Attorney for Appellant
Michael S. Greene
Indianapolis, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Attorney General of Indiana
Timothy W. Beam
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
WILLIAM WOODFORD,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
)
) Supreme Court No.
) 20S00-0007-CR-395
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)
)
)
)
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APPEAL FROM THE ELKHART CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Terry Shewmaker, Judge
Cause No. 20C01-9912-CF-140
ON DIRECT APPEAL
August 3, 2001
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Defendant William Woodford was convicted of possessing in excess of
three grams of cocaine with intent to deliver after nine rocks were
discovered in a stolen truck in which he had been riding. We affirm,
finding the drugs were discovered in a permissible inventory search of the
truck and sufficient evidence that the weight of the cocaine seized
exceeded three grams.
Background
The facts most favorable to the judgment indicate that in the early
morning hours on December 24, 1999, Officer Sawyer stopped a truck for a
faulty light above the license plate and for failing to stop at a stop
sign. As the truck pulled over, Officer Sawyer observed the passenger
reach underneath the passenger seat. There were two occupants in the
truck: Stephen Brooks (the driver) and Defendant William Woodford (the
passenger).
Officer Sawyer asked Brooks for his driver’s license and vehicle
registration. Brooks gave the officer his identification, but said that he
could not find the registration. Defendant offered an explanation that the
truck was owned by his friend, “Mike.”[1] Officer Sawyer asked Defendant
for his identification, but Defendant gave the officer an out-of-state
driver’s license and a triple A card both belonging to one Marvin Allen.
The officer noticed that the age and picture portrayed on the out-of-state
license did not match Defendant’s characteristics.
Officer Sawyer returned to his patrol car to run a check on the
license plate number and discovered that one James Frame was the owner of
the truck. The officer also found that the Marvin Allen, described on the
driver’s license given by Defendant, had a warrant out for his arrest. At
that point, Sergeant Randy Kantner arrived at the scene. Officer Sawyer
conveyed to Sergeant Kantner that he suspected the truck was stolen.
Officer Sawyer returned to the truck and questioned Brooks about the
owner, but Brooks claimed that he did not know and that he was driving it
for Defendant. Officer Sawyer placed Brooks in the police car until he
could verify the true owner. Meanwhile, Sergeant Kantner recognized
Defendant as “William Woodford,” and Defendant confirmed his true identity.
Officer Sawyer then arrested Defendant for false informing. Officer
Sawyer also ran a background check on Defendant and discovered that
Defendant had an outstanding warrant for possession of cocaine. Brooks and
Defendant were transported to the police station for investigation.
After Officer Sawyer was unable to verify the true owner of the truck
at the scene, he took the truck into police custody. At the Goshen police
station, Officer Sawyer continued his efforts to find the true owner, but
was unsuccessful. At that point, Officer Sawyer decided to impound the
vehicle and perform an inventory search pursuant to standard Goshen Police
Department policy. Under the passenger’s seat, Officer Sawyer discovered
nine individually wrapped pieces of a controlled substance later identified
as 3.2 grams of crack cocaine. The officer also found a baggy containing
what was later determined to be .04 grams of heroin. At some point,
Officer Sawyer received a stolen vehicle report from Elkhart City Police
Department that matched the pickup truck in which Defendant was arrested.
The State charged Defendant with Possession of Cocaine in Excess of
Three Grams With Intent to Deliver, a Class A Felony,[2] Possession of
Heroin, a Class D Felony, [3] and with being a Habitual Offender.[4] On
January 27, 2000, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine
evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. The jury found Defendant
guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Defendant to three years
for possession of heroin and 40 years for dealing in cocaine, both to be
served concurrently. The trial court then enhanced the sentence by 30
years for the habitual offender determination, which was to be served
consecutively with the dealing in cocaine sentence. Defendant was
sentenced to a total of 70 years in prison.
Discussion
I
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress cocaine evidence discovered during an alleged unlawful
inventory search. He argues that the evidence was the fruit of an illegal
impoundment, and therefore it should have been suppressed.
