12-2727-cv
Davis v. Mount Saint Mary College
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,
2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 21st day of March, two thousand thirteen.
5
6 PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
7 ROBERT D. SACK,
8 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
9
10 Circuit Judges.
11
12
13
14 DUANE DAVIS,
15
16 Plaintiff-Appellant,
17
18 -v.- 12-2727-cv
19
20 MOUNT SAINT MARY COLLEGE,
21
22 Defendant-Appellee.
23
24
25 FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN, Sussman & Watkins,
26 Goshen, NY.
27
28 FOR APPELLEE: JAMES P. DROHAN (Laura Wong-Pan, on the
29 brief), Thomas, Drohan, Waxman, Petigrow
30 & Mayle, LLP, Hopewell Junction, NY.
31
32 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
33 Southern District of New York (Seibel, J.).
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
2 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
3 AFFIRMED.
4 Plaintiff-Appellant Duane Davis("Davis")appeals from
5 the June 28, 2012 decision and order of the United States
6 District Court for the Southern District of New York
7 (Seibel, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of
8 Defendant-Appellee Mount Saint Mary College (the “College”).
9 Davis was the College’s part-time, men’s basketball
10 coach for fourteen consecutive seasons pursuant to a series
11 of one-year contracts, until he resigned after learning
12 that, after three consecutive losing seasons, the College
13 would not be renewing his contract for the 2009-2010 season.
14 After Davis resigned at age 69, the College created a new
15 position for a full-time, men’s basketball coach, formed a
16 search committee to interview applicants, and, after
17 interviewing six individuals, hired Ryan Kadlubowski at age
18 26. Subsequently, Davis sued the College claiming that the
19 decision not to renew his contract was an adverse employment
20 action motivated solely by his age in violation of the Age
21 Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621
22 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
2
1 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
2 presented for review.
3 ADEA claims are analyzed under McDonnell Douglas’s
4 three-step burden-shifting framework. See Gorzynski v.
5 JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010).
6 Davis only claims that the district court erred at step
7 three in light of three facts: (1) he was more experienced
8 than Kadlubowski, (2) the Athletic Director made a stray
9 comment that Kadlubowski was an “impressive young man,” and
10 (3) the College renewed contracts for younger coaches of
11 different sports that had similar or worse records than he
12 did. Considering the totality of the circumstances as we
13 must, these facts do not reasonably suggest that age was the
14 ‘but for’ cause of the College’s decision. Gorzynski, 596
15 F.3d at 106. For substantially the same reasons as the
16 district court articulated in a comprehensive 28-page
17 opinion, we affirm.
18 We have considered all of Davis’ arguments on appeal
19 and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing
20 reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby
21 AFFIRMED.
22 FOR THE COURT:
23 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
24
25
3