UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4764
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO DEMON BLEVINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:12-cr-00217-FL-1)
Submitted: March 8, 2013 Decided: April 5, 2013
Before DIAZ, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Antonio Demon Blevins appeals his fourteen month
sentence imposed following the revocation of his supervised
release. Blevins claims that his sentence is plainly
unreasonable because the district court impermissibly considered
promoting respect for the law during its imposition. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006). After careful review of the record, we
affirm.
A district court has broad discretion when imposing
sentence upon revoking a term of supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will
affirm such a sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and
is not “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461
F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In making this determination,
we first consider whether the sentence imposed is procedurally
or substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438. Only if we so find,
will we “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable, relying on the definition of ‘plain’ that we use
in our ‘plain’ error analysis.” Id. at 439.
Because Blevins did not allege the district court’s
improper reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) below, he must
also satisfy the additional requirements of plain error review.
See United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 199-200 (4th Cir.
2012) (unpreserved claim that district court considered
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impermissible factor when imposing revocation sentence is
reviewed for plain error), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 2013 WL
359745 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2013). Accordingly, Blevins must show that
1) the district court erred, 2) the error is clear and obvious,
and 3) the error affected his substantial rights. United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993). Blevins has not met
these requirements.
As Blevins correctly notes, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006)
mandates that a district court consider a majority of the
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when imposing a revocation
sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Omitted from § 3583(e),
however, are the need for the sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and
provide just punishment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
Accordingly, a district court may not impose a revocation
sentence based predominantly on such considerations. Crudup,
461 F.3d at 439. To do so contravenes the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s direction that “at revocation the court should
sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking
into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the
underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.”
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2010).
Here, the district court’s explanation of Blevins’
sentence does not indicate a plainly improper reliance on
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§ 3553(a)(2)(A). Although the district court uttered a single,
passing reference to promoting respect for the law, it is clear
that the comment was made in reference to the court’s
consideration of Blevins’ repeated attempts to evade his
probation officer and refusal to willingly accept responsibility
for his conduct. Accordingly, the court’s challenged phrasing
clearly and properly referred to the need to punish Blevins’
violation of the court’s trust. In addition, the district court
properly considered the need to deter similar conduct when it
imposed Blevins’ sentence. Thus, we find no violation of
§ 3583(e), plain or otherwise.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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