FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 20, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
RANDAL ANKENEY,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
No. 12-1422
SUSAN JONES, Warden of Fremont
(D. Colorado)
Correctional Facility; TOM
(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-00808-LTB)
CLEMENTS, Director of the Colorado
Department of Corrections (CDOC);
JOHN SUTHERS, The Attorney
General of the State of Colorado,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY
Before HARTZ, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Proceeding pro se, Randal Ankeney seeks a certificate of appealability
(“COA”) from this court so he can appeal the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing no
appeal may be taken from a final order disposing of a § 2254 petition unless the
petitioner first obtains a COA). Because Ankeney has not “made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” this court denies his request for a
COA and dismisses this appeal. Id. § 2253(c)(2).
In 2008, Ankeney pleaded guilty to one count of child abuse with a factual
basis of sexual assault on a child. The state of Colorado and Ankeney stipulated
to the imposition of an eight-year term of incarceration. Ankeney did not appeal
either his conviction or his sentence. He did, however, file a motion for post-
conviction relief pursuant to Colo. R. Crim. P. 35. The state trial court denied
Ankeney’s motion and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the court’s order.
Ankeney filed the instant § 2254 habeas petition on July 26, 2006. In his
petition, Ankeney raised four claims of error. In an order dated July 17, 2012, the
district court dismissed two of those claims, concluding they did not present
issues cognizable in a § 2254 proceeding. In a separate order, the court addressed
Ankeney’s remaining two claims, both of which were previously adjudicated by
the Colorado courts. The first of those claims was an assertion Ankeney’s due
process rights were violated because the state withheld exculpatory evidence prior
to the entry of his guilty plea. Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
(holding the government must disclose exculpatory evidence prior to trial).
Applying the controlling standard set out in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), the district court concluded Ankeney could not
demonstrate he was entitled to habeas relief on this claim because he failed to
identify any clearly established federal law extending the holding in Brady to an
alleged failure to disclose exculpatory information prior to the entry of a guilty
plea. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (providing that clearly established federal law is
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determined by the United States Supreme Court); House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010,
1015-18 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The absence of clearly established federal law is
dispositive under § 2254(d)(1).”).
In his second claim, Ankeney asserted his sentence was imposed in
violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Colorado state
court rejected this claim, finding Ankeney pleaded guilty to negligent child abuse
resulting in serious bodily injury to the child, a class 4 felony. Thus, he admitted
all the elements of a crime that carries a prison sentence of up to eight years. See
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), (10)(a), (10)(b)(X). Ankeney was
sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, a sentence within the presumptive range.
Again applying the standard set forth in the AEDPA, the federal district court
concluded the Colorado court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to, nor
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and Ankeney failed
to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the state court’s factual
findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
This court cannot grant Ankeney a COA unless he can demonstrate “that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted). In evaluating whether
Ankeney has carried his burden, this court undertakes “a preliminary, though not
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definitive, consideration of the [legal] framework” applicable to each of his
claims. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003). Ankeney is not required
to demonstrate that his appeal will succeed to be entitled to a COA. He must,
however, “prove something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of
mere good faith.” Id. (quotations omitted).
This court has reviewed Ankeney’s application for a COA 1 and appellate
brief, the district court’s order, and the entire record on appeal pursuant to the
framework set out by the Supreme Court in Miller-El and concludes Ankeney is
not entitled to a COA. The district court’s resolution of Ankeney’s claims is not
reasonably subject to debate and the claims are not adequate to deserve further
proceedings.
Because Ankeney has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right,” he is not entitled to a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Accordingly, this court denies Ankeney’s request for a COA and dismisses this
appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
1
Ankeney does not seek a COA on the two claims dismissed by the district
court on July 17, 2012.
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