ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Kurt A. Young Jeffrey A. Modisett
Nashville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Sarah E. Freeman
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
In The
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
ANTHONY L. HOUSTON, )
Defendant-Appellant, )
)
v. ) 49S00-9901-CR-00061
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
Plaintiff-Appellee. )
________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Ruth D. Reichard, Judge
Cause No. 49G029-9706-CF-86487
________________________________________________
On Direct Appeal
June 30, 2000
DICKSON, Justice
The defendant-appellant, Anthony L. Houston, and his co-defendant,
Engai Maul,[1] were convicted of the June 9, 1997, murder[2] of Damon
Simpson. Houston was also adjudicated a habitual offender. Houston
appeals, claiming insufficient evidence and errors in admission of
evidence.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for murder. Our standard of review for sufficiency
claims is well settled. We do not reweigh evidence or assess the
credibility of witnesses; rather, we look to the evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom that support the verdict and will affirm the
conviction if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable jury
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Marcum v.
State, 725 N.E.2d 852, 863 (Ind. 2000); Ruffin v. State, 725 N.E.2d 412,
415 (Ind. 2000); Love v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1244, 1245 (Ind.1999); Taylor v.
State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1110 (Ind. 1997). A verdict may be sustained based
upon circumstantial evidence alone if that circumstantial evidence supports
a reasonable inference of guilt. Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828, 834
(Ind. 2000); Kriner v. State, 699 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Ind. 1998); Taylor v.
State, 676 N.E.2d 1044, 1047 (Ind. 1997); Green v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1314,
1315 (Ind. 1992). Presence at the crime scene alone cannot sustain a
conviction, but presence when combined with other facts and circumstances,
such as companionship with the one engaged in the crime, and the
defendant's course of conduct before, during, and after the offense, may
raise a reasonable inference of guilt. Hampton v. State, 719 N.E.2d 803,
807 (Ind. 1999); Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1106 (Ind. 1997).
The evidence most favorable to the verdict establishes that Maul and
the defendant, Houston, were acquaintances of Simpson. Early on the date
of the murder, both defendants, wearing red shirts or jackets, visited
Simpson at his house. Steven Shepard and Anthony Sparkman, friends of
Simpson, were also present. After Houston and Maul left, Simpson spent the
remainder of the day with Shepard and Sparkman. Houston's mother testified
that she saw her son at home on the evening of the murder and that she told
the prosecutor on another occasion that a vehicle was parked in the
driveway while her son was home and that she had "no idea what color the
van was, it was dark outside . . . ." Record at 894. Neither Houston nor
his mother owned a dark-colored van, but on several occasions before the
murder, Houston was seen riding in a dark-colored van.
Shortly after 11:00 p.m., Shepard observed a dark-colored van come
down the street and park at the curb a short distance behind Simpson's car,
but he did not see anyone get out of the van. Approximately five minutes
later, Houston and Maul knocked at Simpson's door and were admitted. Maul,
who was described as a light-skinned black man, was wearing a red shirt or
jacket. Shepard spoke to them, but they did not respond, instead going
directly to another room to talk to Simpson. Shepard left about 11:20
p.m., leaving Simpson alone with the two co-defendants. Around 11:30 p.m.,
a group of three to five African-American males walked from Simpson's front
door and stood in the street arguing. A witness recognized Simpson's voice
stating that he did not do what he was being accused of doing. They then
saw and heard shots fired and saw Simpson trying to run away. Unidentified
voices yelled that he did not go down and commanded: "get him." Record at
492. The assailants pursued Simpson, and more shots were fired. Simpson
fell to the ground, fatally wounded. A voice was heard to say: "they got
[him]." Record at 493. Two or three men got into the van on the passenger
side, and another, described as a light-skinned black man wearing a red
jacket, ran across a field toward a nearby interstate highway. The van
pulled away quickly without illuminating its headlights. Immediately after
the shooting, several neighbors called 911 to report the shots heard coming
from Indianapolis Avenue. According to the timing of the 911 calls, the
shooting probably occurred around 11:55 p.m.
Forensic evidence showed that Simpson had been shot eight times and
that several of the shots would have been fatal. Ballistics experts
testified that at least four guns and possibly six were used in the
shooting, but no weapons were found at the murder scene. Some of the
bullets recovered from Simpson's body could have been fired from a 9mm
pistol or a .38-caliber revolver. Although no one saw either Houston or
Maul carrying a gun on the day of the murder, there was testimony that
Houston had previously been seen carrying a 9mm semi-automatic handgun,
similar to one of the possible weapons used to shoot Simpson.
The police learned that Maul and Houston had been with Simpson shortly
before his death and attempted to question each regarding the evening's
events. Houston met with a police investigator. After receiving and
acknowledging a police advisement of rights, Houston first attempted to
conceal from police that he had been with Maul at Simpson's home on the day
of the murder, but after obtaining assurances of police protection for his
family, he made additional statements to the police. One of the officers
present at the interview testified that Houston then began to cry and,
appearing very remorseful, told police that he did not mean for Simpson to
die and asked the officer to apologize to Simpson's mother for him.
