UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-7436
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WALTER DEOTIS FOSTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (4:04-cr-01039-TLW-1)
Submitted: March 26, 2013 Decided: April 2, 2013
Before DAVIS, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W. James Hoffmeyer, LAW OFFICE OF W. JAMES HOFFMEYER, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina;
Robert Frank Daley, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Walter Deotis Foster pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to possession with intent to distribute five grams or
more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2000), and the court sentenced him to 204 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the
district court correctly classified Foster as a career offender
pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)
§ 4B1.1(a) (2004). Foster was advised of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief, but he did not do so. We affirm.
We review Foster’s sentence for reasonableness under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). A sentence is procedurally
reasonable if, among other requirements, the court properly
calculates the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range. See id.
at 49-51. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
the district court did not err by classifying Foster as a career
offender. Even absent consideration of his failure to stop for
a blue light conviction, Foster had three prior convictions for
felony drug offenses and one prior conviction for a crime of
violence. See USSG § 4B1.1(a) (requiring defendant have “at
least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence
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or a controlled substance offense” to qualify as career
offender).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Foster, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Foster requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Foster.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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