UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4307
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
HUMBERTO DIMAS-GARCIA, a/k/a Tito,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Richard M. Gergel, District
Judge. (2:10-cr-01104-RMG-8)
Submitted: February 28, 2013 Decided: March 15, 2013
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher R. Antley, DEVLIN & PARKINSON, P.A., Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Peter Thomas Phillips, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Humberto Dimas-Garcia pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more
kilograms of cocaine, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and
possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. The district court
sentenced him to 135 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,
Dimas-Garcia’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there
are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether
Dimas-Garcia’s plea was knowing and voluntary. Dimas-Garcia was
informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but
has not done so. The government has declined to file a brief.
Because we find no meritorious issues for appeal, we affirm.
Counsel asserts that the district court erred in
accepting Dimas-Garcia’s guilty plea to the money laundering
count because the only money he wired or transferred to his
family in Mexico was money he earned from his legitimate
employment. Because Dimas-Garcia did not move to withdraw his
guilty plea in the district court or raise any objections during
the Rule 11 colloquy, the plea colloquy is reviewed for plain
error. United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir.
2002). To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show that:
(1) there was an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the
error affected his “substantial rights.” United States v.
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Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). A defendant’s substantial
rights are affected if the court determines that the error
“influenced the defendant’s decision to plead guilty and
impaired his ability to evaluate with eyes open the direct
attendant risks of accepting criminal responsibility.” United
States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 402-03 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Martinez,
277 F.3d 517, 532 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that defendant must
demonstrate he would not have pled guilty but for the error).
Before accepting a plea, a trial court must conduct a
plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and
determines that the defendant comprehends, the nature of the
charge to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum
penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the rights
he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b);
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
The district court must ensure that the defendant’s plea did not
result from force, threats, or promises not contained in the
plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2).
“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court
[also] must determine that there is a factual basis for the
plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). This requirement “is
intended to ensure that the court makes clear exactly what a
defendant admits to, and whether those admissions are factually
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sufficient to constitute the alleged crime,” thereby protecting
a defendant from pleading guilty to a crime he has not actually
committed. United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 659-60 (4th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our thorough review of the record reveals that the
district court fully complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in
conducting the guilty plea colloquy, at which Dimas-Garcia was
assisted by an interpreter. The record discloses that the court
explained each count in detail to Dimas-Garcia, and Dimas-Garcia
agreed that he was pleading guilty by his own free will because
he was guilty. The government summarized its evidence in open
court, stating that Dimas-Garcia allowed a drug operation to use
his residence to process cocaine and store drug proceeds. The
prosecutor explained that Dimas-Garcia received drug proceeds
from mid-level distributors, and that the money was then either
transported by cars to Atlanta and then to Mexico, or was wired
to Mexico, and that Dimas-Garcia was involved with wiring
proceeds to Mexico. Dimas-Garcia confirmed under oath that he
did not disagree with any part of that summary. Thus we
conclude that Dimas-Garcia’s guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary, and find no error in the district court’s acceptance
of his guilty plea.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
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We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Dimas-Garcia in writing of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Dimas-Garcia requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Dimas-Garcia. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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