible for the
death penalty, but also stated that the trial court was not bound by the
jury’s recommendation when making the sentencing determination. See I.C.
35-50-2-9(e) (1998). This section has been amended to provide that for a
defendant sentenced after June 30, 2002, “[I]f the jury reaches a
sentencing recommendation, the court shall sentence the defendant
accordingly.” Public Law 117-2002 (amending I.C. § 35-50-2-9(e)).