ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Susan K. Carpenter Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, IN Indianapolis, IN
Tracy A. Nelson Eileen Euzen
Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
CONTRICE L. CARTER )
)
Appellant (Defendant Below), ) 02S03-0005-PC-330
) in the Supreme Court
v. )
) 02A03-9905-PC-191
STATE OF INDIANA, ) in the Court of Appeals
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). )
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable John F. Surbeck, Jr., Judge
Cause No. 02D04-9307-CF-519
November 28, 2000
SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
Appellant Contrice L. Carter pled guilty in the middle of his jury
trial. The court took his plea under advisement and scheduled a sentencing
hearing. Carter later sought to withdraw his plea, saying he was innocent.
He contends that he was entitled to withdraw the plea because the request
came before the court formally accepted it. A divided Court of Appeals
rejected this contention. Carter v. State, 724 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000). We grant transfer and affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
During an argument in Fort Wayne on July 5, 1993, Carter shot and
killed Alvinchy Washington. The State charged Carter with murder. On
September 7, 1993, Carter’s trial began and a jury was empaneled. The
court then recessed for depositions related to an alibi defense it had
allowed Carter to raise belatedly. Upon learning that the witnesses
deposed did not corroborate Carter’s version of events, Carter asked his
counsel if it was too late to change his plea.
The next day, based upon an agreement with the prosecutor, Carter pled
guilty to voluntary manslaughter. He was fully and properly advised of his
constitutional rights and the implications of his plea. (R. at 39, 192-
99.) He affirmed that the plea was made freely and voluntarily, and
without duress. (R. at 201.) He gave a factual account of the
circumstances of the crime.[1] (R. at 202-03.) The court discharged the
jury and set a date for sentencing. It deferred formal acceptance of the
plea for a month pending review of the pre-sentencing investigation
report.[2]
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court asked Carter if he was
satisfied with the manner in which he had been represented. Carter had
earlier answered the same question affirmatively, in the course of giving
his plea. (R. at 201.) At sentencing, however, Carter said:
Okay, from the beginning, you know what I’m saying, I was telling [my
attorney] that I didn’t do it right, but you know, when push come to
shove and I couldn’t prove that I didn’t do it, she you know what I’m
saying, told me that I should sign a plea bargain right, and she’s
supposed to be my lawyer, you know what I’m saying, if I’m maintaining
my innocence she’s supposed to be pushing with that for me no matter
what the outcome could be.
(R. at 210-11.)
The trial judge said, “If this then is to be taken as a motion or a
suggestion that the plea of guilty be set aside, I’ll deny that request and
we will proceed now with sentencing.”[3] (R. at 216-17.) The court
accepted the plea and sentenced Carter to thirty years in prison in
accordance with the plea bargain.
I. Indiana’s Stance on “Best Interest” Pleas
In 1953, this Court held that “a plea of guilty tendered by one who in
the same breath protests his innocence, or declares he actually does not
know whether or not he is guilty, is no plea at all.” Harshman v. State,
232 Ind. 618, 621, 115 N.E.2d 501, 502 (1953) (emphasis added).[4] A valid
guilty plea is a confession of guilt made directly to a judicial officer
and necessarily admits the incriminating facts alleged. Id. at 620, 115
N.E.2d at 502.[5] A defendant who says he did the crime and says he did
not do the crime has in effect said nothing, at least nothing to warrant a
judge in entering a conviction.
In 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court found no federal constitutional
barrier to a court’s acceptance of a guilty plea from a defendant who
asserts innocence, at least when there is a strong factual basis for the
plea. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970). Alford explicitly
recognized the authority of individual states to refuse to accept guilty
pleas that are accompanied by assertions of innocence. Id. at 38 n.11.
Re-examining its own position in light of Alford, in 1983 this Court
reaffirmed that in Indiana “as a matter of law . . . a judge may not accept
a plea of guilty when the defendant both pleads guilty and maintains his
innocence at the same time.” Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind.
