UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4146
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM SAMUEL CHESTER, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver,
Jr., District Judge. (2:08-cr-00105-1)
Submitted: January 23, 2013 Decided: March 25, 2013
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and AGEE and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, Edward H. Weis, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United
States Attorney, Lisa Johnston, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West
Virginia; Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, John D.
Buretta, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth D.
Collery, Anthony Vitarelli, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
William S. Chester, Jr. (“Chester”) appeals from his guilty
plea and conviction for possession of firearms in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) after having been convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I
The relevant facts of this case were previously set out in
United States v. Chester (Chester II), 628 F.3d 673, 676–78 (4th
Cir. 2010). In Chester II, we determined that intermediate
scrutiny was the appropriate standard by which to review Second
Amendment challenges to the validity of § 922(g)(9). Chester II,
628 F.3d at 683. We then remanded this case to the district
court to allow the government the opportunity to present
evidence “to establish a substantial relationship between
§ 922(g)(9) and an important governmental goal.” Id.
On remand, the district court concluded that this Court’s
intervening decision in United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154
(4th Cir. 2011), established that § 922(g)(9) reasonably fit a
substantial government objective and thus survived intermediate
scrutiny. United States v. Chester, 847 F. Supp. 2d 902, 911
(S.D. W. Va. 2012). The district court also rejected Chester’s
overbreadth challenge to § 922(g)(9) and held that, even if
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Chester could bring an overbreadth challenge in the Second
Amendment context, that challenge would fail in this case. Id.
at 908 n.5.
Chester timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
II
We review a district court’s rejection of a Second
Amendment challenge to a federal statute de novo. Staten, 666
F.3d at 157.
III
Chester raises three issues on appeal: (A) whether strict
scrutiny applies in this case affecting an individual’s Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms, (B) whether § 922(g)(9)
is substantially related to the important governmental goal of
reducing the incidence and severity of domestic violence
incidents, and (C) whether § 922(g)(9) is an overbroad, facially
invalid infringement upon the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms.
A. The Proper Level of Scrutiny
We first conclude that the district court properly applied
intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny to Chester’s
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Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9). We determined in
Chester II that intermediate scrutiny was the proper standard by
which to evaluate a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9).
Chester II, 628 F.3d at 683. That determination is the precedent
in this circuit and forecloses Chester’s challenge on this
point.
B. Relationship to Important Governmental Goal
Chester contends that § 922(g)(9) has not been shown to
substantially relate to the important governmental goal of
reducing the incidence and severity of domestic violence. In
Staten, we upheld § 922(g)(9) against the same Second Amendment
challenge, holding that
the government has carried its burden of establishing
a reasonable fit between the substantial government
objective of reducing domestic gun violence and
keeping firearms out of the hands of: (1) persons who
have been convicted of a crime in which the person
used or attempted to use force capable of causing
physical pain or injury to another against a spouse,
former spouse, or other person with whom such person
had a domestic relationship specified in
§ 921(a)(33)(A); and (2) persons who have threatened
the use of a deadly weapon against such a person.
Staten, 666 F.3d at 167. The evidence presented in this case
includes substantially the same items as were before the Court
in Staten. We find the circumstances of Staten to be
indistinguishable from the present case and our holding there
forecloses Chester’s challenge on this point.
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C. Overbreadth
The district court properly rejected Chester’s overbreadth
argument. We first note that no circuit has accepted an
overbreadth challenge in the Second Amendment context. See
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 474 (4th Cir. 2011).
Even assuming in principle that such a challenge is cognizable,
however, we have clearly held that an individual “to whom a
statute was constitutionally applied,” id., cannot “challenge
that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the
Court.” Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610
(1973)). As we conclude that § 922(g)(9) has been
constitutionally applied to Chester, we reject his facial
overbreadth challenge.
IV
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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