The Fourth Amendment[5] protects persons from unreasonable search and
seizure and this protection has been extended to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
650 (1961). Generally, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches
and seizures. See Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 143 (Ind. 1999),
reh’g denied. When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has
the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed
at the time of the search. See Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind.
1998) (citing Brown v. State, 691 N.E.2d 438, 443 (Ind. 1998)). One well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement is an inventory search of a
vehicle. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987); South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976); Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 431
(Ind. 1993).
In determining the propriety of an inventory search, the threshold
question is whether the impoundment itself was proper. See Fair, 627
N.E.2d at 430. An impoundment is warranted when it is part of “routine
administrative caretaking functions” of the police, see Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 370 n.5, or when it is authorized by state statute, see Goliday v.
State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 7 (Ind. 1999); see, e.g., Ind. Code § 9-18-2-43
(1998). To prove a valid inventory search under the community caretaking
function, the State must demonstrate that: (1) “the belief that the vehicle
posed some threat or harm to the community or was itself imperiled was
consistent with objective standards of sound policing,” and (2) “the
decision to combat that threat by impoundment was in keeping with
established departmental routine or regulation.”[6] Fair, 627 N.E.2d at
433.
In this case, Officer Sawyer’s justification for taking the truck into
police custody was that he suspected that it was stolen. His belief was
based on the fact that Defendant presented false identification and
Defendant claimed that the truck belonged to an individual named “Mike” yet
the check on the plate number revealed that the owner’s name was James
Frame. Officer Sawyer and Sergeant Kantner repeatedly questioned both
Defendant and Brooks regarding the true identity of the owner, but to no
avail. Indeed, both Defendant and Brooks’s lawful possession of the pickup
truck was in doubt. The decision to impound was made after the ownership
of the truck could not be verified[7] and after Defendant had been lawfully
arrested for false informing. The stolen vehicle report on the pickup
truck, which was received later that day, confirms that the arresting
officer’s decision to impound the truck was reasonable under the
circumstances. We find that the arresting officer’s decision to impound
the pickup truck was justified. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369 (noting that
one caretaking function justifying impoundment is when the “police …
attempt to determine whether a vehicle has been stolen ... .”); see also
Vehorn v. State, 717 N.E.2d 869, 875 (Ind. 1999) (ruling that impoundment
was justified where the defendant-driver was arrested for carrying a
concealed weapon in a vehicle that was reported stolen); Fair, 627 N.E.2d
at 433 (recognizing that the community caretaking function is implicated
where ownership of the vehicle cannot be established) (citing United States
v. Young, 825 F.2d 60, 651(1984), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1012 (1988), and
Madison v. United States, 512 A.2d 279 (D.C. 1986)).
Next, we must determine whether the scope of the inventory search was
lawful.
To pass constitutional muster, the search itself must be performed pursuant
to standard police procedures. See Vehorn, 717 N.E.2d at 875 (citing Fair,
627 N.E.2d at 435) (citing in turn Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375). In this
case, Officer Sawyer testified that when he conducted the inventory search,
he followed written department policy. Officer Sawyer testified that while
performing the inventory search, he “opened the passenger side door” and in
plain view, he saw a “clear plastic baggie” containing a “rock-like
substance” which appeared to be cocaine located underneath the passenger
seat. (R. at 237-38, 339.) Officer Sawyer testified further that in plain
view, he observed a folded dollar bill and inside found a “white powder
substance,” identified as heroin. (R. at 238, 341.) Officer Sawyer listed
all items in the inventory form, not just the incriminating evidence.
Pursuant to standard departmental policy, the officer completed and signed
a standard inventory form.
Because the Goshen police officers were justified in impounding the
pickup truck and followed standard operating procedures, the inventory
search was reasonable. The trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion
to suppress.
II
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain
his conviction for dealing in cocaine because the State failed to meet its
burden showing that “the weight of the cocaine was three grams or over.”
Appellant’s Br. at 14.
