FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 03 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KALITI DIA, No. 11-71337
Petitioner, Agency No. A098-267-440
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 12, 2013 **
Before: PREGERSON, REINHARDT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Kaliti Dia, a native and citizen of Fiji, petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration
judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence
factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2006).
We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
Dia does not challenge the agency’s dispositive determination that her
application for asylum was time-barred. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d
1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, Dia’s asylum claim fails.
Dia presented evidence that unknown people threw rocks at her family’s
house when she was not there and she was inconvenienced by civil unrest.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Dia failed to
establish she suffered past persecution. See Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967-69
(9th Cir. 1998). We lack jurisdiction to consider Dia’s argument that the agency
should have considered her eligibility for asylum on the basis of unsubstantiated
harms allegedly suffered by her Fijian son, because she did not raise this argument
to the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004). We reject
Dia’s contention that the BIA ignored harm that she allegedly suffered while she
was in the hospital during the 2000 coup because she has not overcome the
presumption that the BIA considered the entire record. See Fernandez v. Gonzales,
439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, Dia’s contention that she is entitled to a
presumption of future persecution fails. See Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d
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1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
determination that Dia’s fear of returning to Fiji, based on general political
instability and ongoing ethnic tensions, lacks a nexus to a protected ground,
particularly since Dia is a member of the ethnic Fijian majority. See Singh, 134
F.3d at 970-71. Accordingly, Dia’s withholding of removal claim fails. See
Zehatye, 453 F.3d at 1190.
The BIA properly declined to reinstate Dia’s voluntary departure period for
failure to timely submit proof of having posted her voluntary departure bond. See
8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(3)(ii). Dia’s arguments on appeal that the IJ failed to
explicitly explain the requirements and consequences regarding posting a bond are
not supported.
Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief
because Dia failed to establish that it is more likely than not that she will be
tortured if she returns to Fiji. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1067-67 (9th
Cir. 2009).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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