Attorney for Appellant
Richard L. Tandy
Indianapolis, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Karen Freeman-Wilson
Attorney General of Indiana
Andrew L. Hedges
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
TIMOTHY GREER,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
)
) Supreme Court No.
) 41S00-0003-CR-00228
)
)
)
)
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APPEAL FROM THE JOHNSON SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable James K. Coachys, Judge
Cause No. 41D01-9805-CF-00065
ON DIRECT APPEAL
June 28, 2001
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Defendant Timothy Greer pled guilty to felony murder for shooting a
man while robbing a gun store. He was sentenced to life in prison without
parole. We find that the trial court did not err by allowing the State to
present evidence regarding the details of the crime during the sentencing
hearing. We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Background
The record indicates that on October 4, 1997, Defendant and two
juvenile accomplices robbed a gun store in Greenwood, Indiana. Defendant
drove the two juveniles to the gun store, and after walking in, told the
clerk, Stephen Stapleton, to put his hands up. While Stapleton had his
hands up, Defendant shot him multiple times without provocation. Stapleton
died as a result of these gunshots.
Several days after the killing, the State charged Defendant with the
knowing murder of Stapleton.[1] Indiana law authorizes the State to seek a
sentence of death or of life without parole "by alleging, on a page
separate from the rest of the charging instrument, the existence of at
least one of the aggravating circumstances" listed in the statute governing
the imposition of such sentences.[2] In May, 1998, the State made the
requisite filing to seek a death sentence, alleging that Defendant
intentionally killed Stapleton while committing a robbery. (Intentionally
killing while committing robbery is an aggravating circumstance listed in
the death penalty statute.[3]) The State also amended the charging
information to add felony murder,[4] conspiracy to commit robbery, and
robbery counts.[5]
In October, 1999, the State made the requisite filing to seek a
sentence of life without parole, again alleging as the aggravating
circumstance that Defendant intentionally killed Stapleton while committing
a robbery. At the same time, Defendant and the State entered into and
filed a plea agreement. Under its terms, Defendant pled guilty to Felony
Murder and admitted the charged aggravating circumstance of intentionally
killing while committing robbery.[6] In exchange, the State dropped all
other charges and agreed not to seek the death penalty. The plea agreement
stipulated that “[t]he parties may present evidence relevant to the
aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances listed in” the statute
governing a sentence of life without parole. (Id.) The parties also
agreed that the trial court could decide to sentence Defendant either to
life without parole or to a term of years. (Id.)
Unlike a case in which the State seeks a sentence of life without
parole that goes to trial, there is no sentencing phase before a jury when
a defendant pleads guilty to the underlying murder. Rather, sentencing is
conducted entirely by the court.[7] Under the statute, the court is
required to find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt at
least one of the aggravating circumstances set forth in the statute.[8]
The court must then weigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances so
proven against any mitigating circumstances that it finds to exist.[9] A
sentence of life without parole is only permissible if the court finds that
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating
circumstances.[10] At the sentencing hearing in this case, the State
presented witnesses and evidence regarding the details of the crime and
Defendant presented evidence in an effort to demonstrate the existence of
mitigating circumstances. The trial court subsequently sentenced Defendant
to life in prison without parole.
Discussion
I
Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by
permitting the State to present testimony at the sentencing hearing
regarding certain facts of the crime. Defendant argues that the testimony
of the State’s witnesses led the court to consider non-statutory
aggravating circumstances.
A sentence of life imprisonment without parole is imposed under the
same standards and is subject to the same requirements as the death
penalty. Pope v. State, 737 N.E.2d 374, 382 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied;
Nicholson v. State, 734 N.E.2d 1047, 1048 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied; Rawley
v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (Ind. 2000); Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d
921, 936 (Ind. 1998). Defendant contends that the trial court considered
non-statutory aggravating circumstances in violation of Bivins v. State,
642 N.E.2d 928, 955 (Ind. 1994), cert denied, 516 U.S. 1077 (1996). In
Bivins, this Court held that the aggravating circumstances in a capital
case are narrowed to those charged by the State and found beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. “When the death sentence is sought, courts must
henceforth limit the aggravating circumstances eligible for consideration
to those specified in the death penalty statute, Indiana Code Section 35-50-
2-9(b).” Id.
Defendant’s plea agreement stated that he would “admit to and agree
that, as an aggravating circumstance under [Ind. Code] § 35-50-2-
9(b)(1)(G), he committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim
while committing robbery.” During the sentencing hearing, the State
presented evidence and called two witnesses. It also introduced
photographs of the victim and robbery scene, a list of the weapons that
were stolen and subsequently recovered, and an autopsy photo showing the
victim’s wounds. The State indicated that it called its first witness,
Officer John Laut, “to be the sponsor of [the] photographs, autopsy and
weapons list.” The State also called one of Defendant’s accomplices to
testify “as to what took place inside the gun store when the robbery took
place.”