In order to obtain a conviction on this charge as a Class B Felony,
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1)
possessed cocaine (2) with intent to deliver. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-
1(a)(2); Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1274-75 (Ind. 1997). The
conviction is elevated to a Class A Felony if the State proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that the amount of cocaine possessed weighed three grams
or more. See id. § 35-48-4-1(b)(1).
When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court neither
reweighs the evidence nor assesses the credibility of the witnesses. See
Brasher v. State, 746 N.E.2d 71, 72 (Ind. 2001). We only consider the
evidence most favorable to the jury’s verdict, along with all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom, and will affirm a conviction if the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could
have led the jury to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Chambliss v. State, 746 N.E.2d 73, 77 (Ind. 2001).
As discussed in Part I supra, a lawful inventory search of the pickup
truck led to the discovery of nine individually wrapped rocks of what
Officer Sawyer believed to be cocaine underneath the passenger seat. At
trial, forensic scientist specializing in drug analysis Jill McBride
testified that she randomly selected two of the rocks and that this
representative sample tested positive for cocaine. McBride did not test
the remaining seven rocks. She testified that all nine rocks were
“consistent in color, dryness, and wetness,” which generally shows that
they are all the same substance. (R. at 493.) It is an undisputed fact
that one tested rock crack weighed .33 grams, and the other weighed .43
grams. It is also undisputed that the total weight of the nine rocks
equaled 3.21 grams.
On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the element of possession
under Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(2). Rather, he contends that because the
forensic scientist only tested two of the nine rocks seized, an amount
totaling only .76 grams of cocaine, the State did not meet its burden that
the amount of cocaine was over three grams as required by Indiana Code § 35-
48-4-1(b)(1). Defendant argues that her testimony was “insufficient to
establish that the seven untested rocks were cocaine,” Appellant’s Br. at
14, thus there was insufficient evidence to convict him of dealing in
cocaine.
For a dealing in cocaine conviction, this Court has said, “‘The total
weight of the delivered drug and not its pure component is to be considered
in prosecutions.’” Riley v. State, 711 N.E.2d 489, 493 (Ind. 1990)
(upholding a dealing in cocaine conviction in an amount of three grams or
more where the lab technician performed a sample tested positive for
cocaine—one group of packages weighed 10.15 grams, and the other group
weighed 6.21 grams) (quoting Tobias v. State, 479 N.E.2d 508, 511 (Ind.
1985), reh’g denied.); see also Evans v. State, 566 N.E.2d 1037, 1042 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that there was
insufficient evidence in dealing in cocaine in the amount of three grams or
more because the lab technician did not test each individual rock cocaine).
Here, it is undisputed that the total weight of the nine rocks equaled
3.21 grams, and the two-rock sample from this group tested positive for
cocaine. As such, the testing of a representative sample consisting of two
rocks of cocaine was sufficient for Defendant’s dealing in cocaine
conviction. Because it is within the jury’s province to assess the
credibility of all witnesses and weigh the evidence, we will not reassess
or reweigh on review the evidence it heard. The evidence was ample to
support the jury’s verdict.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
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[1] During this time, Officer Sawyer smelled alcohol emanating from
the truck. Defendant showed the officer an open beer bottle and explained
that it had spilled in the truck.
[2] Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(b)(1) (1998).
[3] Id. § 35-48-4-6.
[4] Id. § 35-50-2-8 (1998).
[5] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as
follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
[6] In United States v. Cooley, the court observed that the Seventh
Circuit has implicitly rejected the Fair analysis that impoundment is
justified where the vehicle itself is imperiled. 119 F. Supp.2d 824, 827
(N.D. Ind. 2000) (discussing United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346 (7th Cir.
1996) (“While protection of the arrestee’s property and municipal liability
are both valid reasons to conduct an inventory after a legal impoundment,
they do not establish the a priori legitimacy of the seizure.”) (emphasis
added)). We adhere to our reasoning in Fair.
[7] Officer Sawyer testified at trial, “In the past, sometimes we’ve
towed vehicles from the scene not knowing who they belonged to and then the
owner has to pay for that expense. If we drive it down to the station, and
try to get a hold of the people that own it, sometimes they’ll just come
and get it and saves them expense and headache.” (R. at 335.)