Thus, Houston was present at Simpson's home with Maul, arriving at the
door just minutes after Shepard saw a dark-colored van park near Simpson's
car. Houston had previously been seen in a dark-colored van. He and Maul
were alone with Simpson at his home just minutes before the fatal shooting
in the street. Houston was known to carry a gun similar to the one used to
inflict some of the fatal wounds. Houston at first concealed facts from
police regarding his presence at the murder scene, but his subsequent
statement to the police implied an admission of his involvement in
Simpson's murder.
Although recognizing that the evidence of guilt in this case is not
especially strong, we nevertheless find that, considering the probative
evidence and resulting reasonable inferences favorable to the verdict, a
reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Admission of Evidence
The defendant next claims that the trial court erred in admitting
certified court records regarding the arrest and conviction of Anthony
Kimmons. Kimmons, a friend of Simpson, Houston, Maul, Shepard, and
Sparkman, had been arrested on federal drug charges on May 30, 1997.
During the first visit to Simpson's house on the day of the murder, Maul
asked Simpson for the name of the lawyer who had represented Simpson on
similar federal drug charges that were dismissed in October of 1996, based
upon a successful motion to suppress evidence. This information was
ostensibly for the purpose of assisting Kimmons in obtaining a lawyer to
represent him. Although Kimmons did not testify at trial, the State
presented records of Simpson's and Kimmons's arrests for similar drug
offenses alleged to have been committed in an area near Simpson's home and
place of work and urged that the motive of Houston and Maul for killing
Simpson was that Simpson was an informant against Kimmons, an acquaintance
of the co-defendants. The defendant argues this evidence was not relevant
because there was no evidence suggesting that he suspected Simpson of being
an informant and, therefore, nothing connecting Kimmons to Simpson's death.
The defendant also argues that the admission of the records "lent
legitimacy" to the State's theory, which he claims was "wholly unsupported
speculation." Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 26.
Only relevant evidence is admissible, and relevant evidence is any
evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." Ind. Evidence Rule 401.
As a general rule, evidence of motive is relevant in the proof of a crime.
Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 173 (Ind. 1997); Tompkins v. State, 669
N.E.2d 394, 397 (Ind. 1996). Even if proffered evidence or testimony is
only marginally relevant, it is within the sound discretion of the trial
court to admit it. Thompson v. State, 671 N.E.2d 1165, 1171 (Ind. 1996);
Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 88-89 (Ind. 1985). We review a trial
court's ruling as to relevance for an abuse of discretion. Anderson v.
State, 718 N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (Ind. 1999); Willsey v. State, 698 N.E.2d 784,
793 (Ind. 1998).
In this case, there was evidence from which motive might be inferred,
including the relationships among the men, Simpson's statement denying
having done something his attackers were accusing him of doing, and
evidence that Kimmons was arrested a few days before Simpson's death. We
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that the records were relevant.
The defendant also argues that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial.
Even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Ind. Evidence
Rule 403. The defendant does not argue that the trial court erred in
balancing prejudice and probative value or that the probative value was
substantially outweighed by the prejudice, but instead argues that the
prejudice is "manifest in light of the lack of other competent evidence to
convict." Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 27. Trial courts are given wide
latitude in weighing probative value against the danger of unfair
prejudice, and we review that determination for abuse of discretion.
Anderson, 718 N.E.2d at 1103; Ingram v. State, 715 N.E.2d 405, 408 (Ind.
1999). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination
that the probative value of the certified records of federal criminal
charges against Simpson and Kimmons, from which the jury might infer
motive, was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to the
defendant.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur. RUCKER, J.,
dissents with opinion.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
KURT A. YOUNG JEFFREY A. MODISETT
Nashville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
SARAH E. FREEMAN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
ANTHONY L. HOUSTON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
) Supreme Court Cause Number
v. ) 49S00-9901-CR-61
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
CRIMINAL DIVISION
The Honorable Ruth D. Reichard, Judge
Cause No. 49G02-9706-CF-86487
ON DIRECT APPEAL
June 30, 2000
RUCKER, Justice, dissenting
I recognize of course our familiar standard for reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction. For such claims
we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Perry v. State,
638 N.E.2d 1236, 1242 (Ind. 1994). We consider only the evidence supporting
the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such
evidence. Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1110 (Ind. 1977). We will
affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value
such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Nonetheless, we are duty bound to
sift and probe the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to prove
each and every element of the crime and to determine whether the inferences
made are reasonable. As Justice Hunter declared over three decades ago:
[I]f as a result of our probing and sifting the evidence most
favorable to the State, we determine that the residue of facts is so
devoid of evidence of probative value and reasonable inferences
adduceable therefrom, as to preclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
we should so declare. A failure to do so is a rejection of our duty
as an appellate tribunal and tantamount to the enunciation of a rule
that any evidence no matter how infinitesimal or inferences drawn
therefrom, whether based on speculation or conjecture, would be
sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Liston v. State, 252 Ind. 502, 250 N.E.2d 739, 743-44 (Ind. 1969). After
probing and sifting the evidence in this case I am convinced the facts most
favorable to the State do not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Houston
is guilty or murder. At most, the evidence shows that he was merely
present at the crime scene. I therefore dissent and would reverse the
judgment of the trial court.
-----------------------
[1] We also decide today, in a separate opinion, Maul's appeal. Maul
v. State, No. 49S00-9811-CR-729 (Ind. June 30, 2000).
[2] Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.