There is no indication that the trial court considered non-statutory
aggravating circumstances by hearing the testimony of the two State
witnesses. Indeed, the court in its sentencing order explicitly said that
it had considered “nothing else in aggravation” other than the charged
aggravating circumstance.
We believe this information was properly presented to the trial court
for at least two reasons. First, although Defendant stipulated that he had
intentionally killed Stapleton while committing robbery, the trial court
still had an independent obligation under the statute to find that the
State had proved the existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (1998). It was certainly
prudent, if not necessary, for the State to make such a showing independent
of Defendant’s statement. Second, in determining whether life without
parole is an appropriate sentence, the court must weigh aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. See id. Moreover, the trial court must issue a
detailed explanation of the factors and the weighing process that lead to
its determination to impose the sentence. See Harrison v. State, 644
N.E.2d 1243, 1262 (Ind. 1995), cert denied, 529 U.S. 1088 (2000). To
perform its weighing responsibilities and to issue a sufficiently detailed
order, the trial court needed to know the details of Defendant’s crime.
The testimony and evidence presented by the State was relevant to that end.
II
Defendant contends that the trial court improperly sentenced him.
Specifically, he argues that the trial court either did not recognize, or
give enough weight to, certain mitigating circumstances.
As described in Part I, supra, the trial court’s duty when considering
whether to impose a sentence of life without parole following a guilty plea
includes the following steps. First, the trial court must find that the
State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the
aggravating circumstances listed in the death penalty statute exists.[11]
Second, the trial court must find that any mitigating circumstances that
exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances.[12]
Third, the trial court must make a record of its reasons for selecting the
sentence that it imposes. See Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d at 1262. In
arriving at its own separate determination as to whether the death penalty
is an appropriate punishment, the sentencing court is to point out its
employment of this process in specific and clear findings. Id. The trial
court's statement of reasons (i) must identify each mitigating and
aggravating circumstance found, (ii) must include the specific facts and
reasons which lead the court to find the existence of each such
circumstance, (iii) must articulate that the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in determination of the
sentence, and (iv) must set forth the trial court's personal conclusion
that the sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender and this
crime. Id.
At the sentencing hearing, Defendant argued that the following
mitigating circumstances existed: Defendant had no significant history of
prior criminal conduct; Defendant was under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance when the murder was committed; the “victim was a
participant in, or consented to, [D]efendant’s conduct;” Defendant was an
accomplice in a murder committed by another person and his participation
was relatively minor; Defendant was acting under the substantial domination
of another person; Defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or
intoxication.
The trial court considered each of the purported mitigating
circumstances in a careful and complete sentencing order that complied in
all respects with applicable law. The trial court weighed the aggravating
circumstance with the mitigating circumstances. The only aggravating
circumstance, which Defendant stipulated to in the plea agreement, was
intentionally killing during the commission of a robbery. The trial court
ultimately found that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the
mitigating circumstances. Although we give some attention to each of
Defendant's claims, particularly given the care and comprehensiveness of
the trial court's order, we find no basis for a detailed review and re-
examination of its findings and conclusions.
Lack of Prior Criminal History. Although Defendant argues that the
trial court did not give enough weight to the mitigating factor that he has
no significant history of prior criminal conduct, see Appellant’s Br. at 14-
15, the trial court's sentencing order did review Defendant’s lack of
significant prior criminal history, ultimately finding it a mitigating
circumstance with “significant weight.” As such, Defendant's argument is
essentially that the trial court did not give this factor enough weight to
equal or outweigh the effect of the aggravating circumstance.
We find the trial court’s analysis supported by the evidence.
Defendant’s criminal history was slight but he had been convicted of
carrying a firearm without a permit on November 19, 1996, and had committed
several uncharged criminal acts shortly before he murdered Stapleton.
While Defendant argues that his handgun conviction resulted only after he
voluntarily summoned the police so that he could dispose of two guns (an AK-
47 and a shotgun), he intentionally attempted to withhold two other
firearms from the police on that occasion.
Influence of Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance. Defendant
argues that the court did not give enough weight to the mitigating
circumstance that he “was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance when the murder was committed.” Defendant contends
that the trial court placed insufficient weight on the mitigating
circumstance that he was suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
See Appellant’s Br. at 25. In particular, he contends that Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder impaired his ability to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement s of law.
During the sentencing hearing, Defendant offered testimony to show
that he was severely mentally or emotionally disturbed at the time of the
murder. Pamela Porter testified that Defendant was abused as a child and
that his abuse contributed to a feeling of insecurity. According to
Porter, Defendant felt alienated throughout his childhood, especially
because nobody intervened on his behalf. At the time of the murder,
Defendant again felt unsafe, this time because of local gang activity.
