UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-6866
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
THOMAS MATHERLY,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:06-hc-02205-BR-JG)
Submitted: March 7, 2013 Decided: March 14, 2013
Before MOTZ, AGEE, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac, Research and
Writing Specialist, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Seth M. Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas Matherly appeals the district court’s order
committing him as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 4248
(2006). We have reviewed the record, and we affirm.
Matherly first asserts two constitutional challenges
to his commitment, claiming that the civil commitment statute,
18 U.S.C. § 4248, levies an unconstitutional criminal
punishment, and that § 4248 violates equal protection principles
by limiting its application only to prisoners. As Matherly
concedes, however, both of these arguments are foreclosed by
this Court’s decision in United States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 189 (2012).
The remaining portion of Matherly’s appeal consists of
his argument that the district court committed clear error in
certifying him as a sexually dangerous person. In this respect,
the district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear
error, while its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. United
States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2012). Where the
district court’s factual findings are based on its evaluation of
conflicting expert testimony, we are “especially reluctant” to
set aside its determinations. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Given Matherly’s concession that he previously engaged
in child molestation and suffers from a serious mental disorder,
the Government was required to prove by clear and convincing
evidence only that Matherly “would have serious difficulty in
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if
released.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2006); see Hall, 664 F.3d at
463. The “serious difficulty” prong of the certification
proceeding refers to the degree of an individual’s “volitional
impairment;” that is, his “ability to refrain from acting upon
his deviant sexual interests.” Hall, 664 F.3d at 463.
Matherly initially argues that, given that he had
never committed a hands-on offense, the district court’s sexual
dangerousness conclusion was based only upon Matherly’s deviant
sexual fantasies and thoughts, and not because of any of his
past conduct. Proceeding on this assumption, Matherly argues
that the district court’s analysis effectively eviscerated the
requirement that the Government prove not only his mental
illness (i.e., his pedophilic desires) but also that he would
have serious difficulty restraining himself from acting upon
such urges.
But Matherly misconstrues the district court’s
reasoning. The district court plainly rested its decision on
Matherly’s active conduct in furtherance of his desires,
observing that he “took measures to feed his compulsions and
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fantasies about kidnapping and raping a young child” by
travelling to the mall and to a nearby elementary school and
“actively thinking about how he could lure [young children]
away.” Because the court specifically found that Matherly had
“taken active steps toward actually molesting a child” and that
“Matherly’s own past conduct” demonstrated his significant
inability to control his deviant sexual desires, Matherly is
mistaken in arguing that the district court’s analysis equated
the mere possession of strong, deviant fantasies with sexual
dangerousness.
Matherly next asserts that the district court erred in
“ignoring or otherwise failing to account for [a] substantial
body of contradictory evidence” that did not support its
decision that he is sexually dangerous. United States v.
Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 461 (4th Cir. 2012). We have thoroughly
examined the record in light of Matherly’s contentions, and we
disagree. “[E]valuating the credibility of experts and the
value of their opinions is . . . a function best committed to
the district courts,” and we see no reason to second-guess the
district court’s decision to credit the testimony of the
Government’s experts instead of that of Matherly’s experts.
Hall, 664 F.3d at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because “the district court’s account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,” we
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agree with the Government that the district court’s conclusions
do not amount to clear error. Id.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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