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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-15355
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-00150-GRJ
ROBIN STRICKLAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(April 11, 2013)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, MARCUS, and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Appellant Robin Strickland appeals the district court’s 1 judgment affirming
the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of Strickland’s application for a
period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act. Strickland alleges that she became disabled on August 1, 2003, and
the ALJ found that she suffered from the severe impairments of degenerative disc
disease and status-post lumbar laminectomy. When assessing Strickland’s residual
functional capacity, however, the ALJ found that, while Strickland’s impairments
could be reasonably expected to produce some of her alleged symptoms,
Strickland’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
those symptoms were not credible. Additionally, the ALJ assigned “little weight”
to Lumbar Spine Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaires that were submitted
by two of Strickland’s treating physicians. Ultimately, the ALJ found that
Strickland could perform a reduced range of sedentary work, and that a significant
number of jobs existed in the national economy that she could perform.
On appeal, Strickland argues that the ALJ did not adequately articulate the
credibility finding, and that substantial evidence does not support that finding.
Moreover, she argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision
to assign “little weight” to the opinions of her treating physicians.
1
This case was decided by a magistrate judge by consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636 et seq.
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We review the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it is supported by
substantial evidence, and whether the ALJ applied proper legal standards.
Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004).
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting
Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997)). We may not reweigh
the evidence and decide facts anew and must defer to the ALJ’s decision if it is
supported by substantial evidence even if the evidence may preponderate against it.
See Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).
A claimant must be under a disability to be eligible for disability insurance
benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). A claimant is disabled if she is unable “to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
. . . impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of” at least 12 months.
Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant bears the burden of proving her disability. See
Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).
In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) applies a five-step sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a). This process includes a determination of whether the claimant:
(1) is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe and
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medically determinable physical or mental impairment; (3) has such an impairment
that meets or equals a Listing and meets the duration requirement; (4) can perform
her past relevant work, in light of her residual functional capacity; and (5) can
make an adjustment to other work, in light of her residual functional capacity, age,
education, and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Before determining whether the claimant can work, the ALJ must first assess
her residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)-(v), (e). The
claimant’s residual functional capacity is an assessment, based upon all relevant
evidence, of the claimant’s ability to do work despite her impairments. Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The
claimant is not disabled if, in light of her residual functional capacity and other
factors, she can make an adjustment to other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
(g)(1).
I. The Credibility Finding
A claimant may establish her disability through her own testimony of pain or
other subjective symptoms. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210; Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d
1553, 1560‒61 (11th Cir. 1995). The ALJ must consider a claimant’s testimony of
pain and other subjective symptoms where the claimant meets our three-part “pain
standard.” See Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560. Under that test, evidence of an underlying
medical condition must exist. Id. If that threshold is met, then there must be either
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objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain or
symptoms arising from the underlying medical condition, or evidence that the
objectively-determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can
reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain or symptoms. Id. A
claimant’s subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies our
pain standard is sufficient to support a finding of disability. Id. at 1561.
If the record shows that the claimant has a medically-determinable
impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce her symptoms, the ALJ
must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the symptoms in determining how
they limit the claimant’s capacity for work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). In doing
so, the ALJ considers all of the record, including the objective medical evidence,
the claimant’s history, and statements of the claimant and her doctors. Id.
§ 404.1529(c)(1)-(2). The ALJ may consider other factors, such as: (1) the
claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of
the claimant’s pain or other symptoms; (3) any precipitating and aggravating
factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of the claimant’s
medication; (5) any treatment other than medication; (6) any measures the claimant
used to relieve her pain or symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning the
claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to her pain or symptoms. Id.
§ 404.1529(c)(3). The ALJ then will examine the claimant’s statements regarding
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her symptoms in relation to all other evidence, and consider whether there are any
inconsistencies or conflicts between those statements and the record. Id.
§ 404.1529(c)(4).
If the ALJ decides not to credit the claimant’s testimony as to her subjective
symptoms, the ALJ must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so or
the record must be obvious as to the credibility finding. See Foote, 67 F.3d at
1561-62. While the ALJ does not have to cite particular phrases or formulations,
broad findings that a claimant was incredible and could work are, alone,
insufficient for us to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant’s medical
condition as a whole. Id. at 1562. The ALJ’s articulated reasons must also be
supported by substantial evidence. Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 941
F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1991). We will not disturb a properly articulated
credibility finding that is supported by substantial evidence. Foote, 67 F.3d at
1562. The failure to articulate reasons for discrediting a claimant’s subjective
testimony, however, requires that the testimony be accepted as true and becomes
grounds for remand where credibility is critical to the outcome of the case. Id.
The ALJ explicitly and adequately articulated her credibility finding. In support of
this finding, the ALJ relied on Strickland’s course of treatment, particularly relying
upon the opinions of Dr. Reid, Dr. Scott, Dr. Valentine, Dr. Greenberg, and Dr.
Stevenson. Generally, the ALJ found that Strickland’s symptoms improved with
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treatment, or that at least, the medical opinions did not corroborate her subjective
complaints regarding her limitations. Moreover, substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s credibility finding. First, various aspects of the medical evidence are
inconsistent with Strickland’s subjective complaints regarding the limiting effects
of her symptoms. Second, there was sufficient evidence regarding Strickland’s
daily living activities to support the ALJ’s finding. These activities were
inconsistent with her subjective complaints regarding the limiting effects of her
symptoms. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s adverse
credibility finding.
II. The Medical Opinions
The ALJ may consider medical opinions, including those regarding what the
claimant can still do despite her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). A
treating physician’s opinion must be given substantial or considerable weight
absent good cause. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004); see
also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (“we give more weight to opinions from your
treating sources”). “Good cause” exists when the: “(1) treating physician’s opinion
was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or
(3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s
own medical records.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41. Among other factors in
determining the appropriate weight to assign a medical opinion, the SSA considers
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the consistency an opinion has with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(4). The ALJ must clearly articulate her reasons for giving less
weight to a treating physician’s opinion, and the failure to do so is reversible error.
Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440.
The ALJ clearly articulated her reasons for assigning “little weight” to the
Lumbar Spine Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaires. The ALJ noted that
both Questionnaires conflicted with the overall medical record. Moreover, good
cause existed for the ALJ’s decision, particularly because both Questionnaires are
inconsistent with various aspects of their authors’ previous medical opinions.
Furthermore, the limitations set forth in the Questionnaires also conflicted with
other aspects of the record, and Strickland’s daily living activities.
In light of the above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
Strickland was not disabled, and, therefore, ineligible for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits. Accordingly, after a careful and thorough review of
the administrative record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment denying
benefits.
AFFIRMED.
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