12-2179
Oyewo v. LaHood
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 20th day of March, two thousand thirteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
8 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 JULIA OYEWO,
14
15 Plaintiff-Appellant,
16
17 v. 12-2179
18
19 RAY LAHOOD, SECRETARY, U.S.
20 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
21
22 Defendant-Appellee.
23
24
25 _____________________________________
26
27
1 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Julia Oyewo, pro se, New York,
2 NY.
3
4 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Christine S. Poscablo, Assistant
5 United States Attorney, Benjamin
6 H. Torrance, Assistant United
7 States Attorney, for Preet
8 Bharara, United States Attorney
9 for the Southern District of New
10 York, New York, NY.
11
12 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
13 Court for Southern District of New York (Fox, M.J.).
14
15 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
16 AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.
17 Appellant Julia Oyewo, proceeding pro se, appeals from
18 a Memorandum and Order by the United States District Court
19 for the Southern District of New York (Fox, M.J.) granting
20 Appellee Department of Transportation’s (“DOT”) motion for
21 summary judgment and dismissing her employment
22 discrimination complaint. We assume the parties’
23 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
24 history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
25 We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
26 judgment, with the view that “[s]ummary judgment is
27 appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no
28 genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is
29 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff
30 & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003).
2
1 As an initial matter, Oyewo has abandoned her
2 alternative work schedule claim by raising it for the first
3 time in opposition to DOT’s motion for summary judgment, see
4 Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 361 (2d Cir.
5 2006), and by presenting minimal argument in her brief on
6 appeal, Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.
7 1998). Likewise, Oyewo waived her job duties claim by not
8 raising arguments concerning it in her brief on appeal.
9 Id.; LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d
10 Cir. 1995).
11 Upon review of Oyewo’s remaining claims, we conclude
12 that her appeal is without merit substantially for the
13 reasons articulated by the magistrate judge in his March 26,
14 2012 Memorandum and Order.
15 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
16 court is hereby AFFIRMED.
17 FOR THE COURT:
18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
19
20
3