FOR THE RESPONDENT FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION
Ronald E. Elberger Donald R. Lundberg, Executive
Secretary
Bose, McKinney & Evans, LLP. Laura Iosue, Staff Attorney
2700 First Indiana Plaza 115 West Washington Street
135 N. Pennsylvania Street Suite 1165
Indianapolis, IN 46204 Indianapolis, IN 46204
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF )
) Case No. 89S00-0105-DI-230
RONALD J. MOORE )
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
October 17, 2001
Per Curiam
Attorney Ronald J. Moore retained for personal use nearly $20,000 in
legal fees in contravention of an agreement which required him to remit
such fees to his law firm. To conceal his misconduct, he lied about the
fees to other attorneys in the firm. Today we approve a Statement of
Circumstances and Conditional Agreement for Discipline between the
respondent and the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission, which
calls for his suspension from the practice of law for this misconduct. See
Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Section 11.
Having been admitted to the bar of this state in 1997, the respondent
is subject to our disciplinary jurisdiction.
The facts are undisputed. Two months after graduating from law
school in 1997, the respondent was hired as an associate lawyer by a
Richmond, Indiana, law firm. The firm and the respondent agreed that the
respondent would be paid a salary, that all legal work he performed would
be as an agent of the firm, and that all fees he earned would belong to the
firm. The respondent’s salary was $600 per week from August 4, 1997, until
his bar admission on November 3, 1997; $800 per week from November 4, 1997,
through December 31, 1998; $900 per week for the 1999 calendar year, with a
$4,000 year-end bonus; and $1,000 per week for the 2000 calendar year.
For about 18 months, the respondent’s duties at the firm included
handling criminal appeals as an appellate public defender for Wayne County.
During the course of the public defender contract, the respondent received
$11,900 from Wayne County in checks made payable to him. The respondent
deposited the checks into his personal bank account and never remitted any
of those fees to the firm. At least twice in 1999, members of the firm
confronted the respondent about the absence of fees from his public
defender work. The respondent told them that he had not been paid yet by
Wayne County. By April 2000, members of the firm became so suspicious of
the respondent’s assertions that they contacted the Wayne County Auditor’s
Office. They discovered that the respondent had been receiving payments
for the public defender work for approximately 18 months. On April 13,
2000, members of the firm confronted the respondent with this information.
He admitted he had retained the money. He also disclosed that he had
represented clients charged with drunk driving, charged each $750 for the
representation, and deposited all of the fees into his personal bank
account, instead of turning them over to the firm as he was required. To
avoid detection, the respondent did not enter these cases into the firm’s
case management system and required the clients pay him directly. The fees
improperly retained by the respondent from the public defender contract and
from the ten drunk driving clients totaled $19,400.
We find that, by his theft of funds that pursuant to agreement
belonged to the law firm, the respondent violated Ind. Professional Conduct
Rule 8.4(b), which provides that an attorney commits professional
misconduct when engaging in a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.
We also find that by lying to his colleagues about those fees, the
respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), which provides that a lawyer
commits professional misconduct when engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
Given our finding of misconduct, we must determine an appropriate
discipline. The parties agree that an 18-month suspension from the
practice of law is warranted. In determining appropriate discipline, we
consider the misconduct, the respondent’s state of mind underlying the
misconduct, the duty of this court to preserve the integrity of the
profession, the risk to the public in allowing the respondent to continue
in practice, and any mitigating or aggravating factors. Matter of Mears,
723 N.E.2d 873 (Ind. 2000).
In mitigation, the parties agree that the respondent paid the firm
$20,000, which included the fees he wrongfully retained plus interest,
within one month after his wrongdoing was discovered and before any
disciplinary investigation was pending. The respondent underwent
counseling and has satisfied the personal financial obligations which
contributed to his decision to commit the misconduct. Joined by members of
his firm, the respondent voluntarily reported his misconduct to the
Disciplinary Commission. He also has met individually with the judges in
Wayne County and with members of the Wayne County Bar Association to admit
his misconduct.
In aggravation, the parties note the respondent planned his conversion
of funds and perpetuated this scheme for at least 18 months by lying about
it on two occasions when members of the firm confronted him. The parties
further agree the respondent’s actions demonstrate a pattern of misconduct
both in terms of the types of funds he converted -- both public defender
contract checks and funds from ten clients -- and in the repetitive nature
of his actions. The parties also note the respondent’s actions were
motivated by personal financial stress and occurred shortly after he
graduated from law school when he was earning from $41,600 to $52,000
annually.
In a similar case, we suspended an attorney who retained fees
belonging to the attorney’s firm. Matter of Miller, 730 N.E.2d 171 (Ind.
2000). Given the respondent’s carefully planned and executed deception in
this case, we conclude that the agreed suspension is appropriate.
Accordingly, the respondent, Ronald J. Moore, is hereby suspended from
the practice of law for not fewer than eighteen (18) months, beginning
November 19, 2001, at the conclusion of which he shall be eligible to
petition for reinstatement pursuant to Admis.Disc.R. 23(4).
The Clerk of this Court is directed to provide notice of this order in
accordance with Admis.Disc.R. 23(3)(d) and to provide the Clerk of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Clerk of each
of the United States District Courts in this state, and the Clerk of each
of the United States Bankruptcy Courts in this state with the last known
address of the respondent as reflected in the records of the Clerk.
Costs of this proceeding are assessed against the respondent.