FOR THE RESPONDENT FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION
R. Stephen LaPlante Donald R. Lundberg, Executive
Secretary
915 Main Street Seth T. Pruden, Staff Attorney
Evansville, IN 47732 115 West Washington Street, Ste. 1060
Indianapolis, IN 46204
______________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF )
) Case No. 82S00-9612-DI-790
RONALD WARRUM )
______________________________________________________________
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
_______________________________________________________________
March 10, 2000
Per Curiam
When attorney Ronald Warrum went before the Vanderburgh Superior Court
on behalf of his client seeking increased child support and restricted
visitation, he failed to notify that court of an existing Utah decree,
known to him, which already governed those post-dissolution matters. We
find that his failure to notify the Indiana court of the Utah decree was
prejudicial to the administration of justice.
This attorney disciplinary case comes before this Court upon the duly-
appointed hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. In
that report, the hearing officer found misconduct and recommended that the
respondent be publicly reprimanded. Pursuant to Ind.Admission and
Discipline Rule 23(15), the respondent has petitioned this Court for review
of the hearing officer’s report, therein challenging certain findings
contained therein. Where the hearing officer’s report is challenged, our
review of the case is de novo, and we examine the entire record in
determining misconduct and discipline therefore. Matter of Hampton, 533
N.E.2d 122 (Ind. 1989). The respondent’s admission to the bar of this
state in 1966 confers our jurisdiction in this matter.
Within that review context, we now find that a couple married in 1982,
had a child in 1983, and lived in the state of Utah until their separation
in 1984, after which the wife moved to Evansville with the child. On March
21, 1985, the couple was divorced by order issued by the Fourth District
Court, Millard County, Utah. The decree awarded custody to the wife and
ordered the husband to pay child support of $50 per month.
After moving to Evansville, the wife received Assistance for Dependent
Children from Vanderburgh County and assistance in collecting her Utah
support pursuant to a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act action
filed by the Vanderburgh County prosecutor. In 1991, the former wife
petitioned the Utah court for an increase in her former husband’s child
support obligation. While the contemplated Utah modification was pending,
she hired the respondent in July 1992 to secure additional support and to
restrict her former husband’s visitation with the child. On July 31,
1992, the respondent filed a complaint in the Vanderburgh Superior Court
seeking an order for “child support, child custody and visitation, or a
modification thereof” (hereinafter the “Indiana case”). [1] The complaint
did not mention the Utah decree, did not mention the terms or conditions of
the Utah decree, and did not set forth the former husband’s current child
support obligation as a consequence of that decree. Also, the complaint
failed to mention that matters relating to support were pending before the
Utah court. At hearing of this disciplinary case, the respondent testified
that he knew of the Utah decree, but not that a motion for modification of
it was pending. He took no action to learn the details or status of the
Utah decree.
After the former husband was notified of the Indiana case, he
contacted the respondent by telephone to provide information about his
employment and income. In September 1992, the former husband’s attorney
wrote to the respondent, asking why there was an Indiana proceeding. The
respondent did not reply. Initial hearing on the respondent’s complaint
was held in Vanderburgh Superior Court on November 30, 1992. The former
wife appeared with the respondent, but the former husband did not. The
respondent provided the court with a child support income calculation and
requested restriction of the former husband’s visitation. The respondent
did not mention the Utah decree, its terms, or the pending modification
thereof. Two weeks later, the Vanderburgh Superior Court adopted the
respondent’s proposed entry of judgment which ordered the former husband to
pay $77.40 in weekly child support pursuant to the Indiana Child Support
Guidelines and which restricted the former husband’s visitation to
supervised visits only. A wage withholding order was sent to the former
husband’s employer in Utah. The Vanderburgh Superior Court’s judgment did
not mention the Utah decree or how it was to be modified, despite the fact
that the respondent testified at disciplinary hearing that, by his Indiana
case, he was attempting to “modify” the Utah decree. The order of judgment
issued by the Vanderburgh Superior Court effectively became a second decree
of child support for the former husband.
No one in Indiana notified Utah authorities of the Vanderburgh
Superior Court’s decree. Although the husband continued to pay his Utah
support, he did not pay support pursuant to the Indiana order, and an
arrearage accumulated. The former wife later asked the Vanderburgh County
prosecutor to assist her in collecting the overdue support. Although the
prosecutor’s office had a reciprocal action pending with Utah with respect
to the support obligation of the first Utah decree, neither that office nor
the Utah authorities knew of the Vanderburgh Superior Court’s order until
informed of it by the former wife. With knowledge of the order, the
Vanderburgh County prosecutor intercepted at least three of the former
husband’s tax refund checks to satisfy the Indiana arrearage. The former
husband, being in compliance with the Utah order, complained to Utah
authorities.
Child support authorities of Utah and Indiana conducted a complete
investigation of the matter. Utah authorities were concerned that Indiana
had issued a second support order when no transfer of the case from Utah to
Indiana had ever been made. Indiana authorities could not understand why
Utah’s support obligation was so low. The governor’s offices in each
state became involved, as did a U.S. senator from Utah and the Family and
Social Services Administration of Indiana. A dispute arose over which
state had jurisdiction and what the true amount of the support should be.
