ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kevin C. C. Wild Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Christopher L. Lafuse
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
JEROME OWENS, )
)
Appellant (Defendant Below), )
)
v. ) No. 49S00-0009-CR-546
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
Cause No. 49G01-9906-CF-109366
September 17, 2001
SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
Convicted murderer Jerome Owens says the trial court should have
excluded his confession because several hours before he confessed he
voluntarily smoked a cigarette laced with embalming fluid, animal
tranquilizer, ether and PCP. It is an impressive factual claim, but we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Owens was the primary suspect in the July 6, 1998, shooting death of
Linda Ferrell. He was eventually arrested on an unrelated charge in
Louisville, Kentucky and brought to Indianapolis for questioning on June
22, 1999. He signed an advisement of rights and a police interviewer asked
him to describe in writing his activities the night of Ferrell’s death.
Owens agreed and wrote a six-page account of his relationship with Ferrell
in which he denied any involvement in her murder. The interviewer pointed
out that the statement contained almost no information about the night of
the murder. Owens then changed his story in a videotaped interview.
Owens explained that Ferrell, a former girlfriend, had once promised
him money for a music recording business if he stayed with her. On the
evening of June 22, 1998, he was living with another woman and facing
eviction, and remembered Ferrell’s offer of financial support. He borrowed
a badly dented white Hyundai Excel that sometimes “cut off” when put in
forward gear, and went to visit Ferrell. He took his 25-caliber
semiautomatic handgun, which he kept cocked at all times.
Ferrell answered the door, but blocked Owens’ entrance. She refused
Owens’ request for money and said that she would not take him back.
Angered, Owens shot Ferrell once in the face, killing her. As Ferrell fell
backward Owens fled, backing the Excel out of the apartment complex at high
speed. Ferrell’s downstairs neighbor heard the gunshot and saw the beat-up
Excel backing rapidly down the street.
Before his trial, Owens sought to suppress his confession, claiming
that he was under the influence of drugs that rendered his statement
involuntary. He testified that about an hour and a half before he arrived
in Indianapolis, he voluntarily smoked a cigarette laced with embalming
fluid, animal tranquilizer, ether and PCP acquired from some unidentified
person at the Louisville jail. The drugs did not affect his ability to
write but slowed down his thinking and actions and made him “stupid,”
“nonchalant,” and willing to say “basically yeah to whatever” for about
five to six hours, during which time he confessed.[1] (R. at 187, 199, 307-
08, 327.) He offered no corroborating evidence for this story.
The trial court denied Owens’ motion to suppress. A jury found Owens
guilty and the judge sentenced him to fifty-five years for murder and a
concurrent 365 days for unlicensed handgun possession. In this direct
appeal, he claims that the trial court should have excluded his confession
because it was not voluntarily and intelligently given.[2]
Voluntary Intoxication and Confessions
The touchstone for admissibility of confessions is whether the
defendant was “compelled . . . to be a witness against himself.” U.S.
Const. amend. V. This inquiry focuses on whether there has been
overreaching or misconduct by the police; there is no Fifth Amendment right
to testify only when well advised or when it is in the defendant’s best
interest. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). A confession may
be inadmissible if the defendant was so intoxicated or impaired as to be
unconscious of what he was doing, or in a state of mania. Luckhart v.
State, 736 N.E.2d 227, 231 (Ind. 2000); Houchin v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1228,
1231 (Ind. 1991). A lesser degree of intoxication goes only to the weight
the finder of fact gives to the confession, not its admissibility.[3]
Brooks v. State, 683 N.E.2d 574, 576 (Ind. 1997) (confession by defendant
claiming to have been under the influence of alcohol and marijuana properly
admitted). In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we consider only the
evidence supporting that decision plus any unrefuted evidence in the
defendant’s favor. Houchin, 581 N.E.2d at 1231.
The Tale of the Tape
The State rebutted Owens’ claim of a drug-related impairment with his
own videotaped statement.[4] Throughout his confession, Owens talked,
gestured and reacted to questions at a normal pace. (R. at 304, State’s
Exh. 12.) He appeared calm but alert, and was responsive to inquiries.
(R. at 304, State’s Exh. 12); see Brooks, 683 N.E.2d at 576 (defendant
appeared relaxed, alert and responsive in videotaped confession). He spoke
distinctly and seemed oriented to his surroundings. (R. at 304, State’s
Exh. 12); see Lambert v. State, 643 N.E.2d 349, 353 (Ind. 1994)(defendant
was oriented as to time and place and did not slur his words). He told his
story in a logical sequence. (R. at 304, State’s Exh. 12); see Lambert,
643 N.E.2d at 353 (defendant recounted events in logical order).
Owens also demonstrated physical coordination as he sipped a soda,
smoked several cigarettes, and initialed his handwritten statement at
various places upon request. (R. at 304, State’s Exh. 12); see Houchin,
581 N.E.2d at 1232 (defendant showed coordination by ability to smoke
cigarettes). He provided a number of details such as what the victim was
wearing (a nightgown) and not wearing (her eyeglasses), where she stood and
how she fell, and the nature and location of her fatal wound. (R. at 304,
State’s Exh. 12.) He displayed awareness of the fix he was in by asking
the interviewer at the conclusion of his statement whether “even if I would
have lied, you still would have known . . . ?” (R. at 304, State’s Exh.
12); see Houchin, 581 N.E.2d at 1232 (defendant displayed awareness of his
situation by asking about his likely sentence).
In short, the videotape does not show that Owens was impaired at all,
and there is no particular claim of compulsion. The trial court did not
err in denying his motion to suppress.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] Owens also claims that the drugs made him “paranoid,” which seems at
odds with his claim that they made him excessively cooperative. (R. at
187.)
[2] In addition to claiming that he was under the influence of drugs, Owens
says his advisement of rights was stale by the time he confessed.
(Appellant’s Br. at 9.) However, the videotape clearly shows the police
interviewer reviewing the previously signed advisement with Owens just
before Owens began telling what happened the night of the murder. (R. at
304, State’s Exh. 12.)
Owens also says he is “of limited intelligence and suffering from mental
health illness.” (R. at 67; Appellant’s Br. at 9.) He offers no
supporting evidence, so this claim is similarly unavailing.
[3] Owens chose to testify at trial, and told the jury about the tainted
cigarette. (R. at 327-30.)
[4] The State verified that Owens was free of the influence of drugs at the
suppression hearing, to allow the trial judge to compare the “real” Owens’
demeanor to the image on the tape. (R. at 203-04.)