ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
ANDREW C. MATERNOWSKI JEFFREY A. MODISETT
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
THOMAS D. PERKINS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
MARVIN D. CASTOR, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
) Supreme Court Cause Number
v. ) 89S00-9803-CR-182
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE WAYNE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Barbara A. Harcourt, Special Judge
Cause No. S2861933CR
ON DIRECT APPEAL
September 13, 2001
RUCKER, Justice
A jury convicted Marvin D. Castor of murder, and the trial court sentenced
him to death. In the initial direct appeal, this Court affirmed Castor’s
conviction but remanded for resentencing. After a new sentencing hearing,
the trial court sentenced Castor to sixty years imprisonment. In this
appeal, Castor contends his sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of
his mental illness. We disagree and therefore affirm.
Factual and Procedural History[1]
In May 1986, Castor worked as a salesman for the Sugar Creek Resort
located near Greenfield, Indiana. The Resort was affiliated with a
business entity known as Collett Ventures. Castor and his brother, who
also worked for the Resort, obtained and reviewed a number of documents
concerning Collett Ventures. They concluded that their employer was
engaged in defrauding lending institutions. Castor decided to approach a
representative of Collett Ventures and request $250,000 in exchange for the
documents.
In a May 6th meeting with Bill Collett, Castor’s superior at Collett
Ventures, Castor demanded payment in exchange for the documents. After
Castor left the office, Collett reported the incident to the Hancock County
Sheriff’s Department, which in turn contacted the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The following day the FBI recorded telephone conversations
between Castor and at least two representatives from Collett Ventures.
During the conversations Castor said he believed Collett Ventures had sent
“hit men” to his house with the intent to injure him. Castor also said
that he was armed to the teeth and that the “hit men” would not intimidate
him. The Collett Ventures representatives assured Castor there were no
“hit men” after him but that his extortion attempt had been reported to the
police. They also discussed with Castor arrangements for paying the money
he demanded.
The next day Castor waited in his pickup truck at the agreed upon
location. Malcolm Grass, a Hancock County deputy sheriff, and a number of
FBI agents arrived to arrest Castor. All the officers arrived in unmarked
vehicles, and none wore uniforms. Witness accounts vary concerning when or
whether the officers announced they were either police or FBI. In any
event, the only visual identification showing the men were law enforcement
personnel was a hat worn by one officer emblazoned with the letters “FBI.”
Both Castor and deputy sheriff Grass exited their vehicles with
weapons drawn. As they faced each other, Castor fired at least two shots.
One bullet struck Grass in the head. He died as a result. Castor
ultimately surrendered. As the FBI agents arrested him, Castor asked if
they were members of the Mafia. He also said that he believed the agents
were “hit men.”
The State charged Castor with murder and sought the death penalty
because Grass was a law enforcement officer acting in the course of his
duty.[2] A jury convicted him as charged and after the penalty phase of
the trial, recommended that the death penalty be imposed. The trial court
accepted the recommendation and sentenced Castor to death.
On direct appeal in 1992, this Court affirmed Castor’s conviction for
murder but reversed the sentence of death and remanded the case to the
trial court for a new penalty
phase hearing. Castor, 587 N.E.2d at 1290. On remand, Castor’s
incompetency to stand trial caused a lengthy series of delays. Ultimately
in 1996, the trial court found Castor competent and conducted a new
sentencing hearing. The trial court found three aggravating factors: (1)
substantial risk that Castor will commit another crime of the same
magnitude as murder; (2) Castor knew Grass was a law enforcement officer
acting in the course of duty when he was murdered; and (3) Castor was in
need of correctional and rehabilitative treatment that could best be
provided by long-term commitment to a penal facility. The trial court
found only one mitigating factor - no history of criminal activity.
Concluding that the aggravating factors outweighed the single mitigating
factor, the trial court sentenced Castor to an enhanced term of sixty
years. This appeal ensued in due course.
Discussion
Castor contends his sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of
his mental illness. He specifically argues that the trial court failed to
consider his severe mental illness as a significant mitigating factor.