To resolve it, officials from both states met before a mediator in Chicago.
That mediation was unsuccessful, and certain disputes between the states
still existed at the time of the disciplinary hearing of this matter. In
1994, the petition to modify the Utah decree to provide additional support
was granted, and the Vanderburgh County prosecutor moved to dismiss the
Indiana support judgment, although still contending that a valid Indiana
arrearage existed.
Although the respondent asserted in his complaint that Indiana had
jurisdiction of the former husband’s support and visitation by virtue of
Ind.Code 31-1-11.6 et seq. (Indiana’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Law),[2] he failed to submit an affidavit required by that law to inform
Indiana courts of previous child custody proceedings. He also admitted at
disciplinary hearing that he was aware at the time he filed the Indiana
case of a possible jurisdictional dispute in light of the Utah decree.
Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice. The respondent’s failure to inform the Indiana
court of the Utah decree led to competing orders, duplicitous litigation in
Utah and Indiana, and a protracted controversy between states as to which
child support/visitation order should control. Considerable resources of
both states were expended, first in addressing similar issues of support
and visitation, then in trying to resolve the conflict between the states.
The respondent’s unfortunate failure to disclose the Utah decree to the
Indiana court was completely contrary to the letter and spirit of
Indiana’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Law, which was to “[a]void
litigation of custody decisions of other states and this state so far as
feasible,” and to “[f]acilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other
states; and [foster] mutual assistance between the courts of this state and
those of other states concerned with the same child.” See I.C. 31-1-11.6-
1, repealed by P.L. 1-1997, SEC. 157. That the respondent’s actions so
thoroughly frustrated the purpose of the UCCJL, wasted judicial resources,
and led to an interstate conflict clearly demonstrates that he engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Accordingly, we find
that the respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
The respondent argues that “party opponents” (in this case the former
husband) have no standing to institute disciplinary proceedings. He bases
this assertion on language in the Preamble to the Rules of Professional
Conduct:
The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer’s self assessment,
or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a
disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a
collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek
enforcement of the Rule. (Emphasis added).
The respondent’s argument is without merit. The very language he cites
provides that the disciplinary rules are a just basis for a disciplinary
authority to sanction a lawyer. Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule
23(10)(a) provides that a member of the public, a member of this bar, a
member of the commission, or a Bar Association may submit a grievance to
the Disciplinary Commission. The “collateral proceeding” reference in the
Preamble is clearly intended to encompass litigation other than
disciplinary actions.[3]
Having found misconduct, we now turn to the issue of appropriate
sanction. The hearing officer recommended that the respondent be publicly
admonished for his actions. We agree. The evidence clearly and
convincingly demonstrates that the respondent knew of the Utah decree at
the time he litigated the Indiana case, but neglected to advise the Indiana
court of it or its terms. By that failure, the respondent deprived the
Indiana judge of the opportunity to apply the provisions set forth in
Indiana’s UCCJL, caused unnecessary litigation in this state, and set the
stage for an interstate conflict ultimately consuming the resources of high
state officials. Because of his insult to the administration of justice and
its significant consequences in this case, we conclude that a public
reprimand is appropriate.[4]
It is, therefore, ordered that the respondent, Ronald Warrum, is
hereby reprimanded and admonished for this his misconduct.
The Clerk of this Court is directed to provide notice of this order in
accordance with Admis.Disc. R. 23(3)(d) and to provide the clerk of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the clerk of each
of the Federal District Courts in this state, and the clerk of the United
States Bankruptcy Court in this state with the last known address of
respondent as reflected in the records of the Clerk.
Costs of this proceeding are assessed against respondent.
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[1] The full text of the complaint is as follows:
Comes now [former wife] and for her claim against [former husband]
says:
1. [Former wife] is the mother of . . .a minor child born on March
10, 1983.
2. [Former wife and minor child] reside at . . . Evansville, Indiana
and have resided in Indiana since April, 1984.
3. [Former husband’s] last known address was at . . . Sandy Utah
84092.
4. Petitioner requests an order of support, child custody and
visitation, or modification thereto, all pursuant to Title 31.1-11.5 and/or
11.6.
[2] Repealed by P.L. 1-1997, SEC. 157.
[3] The hearing officer found that the respondent violated Prof.Cond.R.
3.3(a)(3), which provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to
disclose to a tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client
and not disclosed by opposing counsel. Although it is clear that the
respondent knew of the authority of the Utah decree, his failure to
disclose its existence to the Indiana court did not violate the rule
because the order was not “adverse” to his client’s position. The Utah
decree provided child support for the client’s child and set visitation
restrictions, thereby providing benefits not adverse to his client’s
position in the Indiana proceeding. We therefore conclude that the
Commission failed to demonstrate that the respondent violated Prof.Cond.R.
3.3(a)(3).
[4] We note that in a similar case, where the gravamen of the lawyer’s
misconduct was failure adequately to disclose pertinent matters to a court,
a public reprimands was ordered. Matter of Mullins, 649 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind.
1995) (failure to disclose parallel intrastate court proceedings).