1983) (emphasis added).[6]
Harshman and Ross, therefore, clearly established that an Indiana
trial court may not accept a guilty plea that is accompanied by a denial of
guilt. The Harshman-Ross rule is explicitly contingent, however, upon the
protestation of innocence occurring at the same time the defendant attempts
to enter the plea. Harshman, 115 N.E.2d at 502, 232 Ind. at 621; Ross, 456
N.E.2d at 423.
We elaborated on the policy underlying Indiana’s rule in Trueblood
v. State, 587 N.E.2d 105 (Ind. 1992). We observed that the Harshman-Ross
rule serves to increase the reliability of guilty pleas. Id. at 107. It
also promotes respect for the court system because it prohibits conviction
and sentencing without trial if the defendant has admitted no crime to the
court. Id. Still, as reiterated in Trueblood, it “generally applies only
to defendants who plead guilty and maintain their innocence at the same
time.” Id. (emphasis added).[7]
There is a substantive difference between a defendant who maintains
innocence but asks the court to impose punishment without trial, and one
who concedes guilt in one proceeding but contradicts that admission by
claiming innocence in a later proceeding. In the former case, the
defendant has consistently denied culpability, and has therefore never made
the reliable admission of guilt that Indiana requires. In the latter case,
a defendant under oath has told the court two opposing stories, both of
which cannot be true.
An admission of guilt that is later retracted may nonetheless be
reliable. See Trueblood, 587 N.E.2d at 109-10. Admissions of guilt and
assertions of innocence come in many shades of gray, and the trial judge is
best situated to assess the reliability of each. A credible admission of
guilt, contradicted at a later date by a general and unpersuasive assertion
of innocence, may well be adequate for entering a conviction.
Nevertheless, Carter asks this Court to narrow the trial court’s
normal discretionary authority, which is grounded in both statute and
precedent, and to give defendants in effect an absolute right to withdraw
guilty pleas prior to formal acceptance. The policy considerations
underlying Indiana’s prohibition on Alford pleas do not require this
result. Furthermore, a rule that would afford defendants an absolute right
to retract a plea before its formal acceptance would be an all-too-handy
tool for deferring trial (and halting a trial in progress that was not
going well for the defendant) and would do little to enhance public respect
for the courts.[8]
Defendants who make impulsive or ill-advised plea decisions and regret
their actions upon later reflection are adequately protected by the right
to request permission to withdraw a plea and to appeal a conviction if
permission is denied. See Ind. Code Ann. § 35-35-1-4(b), (e) (West 1998).
II. A Case on Point
Given Indiana’s long history on guilty pleas and claims of innocence,
it is not surprising that this Court has previously heard a case just like
Carter’s. The appeal in Owens v. State, 426 N.E.2d 372 (Ind. 1981),
involved both a similar factual scenario and a comparable legal challenge.
Defendant Owens pled guilty to murder, two counts of armed robbery, and
attempted robbery after he was fully advised of his constitutional and
statutory rights. Id. at 372-73. Owens conceded when he entered his plea
that the State’s factual assertions were substantially correct. Id. at
374. The trial court took the plea under advisement and scheduled
sentencing for three weeks later, contingent upon its acceptance of the
plea. Id.
At the sentencing hearing, before the trial court formally accepted
the plea, Owens orally asked permission to withdraw the plea. Id. Owens’
counsel indicated to the court that her client now professed his innocence.
Id. The court denied the request to withdraw the plea, and then formally
accepted the plea. Id. at 375. Owens was sentenced to forty years for the
murder and to lesser concurrent terms for the other offenses. Id. at 372-
73.
This Court unanimously held that, under both statute and precedent,
“[t]he question whether a defendant should be permitted to withdraw a
guilty plea, once it has been formally entered, is a matter addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 375. Applying this
standard, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Owens’ request. In support of this conclusion, this Court
particularly noted that the protestation of innocence at the sentencing
hearing was general in nature. Id.
Thus, we established nearly two decades ago that court permission is
required to withdraw a guilty plea, even when the plea has not been
accepted and the withdrawal request is based upon a protestation of
innocence. Id. at 375. Denial is reviewable under an abuse of discretion
standard. Id. Conflicting authority in the Court of Appeals, Brooks v.
