ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
J. Richard Kiefer
Andrew J. Borland
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Attorney General of Indiana
Timothy W. Beam
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
__________________________________________________________________
RYAN PRATT, )
)
Appellant (Defendant Below), )
)
v. ) Indiana Supreme Court
) Cause No. 49S00-0004-CR-265
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). )
__________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Cale J. Bradford, Judge
Cause No. 49G03-9907-CF-120073
__________________________________________________________________
ON DIRECT APPEAL
__________________________________________________________________
March 27, 2001
BOEHM, Justice.
Ryan Pratt was convicted of murder, battery, and neglect of a
dependent and sentenced to sixty years imprisonment. The victim was
Pratt’s eleven-month-old son, Dylan Pratt. In this direct appeal, he
contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Factual and Procedural Background
Dylan was born with amniotic band syndrome which resulted in severe
deformities including an extra tissue appendage on his head, missing tissue
from both eyelids, a cleft lip and gum, joined fingers, and the loss of his
left leg below the thigh bone. In addition, he had difficulty breathing,
difficulty keeping food down, and suffered from apnea, which is defined as
the “transient cessation of respiration.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 54 (10th ed. 1993). Because of these problems, Dylan was in and
out of the hospital suffering from a “failure to thrive.” On each
occasion, after being admitted to the hospital, Dylan gained weight and was
then released into his parents’ care.
On February 9, 1999, Dylan was again admitted to the hospital. Dylan
gained weight and the doctors concluded he should be placed in the Parent
Care Unit (PCU), in an effort to educate his parents in his care including
medication and feeding. An apnea monitor measured Dylan’s heart and
respiratory rate. An alarm sounded if Dylan’s heart or respiratory rate
exceeded set parameters or if the leads attached to his body became loose
or unattached. Pratt and Dylan’s mother, Melody Brown, alternated watching
Dylan while he was in the PCU. Pratt was alone with Dylan on the night of
Saturday, February 20, 1999. The apnea monitor registered an alert twice
that evening, before it was turned off until 7:00 a.m. Sunday morning.
On Sunday morning, Dr. Jill Mazurek examined Dylan and noted that he
appeared to be sleeping and his heartbeat and lungs were normal. As
Mazurek was leaving the room, the alarm sounded, but was silenced when
Pratt adjusted the leads. Mazurek heard the alarm a second time from the
hall and sent in a nurse to check Dylan’s condition. Katie Hirsch, a
nurse, entered the room as Pratt was trying to silence the alarm. Hirsch
thought Dylan looked very gray and immediately called for help. Two
doctors entered the room, noticed Dylan’s blue color, and started
cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
Dylan was transferred to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit where
Melody noticed a “puffy bruise” on his head that had not been there when
she left on Friday. She reported the bruise to the staff, who in turn
alerted Dr. Melda Ackerman. Ackerman ordered a series of CT scans that
showed that Dylan had a poor gray-white brain differentiation that could be
a sign of brain swelling. This led the hospital to call Dr. Roberta
Hibbard, the director of child protection programs at the Indiana
University Medical Center, and an Indianapolis police officer. Hibbard
discovered two cylindrical bruises approximately two and one half inches
apart on Dylan’s head, and a pattern of bruising on Dylan’s back and
buttocks. This bruising resulted in a laceration to Dylan’s kidney. In
Dylan’s room, the police officer found a phone that matched the bruises on
Dylan’s head. The officer then interviewed Brown concerning Dylan’s
injuries. As Brown left the interview, the officer overhead her tell
Pratt, “Don’t worry, I didn’t tell the Detective anything.”
Another doctor examined the recordings of the apnea monitor for the
night of February 20. In addition to discovering that it was turned off
for most of the night, the doctor also believed that the readings from
Sunday morning were consistent with a child with a herniated brain,
suggesting that the blows causing the bruises occurred before the monitor
was reactivated Sunday morning.
Dylan died on March 5, 1999, as a result of blunt force trauma to the
head. Pratt was found guilty of murder, battery, and neglect of a
dependent. The trial court merged the battery and murder convictions and
sentenced Pratt to sixty years for the murder, to be served concurrently
with three years for neglect of a dependant.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Pratt contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
murder or battery.[1] When reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the
evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of
witnesses. Spurlock v. State, 675 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ind. 1996). We look to
the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the
verdict and will affirm a conviction if evidence of probative value exists
from which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. Mere presence at the crime scene with the opportunity to
commit a crime is not a sufficient basis on which to support a conviction.
Roop v. State, 730 N.E.2d 1267, 1271 (Ind. 2000); Wilson v. State, 455
N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (Ind. 1983). However, presence at the scene in
connection with other circumstances tending to show participation may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction. Roop, 730 N.E.2d at 1271.
When Brown left Dylan on Saturday evening, Dylan was not injured.
According to Pratt’s own account, he is the only person who stayed in the
room with Dylan until Hirsch called the doctors. The undisputed medical
evidence is that Dylan died from blows to the head; the only issue is the
source.[2]
According to Pratt, any number of nurses or doctors could have beaten
Dylan. Evidence suggesting these possibilities was presented to and
rejected by the jury. Pratt also claims that there was no eyewitness or
direct testimony that he hit Dylan or even acted in a hostile manner
towards his son. Although this is true, it is well established that
“circumstantial evidence will be deemed sufficient if inferences may
reasonably be drawn that enable the trier of fact to find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bonds v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1238, 1242
(Ind. 1999).
The evidence established that when Brown left Dylan on Saturday night,
he was not bruised. Pratt was in the room with Dylan until the nurse
called for help, and the bruising was discovered shortly thereafter. The
bruising pattern was consistent with the phone that was in the room with
Pratt and Dylan.[3] During the night, while Pratt was with Dylan, the
apnea monitor was turned off. When it was reactivated, a doctor testified
that the reading was consistent with a child with a herniated brain.
Although any one of these items alone does not establish that Pratt
murdered Dylan, taken together with the reasonable inferences therefrom,
there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found
Pratt guilty. Roop, 730 N.E.2d at 1270-71.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] Because the trial court merged the battery conviction into the murder
conviction, here we address only the sufficiency of the evidence with
regard to the murder conviction. Cutter v. State, 725 N.E.2d 401, 407 n.2
(Ind. 2000).
[2] Pratt also claims that there is insufficient evidence to establish that
he “knowingly” killed Dylan. His argument under this section focuses on
the lack of evidence that he committed the crime, not on whether Dylan’s
injuries were the result of “engag[ing] in conduct with an awareness that
the conduct has a high probability of resulting in death.” Jackson v.
State, 728 N.E.2d 147, 153 (Ind. 2000). Because he does not present a
cogent argument in support of this contention, it is waived. Former
Ind.Appellate Rule 8.3(A)7 (now App.R. 46(A)8).
[3] Citing Samek v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1286, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997),
Pratt claims that the State failed to properly preserve the telephone for
fingerprint and tissue analysis and that this “may violate a defendant’s
due process rights.” In a situation such as this, where the evidence is
merely potentially useful evidence, the defendant must show that the
State’s failure to preserve the evidence was committed in bad faith in
order to prove a violation of his due process rights. Id. Pratt has not
done so here.