Porter testified that Defendant’s fear from the gang activity in the area
set off “emotional triggers ... that related back to his childhood.”
Specifically, Defendant had feelings of “impending doom,” and a desire to
protect himself and one of his juvenile accomplices, Clayton Holmes.
Dr. John P. Wilson, a specialist in post-traumatic stress disorders
testified that Defendant was suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome.
Dr. Wilson testified that Defendant underwent a psycho-biological change
as a response to childhood abuse. According to Dr. Wilson, Defendant
“suffere[d] from the effects of his childhood abuse that take[s] the form
of post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety disorder and other features that
go with that, which [Dr. Wilson] would include as depression and also
personality alterations.”
Dr. Wilson also testified that Defendant felt that he and Clayton
were in danger from a gang. Due to Defendant’s psychological disorders,
Defendant felt the need to protect himself and Clayton. Defendant sought
out help from authorities to no avail and finally decided to take action
himself. Dr. Wilson testified that Defendant might have shot the clerk
because, whether or not the clerk was reaching for the gun, Defendant may
have perceived that the clerk was going for his gun.
The trial court found that the mitigating circumstance that Defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (in
particular, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) when the murder was committed
did exist. The trial court placed “some, but less than significant,
weight” on it. We find the record supports the trial court's conclusion.
The trial court considered the evidence of Defendant’s attachment to
Holmes, his feelings of insecurity, and his perception that society had
failed to protect him. The trial court concluded:
[T]his mitigating circumstance does exist and the court gives it some
weight ..., but less than significant weight because there was no
evidence that Defendant’s Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in any way
prevented him from knowing right from wrong, or prevented him from
making choices about his conduct, or justified or excused the act of
intentionally killing another human being.
(R. at 518.) The record indicates that the trial court carefully
scrutinized and evaluated the psychological evidence. The psychological
evidence presented by Defendant does suggest that his traumatic childhood
contributed to a heightened feeling that he needed to protect himself and
Clayton. This could explain Defendant’s decision to rob a gun store.
Defendant’s psychological disorder is less convincing as a mitigating
circumstance in respect of his shooting Stapleton multiple times with no
provocation. We find the trial court’s analysis supported by the record.
Defendant shot an unarmed man in the course of a robbery and, according to
Defendant’s own witnesses, he knew right from wrong. The claim that he
shot Stapleton as a result of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or of feelings
of insecurity caused by a troubled childhood seems highly attenuated.
Victim Contribution to the Crime. Defendant agues that the court
abused its discretion by failing to find as a mitigating circumstance that
the victim contributed to the crime. Defendant directs this Court to his
own statements indicating that at the time of the shooting, he thought
Stapleton was reaching for a gun. See Appellant’s Br. at 20. Even if this
were so, it would not constitute a circumstance of a victim contributing to
the crime. As such, we find the record supports the trial court's finding
that Stapleton did not contribute to the crime. Furthermore, during the
sentencing hearing, one of Defendant's accomplices testified that the
victim had his hands up when Defendant shot him. And Defendant's
sentencing memorandum concedes that “[n]one of the evidence before the
court gives rise to this mitigating circumstance.” (R. at 494.)
Domination of another. Defendant argues as a mitigating circumstance
that he was acting under the domination of another person. He contends
that the trial court “failed to consider the ... the relationship between”
himself and one of his juvenile accomplices, Clayton Holmes. The trial
court considered this argument, finding:
Defendant argues that the systematic abuse perpetrated upon him
throughout his childhood severely retarded his emotional maturity such
that he had the maturity and reasoning of his teen-age co-defendants.
He further asserts that because he perceived his “adopted” brother,
Clayton Holmes, was at risk and that Clayton Holmes was the one more
interested in the robbery, that somehow Defendant was acting in some
degree under the domination and effect of ‘his relationship with
Clayton Holmes.’
(R. at 516.) (quotations in original) The trial court concluded that
“there was no credible evidence presented that it was Clayton Holmes who
instigated and planned the robbery and there was no credible evidence that
Defendant was acting under the substantial domination of Clayton Holmes.”
(R. at 517) (emphases in original.). The record supports the trial court's
finding.
Conclusion
We express our appreciation for the trial court's careful and
complete sentencing order. Such orders facilitate appellate review. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (1) (1993).
[2] Id. § 35-50-2-9(a) (Supp. 1996).
[3] Id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) (Supp. 1996).
[4] Id. § 35-42-1-1 (1993).
[5] Id. § 35-42-5-1 (1993)
[6] Id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G) (Supp. 1996).
[7] Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (1998).
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(i)(1) (1998).
[12] Id. § 35-50-2-9(i)(2).