ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Steven Knecht
Lafayette, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Karen Freeman-Wilson
Attorney General of Indiana
James B. Martin
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
__________________________________________________________________
JAMES M. ROOP, )
)
Appellant (Defendant Below), )
)
v. ) Indiana Supreme Court
) Cause No. 79S00-9907-CR-405
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). )
__________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE TIPPECANOE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable George J. Heid, Judge
Cause No. 79D01-9712-CF-113
__________________________________________________________________
ON DIRECT APPEAL
__________________________________________________________________
June 30, 2000
BOEHM, Justice.
James M. Roop, Jr. was convicted of child molesting as a Class A
felony, neglect of a dependent as a Class B felony, battery as a Class D
felony, and of being a habitual offender. He was sentenced to concurrent
terms of fifty years for child molesting, fifteen years for neglect of a
dependent, and three years for battery. The child molesting conviction was
enhanced by thirty years for the habitual, for an aggregate sentence of
eighty years imprisonment. In this direct appeal Roop contends that (1)
the trial court erred in excluding evidence that his father-in-law may have
molested Roop’s wife when she was a child, and (2) there is insufficient
evidence to support his convictions. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Factual and Procedural Background
In November of 1997, Roop resided in Lafayette with his wife
Cassandra and her fourteen-month-old daughter, K.S. Cassandra’s parents,
William and Patty Robinson, lived next door. On the evening of November
19, Cassandra changed K.S.’s diaper and put her to bed. Cassandra observed
no injuries or bleeding at that time. Roop and Cassandra went to bed
sometime after 3:30 a.m. When Cassandra and Roop heard K.S. awaken during
the night, Roop got up to attend to her. He did not return to bed. At
about 8:00 a.m., Roop awakened Cassandra and told her to come to the living
room. Cassandra found K.S. lying on the couch on an open, bloody diaper.
She was crying and shaking. Roop was cleaning blood from his hands with
baby wipes. Cassandra and Roop took K.S. to the emergency room where Dr.
Diane Begley observed a “cut that extended into the hymen and towards the
rectum.” Dr. Begley believed the injury was the result of sexual
molestation and contacted Child Protective Services. She arranged for K.S.
to be transferred to Indianapolis to be examined by Dr. Roberta Hibbard, an
expert in child sexual abuse. Dr. Hibbard concluded that K.S. had been
sexually assaulted. Dr. Trace Scherer, a pediatric surgeon, also examined
K.S. in Indianapolis and reached the same conclusion. Dr. Scherer
surgically repaired the injury after noting it was fifteen millimeters long
and ten millimeters deep.
Roop spoke to police at the hospital in Lafayette and stated that he
awakened to change K.S.’s diaper and noticed no injury. He changed her
diaper, fed her, and bathed her. He watched cartoons with her, put her
back to bed, and went to sleep on the sofa. He later heard her “fussing,”
and then noticed blood in her diaper. He told police that K.S.’s injury
might have been caused by a razor blade on the tub, or by her scratching
herself while being changed, or that the cat might have done it.
Roop was charged with two counts of child molesting, battery, neglect
of a dependent, and with being a habitual offender. His defense at trial
was that someone else—possibly his father-in-law—may have molested K.S. He
did not dispute that K.S.’s injury was the result of sexual abuse. The
jury found him not guilty of one count of child molesting and guilty of the
remaining counts and the habitual enhancement. He was sentenced to an
aggregate term of eighty years imprisonment.
I. Exclusion of Evidence
Roop contends that the trial court erred by excluding testimony
suggesting that William may have molested Cassandra during her childhood.
The excluded testimony was that of Karen Anderson, a court-appointed
special advocate for K.S. Anderson testified in an offer of proof that she
had received information from another person “about sexual molestation
being in [the Robinson] family” during Cassandra’s childhood. Anderson
agreed upon questioning by the State that any allegations that William had
molested Cassandra were “obviously multiple hearsay.” Moreover, Anderson
also testified that Cassandra had told her that “everything had been fine”
in regard to her childhood relationship with her father.
Roop correctly points out that under Indiana Evidence Rule 401
“[e]vidence which tends to show that someone else committed the crime” is
admissible because it “logically makes it less probable that the defendant
committed the crime.” Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 389 (Ind. 1997).
The trial court recognized and adhered to this principle, observing that it
would not “preclude [the defense] in any way from showing that Mr. Robinson
was involved here or was the actual perpetrator but you have to prove it in
accordance with the Indiana Rules of Evidence . . . .” The trial court
allowed testimony showing that William had a key to Cassandra’s apartment,
that the door to the apartment was sometimes left unlocked, and that
William had previously picked up K.S. without knocking or informing anyone.
In addition, Roop’s medical expert noted a second injury to K.S. that he
believed resulted from an object such as a ring on a finger, and William
testified that it was possible he was wearing a ring with an onyx stone on
November 20. Nevertheless, William testified that he never took K.S.
without Cassandra’s permission, and Patty testified that William did not
leave their apartment in the morning hours of November 20. Finally,
neither Roop nor Cassandra saw William in their apartment during that time
period.