State, 577 N.E.2d 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991),[9] served as a basis for the
dissent in the present appeal.[10] Brooks is hereby disapproved.
III. Applying the Standard
The facts presented here clearly demonstrate that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion. In Owens, the defendant pled guilty and provided
a factual foundation for that plea by admitting that the allegations
against him were true. Owens, 426 N.E.2d at 374. Three weeks later, at
his sentencing hearing, Owens asserted his innocence in a general manner
and asked to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 374-75. This Court found no
abuse of discretion in the denial of the request. Id. at 375.
The circumstances in this case were very similar. In fact, Carter’s
admission of guilt was more detailed. (R. at 202-03.) Also, in evaluating
Carter’s assertion of innocence and implied request to withdraw his guilty
plea, the trial court specifically noted that Carter had been “relaxed and
quite candid” at the time he entered that plea and provided its factual
foundation. (R. at 216.) The trial court did not err in denying Carter
permission to withdraw his guilty plea.
Conclusion
We grant transfer and summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of
Appeals. Ind. Appellate Rule 11(B)(3). The judgment of the trial court is
thus affirmed.
Dickson, Sullivan, and Boehm, JJ., concur.
Rucker, J., concurs in result.
-----------------------
[1] When asked what he did that made him guilty of this offense, Carter
responded “I shot somebody.” He went on to describe the circumstances as
follows:
Well, I had went over there . . . I guess it was his . . . some girl
that lived over had a problem with one of my cousins or something so I
had went over to my Aunt house, you know, with a couple of dudes and
her, you know, they was over there with a gun, talking about whether
to tell (unintelligible name) to come outside, so I found out where it
is, and I went over there to talk to him about it, you know, and first
I got out the car and me and him talked, you know, kind of like an
argument, heated up, and I was like, you know . . . I can’t recall the
exact conversation we had, but you know, to the extent, you know,
words like we calling each other names. I was like f---, you know,
like, f--- you. He pulled out a gun and I pulled out a gun and I shot
him. I seen him run around the building and I just went down to my
car and left.
(R. at 202-03.)
[2] During the pre-sentence investigation, Carter told the probation
officer, “I am pleading guilty because I cannot prove that I didn’t do it.”
(R. at 46.) The report also stated that “[t]he defendant is maintaining
his innocence. He said he only pled guilty to avoid getting 60 years. He
said he only told the judge what he read in the police report.” Id.
This Court held in Moredock v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1230, 1231 (Ind. 1989)
that such protestations of innocence made outside the courtroom do not
entitle a prisoner to post-conviction relief. Therefore, these assertions
do not affect our analysis.
[3] A defendant’s failure to submit a verified, written motion to withdraw
a guilty plea generally results in waiver of the issue of wrongful denial
of the request. Flowers v. State, 528 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind. 1988). However,
the issue of waiver is neither presented nor addressed here.
[4] Harshman pled guilty to stealing a vehicle, but told the judge he had
no recollection of doing so. Id. at 620, 115 N.E.2d at 502.
[5] The Harshman Court called a guilty plea a “judicial confession,” a term
first used in Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E. 773 (1920). The
Batchelor Court explained it this way, quoting a treatise:
Confessions are divided into two classes, namely, judicial and extra-
judicial. Judicial confessions are those that are made before the
magistrate or in court, in the due course of legal proceedings; and it
is essential that they be made of the free will of the party, and with
full and perfect knowledge of the nature and consequences of the
confession. Of this kind are the preliminary examinations, taken in
writing by the magistrate, pursuant to statutes; and the plea of
guilty made in open court, to an indictment. Either of these is
sufficient to found a conviction, even if to be followed by a sentence
of death, they being deliberately made, under the deepest solemnities,
with the advice of counsel, and the protecting caution and oversight
of the judge. Such was the rule of the Roman Law * * * and it may be
deemed a rule of universal jurisprudence.