Castor also complains the trial court did not adequately articulate its
reasons for using the “in need of correctional or rehabilitative treatment”
aggravator. Determination of sentences is a matter of discretion for the
trial court. Young v. State, 696 N.E.2d 386, 391 (Ind. 1998). However,
when deciding to enhance a sentence, the court must state all significant
aggravating and mitigating factors and articulate the balancing process by
which it determined that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating
ones. I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1; Harris v. State, 659 N.E.2d 522, 527-28 (Ind.
1995).
A claim that the trial court failed to find a mitigating circumstance
requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both
significant and clearly supported by the record. Wallace v. State, 725
N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000); Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ind.
1999). Here, Castor argues that the facts surrounding the deputy sheriff’s
killing, combined with Castor’s competency evaluations, show that he was
mentally ill at the time of the crime. Castor points to his “hit men”
references and his belief that Collett Ventures was involved in illegal
activity to support his claim that the “entire tragedy is a product of []
mental illness.” Br. of Appellant at 19.
Castor has not carried his burden of proof. First, even if his
conduct in 1986 could be described as bizarre or unusual, that does not
necessarily mean that Castor was mentally ill at the time. See, e.g.,
Allen v. State, 716 N.E.2d 449, 455 (Ind. 1999) (finding defendant guilty
despite claim of insanity based in part on testimony that defendant heard a
voice telling him to commit the crime); Garner v. State, 704 N.E.2d 1011,
1014 (Ind. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s claim of insanity even though he
acted strangely prior to committing a murder). Nor does the fact Castor
was subjected to eight competency evaluations between 1992 and 1996
demonstrate that he was mentally ill at the time of the crime. The record
does show that at various times mental health professionals either
testified or submitted reports concluding Castor suffered a mental illness
and was thus unable to assist counsel in his defense. However, there was
no testimony that Castor was mentally ill at the time the crime was
committed. For example, Dr. Richard Lawlor, a clinical psychologist at the
Indiana University School of Medicine, was one of the mental health
professionals who examined Castor on the question of his competency to
stand trial. In a November 1994 hearing, counsel for Castor inquired
whether it was possible that Castor suffered a mental illness at the time
of the crime. Dr. Lawlor responded: “I don’t know whether that would be
true or not . . . . And I think that he was probably able, if it did exist
at that time, to maintain outward control during those periods of time with
the help of what seems to be a significant amount of intelligence.” R. at
2371.
It is true that mental illness at the time of the crime may be
considered a significant mitigating factor. Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d
1262, 1271 (Ind. 1996). However, in this case whether Castor actually
suffered a mental illness in May 1986 is not clearly supported by the
record. On this point we find no error in the trial court’s sentencing.
As for Castor’s complaint that the trial court did not adequately
articulate its reasons for imposing the “in need of correctional or
rehabilitative treatment” aggravator, the law provides that when relying on
this aggravator, a trial court must articulate why the specific defendant
requires corrective or rehabilitative treatment that could best be provided
by commitment to a penal facility for a period of time in excess of the
presumptive sentence. Ford v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (Ind. 1999).
The record shows the trial court cited this aggravator because Castor “has
been incarcerated since May 1986, and Defendant continues to make threats
of killings while awaiting trial on the murder charge, and after conviction
of murder and awaiting retrial on the penalty phase . . . .” R. at 3174-
75. This statement identifies Castor’s subsequent conduct as justification
for the imposition of the aggravator and is sufficient to support its use
by the trial court.
The Indiana Constitution confers upon this Court the power to review
and revise sentences. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4. However, we will not
revise a sentence unless it is “manifestly unreasonable in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate
Rule 7(B) (formerly App.R. 17(B)); Johnson v. State, 734 N.E.2d 242, 246
(Ind. 2000). In this case we conclude that a sixty-year sentence for
murdering a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duty, knowing
that he was in fact an officer, is not manifestly unreasonable.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] A more detailed summary of the facts can be found in Castor’s
original appeal. See Castor v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1281, 1283-85 (Ind.
1992).
[2] See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(6)(A) (listing law enforcement
officer killed while acting in the course of duty as an aggravating factor
for which the State may seek a death sentence or a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole).