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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-13517
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:11-cr-00034-WTH-TBS-5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
PRISCILLA N. RICHARDSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(March 19, 2013)
Before HULL, MARTIN and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Priscilla Richardson appeals her conviction for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
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§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846. Richardson’s sole argument is that the district
court erred when it denied her motion for judgment of acquittal because the
evidence against her was entirely circumstantial.
I.
The evidence at trial was that in November 2011, Richardson and a friend,
Crystal Echeverria, picked up six kilograms of cocaine at the Paradise Inn Hotel in
Houston, Texas and delivered it to known drug distributors in Ocala, Florida.
Richardson and Echeverria transported the cocaine in a secret compartment located
underneath the backseat of Richardson’s Volkswagen Passat. When they arrived
in Ocala, the women dropped off the Passat with Eleuterio Hernandez.
Hernandez’s job was to remove the cocaine from the hidden compartment, sell it
locally, and stow the profits back in the compartment so that Richardson and
Echeverria could return with the money to Texas.
Hernandez informed Echeverria and Richardson that it would take him two
to four days to complete his task. In the meantime, the women stayed at the
Howard Johnson Hotel in Ocala. Unbeknownst to the conspirators, Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents were tracking the developments
between Richardson, Echeverria, Hernandez, and others, having been tipped off
that two female drug couriers were expected to initiate a large drug deal in the
Ocala area. On December 2, five days after their arrival in Ocala, and after
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arresting Hernandez and securing his cooperation, DEA agents arrested Richardson
and Echeverria as they were returning to their hotel to pick up the Passat and drive
home to Texas.
Richardson testified at trial. Her account of the events was quite different
than that described above. Richardson explained that she lived in Austin, Texas
with Echeverria, her friend from high school. In November, Echeverria urged
Richardson to buy a car because Echeverria was no longer able to drive her around.
Echeverria even arranged for Richardson to purchase a car—the Volkswagen
Passat—from Echeverria’s boyfriend. Richardson recalled that although
Echeverria’s boyfriend was a car salesman and showed her “a couple other cars,”
he and Echeverria strongly encouraged her to buy the Passat.
Richardson testified that after buying the Passat, she made plans to visit her
mother in Merritt Island, Florida. En route, she intended to visit a boyfriend in
Houston. At her own boyfriend’s suggestion, Echeverria agreed to tag-along.
Before the trip, Richardson lent the Passat to Echeverria a few times because
Echeverria’s car was broken down.
When they got to Houston, Richardson and Echeverria rented a hotel room,
but only stayed for a few hours because Echeverria was eager to get back on the
road. Indeed, Richardson’s time with her boyfriend was so brief that she described
it as “a blink.” Richardson recalled that Echeverria drove most of the way to
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Florida and that the women stopped in Ocala because Echeverria knew friends
there and wanted to visit. Richardson also explained that she gave the Passat to
Hernandez—Echeverria’s friend—because it was making “noises,” “something
was really wrong with [it],” and Echeverria had suggested that Hernandez would
fix it for cheap.
While waiting for Hernandez to fix the car, Richardson and Echeverria
stayed at the Howard Johnson and “kill[ed] time.” They were arrested as they
were coming back to the hotel to meet Hernandez so that he could return the
Passat, having completed the repairs. Richardson testified that she did not know
about the Passat’s hidden compartment, or that six kilograms of cocaine were
stashed there, until after she was arrested.
At the close of the government’s case, and again at the conclusion of her
defense, Richardson moved for judgment of acquittal arguing that the government
had failed to carry its burden because its case was based entirely on “circumstantial
evidence . . . [and] there remain[ed] a reasonable hypothesis of [her] innocence.”
The district court denied Richardson’s motion each time and submitted the case to
the jury. After deliberating less than a day, the jury returned its verdict.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of judgment of acquittal on
sufficiency of evidence grounds, considering the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the government, and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility
choices in the government’s favor. United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1290–
91 (11th Cir. 2011).
A jury’s verdict cannot be overturned if any reasonable construction
of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence need not be
inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis except guilt, and the
jury is free to choose between or among the reasonable conclusions to
be drawn from the evidence presented at trial. But when the
government relies on circumstantial evidence, reasonable inferences,
not mere speculation, must support the conviction.
Id. at 1291 (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted).
“To sustain a conviction for conspiracy to distribute narcotics the
government must prove that 1) an agreement existed between two or more people
to distribute the drugs; 2) that the defendant at issue knew of the conspiratorial
goal; and 3) that he knowingly joined or participated in the illegal venture.”
United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1089 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks
omitted). The government can prove each element by direct or circumstantial
evidence. See United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam).
Richardson’s argument on appeal amounts to an assertion that she was an
unwitting accessory to a scheme devised and executed by Echeverria and
Hernandez and, therefore, the evidence was legally insufficient to convict her of
the conspiracy. While we have “repeatedly held . . . that mere association with a
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conspirator and presence in a vehicle which engages in [activities related to the
conspiracy] is not sufficient to establish participation in a conspiracy to distribute
cocaine,” United States v. Lopez-Ramirez, 68 F.3d 438, 441 (11th Cir. 1995),
Richardson’s appeal fails because the evidence here was sufficient for a reasonable
jury to conclude that her role was significantly greater than that. In addition to the
evidence detailed above, the jury heard testimony that Richardson made phone
calls to, and received calls from, her coconspirators; that Richardson and
Echeverria discussed the drug trade in the presence of coconspirators; and that
when she was arrested, Richardson had in her possession a hotel receipt from
Houston with “Ocala, Florida” written on the back, as well as a pre-paid cell phone
used to contact other known drug dealers. The jury also heard testimony from
DEA agents that it is common practice for drug couriers to title vehicles in their
own names so as to avoid suspicion if stopped by police; that the Passat’s hidden
compartment was “very sophisticated” and of the kind used for serious drug
running; and that it would have been prohibitively risky for a drug supplier to put
six kilograms of cocaine in the car of an unwitting driver, on the off-chance that
she happened to end up where the drugs were intended to be delivered. See United
States v. Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d 719, 722 (11th Cir. 1997) (“A reasonable jury
could infer from the quantity of drugs seized that a ‘prudent smuggler’ is not likely
to entrust such valuable cargo to an innocent person without that person’s
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knowledge.”). Finally, the jury heard testimony undermining Richardson’s own
account of her trip to Ocala, including that Richardson’s mother was unaware that
she intended to visit, and that neither Richardson nor Echeverria ever told
Hernandez that they believed the Passat was broken down, despite Richardson’s
claim that Hernandez was supposed to fix it.
In sum, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that
Richardson was aware of, and willingly participated in, the conspiracy to distribute
cocaine. Brown, 587 F.3d at 1089; see also Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d at 722.
III.
For these reasons, Richardson’s conviction is
AFFIRMED.
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