The trial court properly excluded Anderson’s “multiple hearsay”
testimony. It found that testimony that William had molested Cassandra was
barred by Evidence Rules 404(b) and 403. Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident . . . .
The following test is applied in deciding whether the challenged evidence
is admissible: (1) the court must determine that the evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the
person’s propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) the court must
balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect
pursuant to Rule 403. Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997);
Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 233 (Ind. 1997). In short, if the
evidence bears on some issue other than criminal propensity and clears the
balancing hurdle of Rule 403, it is admissible.
Roop asserts no proper 404(b) purpose for which William’s alleged
molestation of Cassandra was offered. Indeed, it appears that the
testimony was offered solely to suggest that William had molested before
and therefore had a propensity to molest again. This is, of course, the
“forbidden inference” that Rule 404(b) prohibits. Although a prior
molestation may be admissible under Rule 404(b) when offered for a
permissible purpose such as intent, plan, or absence of mistake, no such
purpose is suggested here.
Its remoteness in time and the lack of any evidence that the
molestation of K.S. was in any way similar to the alleged incident
involving Cassandra further undermine its admissibility.[1] See Fisher v.
State, 641 N.E.2d 105, 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). In addition to the trial
court’s finding that the testimony had “almost no probative value,” the
testimony presented the possibility of confusing or misleading the jury and
could have caused undue protraction of the trial. In light of these
considerations, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the evidence under Rules 404(b) and 403.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Roop contends there is insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for child molesting.[2] When reviewing a claim of sufficiency
of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of
witnesses. Spurlock v. State, 675 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ind. 1996). We look to
the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the
verdict and will affirm a conviction if evidence of probative value exists
from which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. Mere presence at the crime scene with the opportunity to
commit a crime is not a sufficient basis on which to support a conviction.
See Wilson v. State, 455 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (Ind. 1983). However, presence
at the scene in connection with other circumstances tending to show
participation may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Menefee v. State,
514 N.E.2d 1057, 1059 (Ind. 1987).
When Cassandra put K.S. to bed on November 19, 1997, K.S. was not
injured or bleeding. Roop and Cassandra went to bed sometime after 3:30
a.m. on November 20. According to Roop’s own account, he is the only
person who had contact with K.S. between the time he awoke, changed her
diaper and bathed her, and the time he noticed blood in her diaper and
awakened Cassandra. The undisputed medical evidence is that K.S. was
sexually abused; the only issue is the identity of the perpetrator.
According to Roop, Cassandra or William could have molested K.S.
Evidence suggesting these possibilities was presented to and rejected by
the jury. On appeal, Roop suggests that Cassandra was in the apartment and
had access to K.S., but concedes that in his statements to police he stated
that Cassandra did not attend to K.S. in those hours. He now merely
suggests that he could not have known what Cassandra was doing while he was
asleep. There is no evidence that William was in the apartment at or near
the time of the molestation of K.S., let alone that he molested her.
Finally, Roop told Cassandra en route to the hospital that he wished he had
gone to work that day “[b]ecause this never would have happened.” Roop
testified at trial that he had made this statement but explained it as
follows: “I felt obligated, [K.S.] was under my care and I kind of felt,
you know, like since this happened under my care, you know, it was my
fault. I mean, I was caring for her at the time . . . .” On its face this
does not explain the statement that the injury “never would have happened”
if Roop had gone to work. The jury was free to consider Roop’s statement
en route to the hospital as an admission of guilt and this, coupled with
his opportunity and the lack of opportunity of others to commit the
offense, is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have reasonably
found him guilty of child molesting.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] The trial court found that any allegations regarding Cassandra were
"remote" in time and that they had "almost no probative value here with
regard to [K.S.'s] injuries."
[2] As captioned, Roop's argument also alleges insufficiency of the
evidence to support the battery and neglect of a dependent convictions.
However, the body of his argument is devoted to sufficiency of the evidence
relating to the child molesting charge. The only mention of the other
counts is the allegation: "The charge for Neglect of a Dependant was
predicated on the same theory as the other charges--that Roop placed [K.S.]
in danger by molesting and/or committing a battery upon her; rather than on
some alternate theory that he placed her in danger by allowing someone else
to commit the act upon her." As we understand Roop's argument, if there is
sufficient evidence of child molesting, there is also sufficient evidence
for the other counts. Accordingly, we address only the sufficiency of the
evidence of child molesting.
We also note that Roop’s convictions for child molesting, neglect of
a dependent, and battery appear to raise a claim under the Indiana Double
Jeopardy Clause. See Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999).
Here, the appellant’s brief was filed on December 29, 1999, and Richardson
was readily available to be raised. In any event, we note that raising the
issue would likely have had no practical effect because the sentences were
ordered served concurrently.