ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kevin McShane Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Eileen Euzen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
In The
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
CLAUDE HOSKINS, )
Defendant-Appellant, )
)
v. ) 49S00-0002-CR-132
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
Plaintiff-Appellee. )
________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Gary L. Miller
Cause No. 49G05-9807-CF-113273
________________________________________________
On Direct Appeal
October 30, 2000
DICKSON, Justice
The defendant, Claude Hoskins, was convicted of murder[1] for the July
10, 1998, death of Betty Weir. Rejecting the defendant's claims of trial
court error and jury misconduct, we affirm the trial court.
Betty Wier was killed by a single .357 magnum gunshot fired by the
defendant in their home.[2] He asserted that the shooting was accidental.
The defendant first contends that the trial court erred in refusing his
tendered instruction, which would have advised the jury that an adult who
has not been convicted of a felony may possess or carry a handgun in that
person's home or business without a license.
In support of his tendered instruction, the defendant urged the trial
court that it was needed because the possession of firearms is currently a
very controversial and emotionally-laden issue and that some jurors may
incorrectly believe that it was unlawful for him to possess the handgun in
his home. The defendant argues that this potential, erroneous notion was
not allowed to be corrected by his instruction, and therefore, his
substantial rights were prejudiced by the court's action.
To determine whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an
instruction, we consider: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly
states the law; (2) whether the evidence supports giving the instruction;
and (3) whether other instructions already given cover the substance of the
tendered instruction. Williams v. State, 700 N.E.2d 784, 787-88 (Ind.
1998); Griffin v. State, 644 N.E.2d 561, 562 (Ind.1994). When evaluating
these considerations, we bear in mind that instructing the jury generally
lies within the sole discretion of the trial court. Edgecomb v. State, 673
N.E.2d 1185, 1196 (Ind. 1996). Appellate reversal is appropriate only for
abuse of discretion. Id. The State acknowledges that the tendered
instruction may have been a correct statement of the law and the substance
of the instruction was not covered by any other instructions, but asserts
that there is no evidence in the record to support giving the instruction.
In reviewing appellate claims alleging improper refusal of tendered
instructions, we usually refer to the second consideration in terms of
whether the evidence supports giving the instruction. However, this same
consideration has also been aptly articulated as "[w]hether there was
evidence to render the instruction applicable to the issues." Williams v.
State, 481 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (Ind. 1985). In the present case, this latter
description provides a helpful basis for our analysis.
The defendant was not charged with the unlawful possession of a
handgun. The legality of his possession of the weapon was not an issue in
this case. The defendant does not contend that the State made any
allegations of unlawful possession at any point during the trial. We
understand that the tendered instruction may have been helpful in light of
potential jury consideration of irrelevant matters, and it likely would not
have been error for the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, to
have given the instruction. The instruction was not, however, applicable
to the issues raised by the evidence. It was not an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to decline the tendered instruction.
The defendant's second contention is that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to correct errors alleging juror misconduct. The motion
was supported by the affidavit of a co-employee of one of the jurors. The
affiant asserted that, shortly after the shooting occurred, she told a
person who later became a juror that "my girlfriend's brother shot his
girlfriend" and that the juror told her after the trial that, after the
trial started, she remembered reading about the shooting in the newspaper.
Record at 119. The defendant contends that the effect of this information
on the juror should be presumed to be prejudicial and that it deprived him
of an impartial tribunal and a fair trial.
To warrant a new trial upon a claim of juror misconduct, the
defendant must show that the misconduct was gross and probably harmed the
defendant. Carr v. State, 728 N.E.2d 125, 131 (Ind. 2000). This
determination is a matter within the trial court's discretion. Lopez v.
State, 527 N.E.2d 1119, 1130 (Ind. 1988).
The facts recited in the affidavit do not demonstrate juror
misconduct, nor do they justify any inference of probable harm. The
defendant does not establish that the juror gave false or misleading
answers during voir dire. We decline to find any abuse of discretion in
the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to correct errors.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
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[1] Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
[2] Evidence was presented that the defendant and Betty Weir,
although never married, had been together seventeen and one-half years
prior to her death, and that they were the parents of three children, aged
sixteen, fourteen, and eleven.