Id. at 80-81, 125 N.E. at 777.
Batchelor was a remarkable case in which this Court early charted its
position about the care a court must take in accepting a guilty plea.
Batchelor was held in jail at Gary for four days, his frequent requests to
consult with his family and his lawyer refused. On the fourth day, he was
taken to the jail at Crown Point. On the fifth day, a grand jury indicted
him for murder in the first degree and officers brought him to the Lake
Criminal Court for arraignment. The trial judge told him he had the right
to a lawyer, but did not ask if he wanted one. The judge also told
Batchelor that if he pled guilty the court would sentence him in accordance
with law, but did not tell him what the sentence could be. Asked to plead,
Batchelor said he was guilty and wished to plead guilty. The next day, the
court accepted Batchelor’s plea and sentenced him to death. Two days
later, Batchelor had had the chance to speak with a lawyer and moved to
withdraw the plea. The trial court refused. This Court reversed, holding
that Batchelor’s right to counsel under Section 13 of the Indiana Bill of
Rights had been denied him. Justice Lairy wrote, “The privilege of the
presence of counsel upon the trial would be a poor concession to the
accused if the right of consultation with such counsel prior to the trial
was denied.” Id. at 77, 125 N.E. at 776 (quoting People ex rel. Burgess v.
Risley, 66 How. Pr. 67 (N.Y. 1883)).
[6] The Ross and Harshman cases had more in common than the key issue. The
author of the Ross opinion had, as a young assistant public defender,
represented Mr. Harshman. Ross, 456 N.E.2d at 421; Harshman, 232 Ind. at
619, 115 N.E.2d at 501. By the time Ross was decided thirty years later,
Richard M. Givan had moved behind the bench and become Chief Justice of
Indiana. Withered, Jerome L., Hoosier Justice: A History of the Supreme
Court of Indiana 148 (1998).
[7] We permitted a deviation from the “same time” rule in Patton v. State,
517 N.E.2d 374 (Ind. 1987), but we observed in Trueblood that such
deviations were not automatic even in capital cases. Trueblood, 587 N.E.2d
at 110. Decided five years earlier, Patton held that a trial court abuses
its discretion if it refuses to allow a defendant who asserts innocence at
a sentencing hearing in a capital case to withdraw a previously accepted
guilty plea. Patton, 517 N.E.2d at 376. In Trueblood, the defendant pled
guilty after his trial commenced and several witnesses had given damaging
testimony. Trueblood, 587 N.E.2d at 109. After the jury was released, the
defendant asserted innocence and sought unsuccessfully to change his plea.
Id. at 107. This Court held that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in denying the plea withdrawal request and imposing a death
sentence, given the strong indications that the defendant truthfully
admitted his guilt and later sought to retract the admission in an effort
to manipulate the system. Id. at 109-10.
[8] The result Carter seeks would raise additional concerns beyond the
potential for manipulation. It could create an inequity among similarly
situated defendants, and a perverse incentive for judges. Assume that two
defendants plead guilty in different courts. One judge immediately accepts
the plea and the other opts to defer formal acceptance until the sentencing
hearing, pending review of a pre-sentencing investigation report. One
defendant would have an unqualified right to nullify the plea prior to its
acceptance days or weeks later; the other would not have a similar
opportunity. In addition, judges might be deterred from taking the
reasonable and prudent step of reviewing pre-sentence investigation reports
before formally accepting pleas, to avoid the risk of defendants retracting
reliable pleas solely to prolong the adjudicative process.
[9] The court in Brooks held, based on facts similar to the case presented,
that acceptance at a sentencing hearing of a previously entered guilty plea
was reversible error because the defendant protested his innocence prior to
the acceptance. Brooks, 577 N.E.2d at 981. Brooks was erroneous when it
was written, in conflict with Owens.
[10] Carter v. State, 724 N.E.2d 281, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (Sullivan,
J., dissenting), transfer granted, opinion vacated by Carter v. State, 735
N.E.2d 234 (Ind. May 24, 2000).