Charles Smalley v. Shapiro & Burson, LLP

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1266

CHARLES SMALLEY; PAMELA BALL, On behalf of themselves and
as a class,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

SHAPIRO & BURSON, LLP; JOHN S. BURSON, Esq.; WILLIAM M.
SAVAGE, Esq.; JASON MURPHY, Esq.,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

KRISTINE D. BROWN, Esq.; ERIK W. YODER, Esq.; GREGORY N.
BRITTO, Esq.,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (8:11-cv-00906-JFM)

Argued: March 22, 2013 Decided: April 16, 2013

Before WILKINSON and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and Jackson L.
KISER, Senior United States District Judge for the Western
District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion. Senior Judge Kiser
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Davis
joined.
ARGUED: Ian Stumpf, JR HOWELL & ASSOCIATES, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellants. Robert A. Scott, BALLARD SPAHR, LLP, Baltimore,
Maryland; William Joseph Carter, CARR MALONEY, PC, Washington,
D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Glenn A. Cline, BALLARD SPAHR,
LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Bizhan Beiramee, BIZHAN BEIRAMEE,
ESQ., P.C., McLean, Virginia, for Appellees Shapiro & Burson,
LLP, John S. Burson, Esq., and William M. Savage, Esq.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2
KISER, Senior District Judge:

Appellants ask us to hold that their federal causes of

action are not barred under Maryland claim preclusion law

because the claims could not have been asserted in the state

foreclosure proceedings. Because we decide that the district

court lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the case under

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we do not need to resolve that

question. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment

and remand the case with instructions to dismiss Appellants’

actions without prejudice.

I.

Charles Smalley and Pamela Ball (collectively

“Appellants”), are African-American residents of Maryland.

Appellee Shapiro & Burson, LLP, is a Maryland law firm. In

2009, Appellee foreclosed on Appellants’ homes on behalf of

Appellants’ mortgage lenders.

Appellee Shapiro & Burson conducts a large number of

foreclosures in Maryland and other jurisdictions. Appellees

John Burson, William Savage, and Jason Murphy were all attorneys

for Appellee Shapiro & Burson. 1 Burson, Savage, and Murphy were

1
“Appellees” refers to Shapiro & Burson, LLP, John Burson,
William Savage, and Jason Murphy collectively, all of whom were
parties to the action in the district court.

3
all appointed as substitute trustees for the purpose of

conducting the foreclosures at issue. (J.A. 150.)

Pamela Ball

The foreclosure proceeding against Appellant Pamela Ball

was instituted in November of 2007. Appellant Ball “never

sought an injunction to stop the sale, nor did she file any

exceptions to the sale, as she could have done pursuant to Md.

Rule 14-305[,] to challenge the conduct of the foreclosure

auction.” (Br. for Appellees pg. 5.) When Shapiro & Burson

employees (not the substitute trustees) filed the Order to

Docket Foreclosure against Appellant Ball, the signing affiant

swore that Appellees were the note holders and that they had the

right to foreclose on the property. Additionally, the affiant

swore that a copy of the note was attached to the Order to

Docket and that the note was a true and accurate copy of the

original. Appellants maintain that none of those statements

were true. (See J.A. 152.) Appellants allege that Appellees

were never in possession of the note. (Id.)

The same month that the Order to Docket was filed,

Appellees sold Appellant Ball’s property, allegedly without ever

seeing or possessing the promissory note as represented. (Id.)

In December of 2007, Appellees sent Appellant Ball an eviction

notice, ordering her to vacate her property within three days;

she complied. (Id.) Several months after insisting Appellant

4
Ball vacate the property, Appellees informed the state court

that the Order to Docket was defective, and they filed a “Motion

to Accept Lost Note Affidavit” at that time. (See id.)

Appellant Ball did not oppose the motion. (See J.A. 235-41.)

Despite the defective Order and original affidavit, the state

court ratified the foreclosure. (J.A. 152.)

On December 23, 2008, over a year after Appellees sold

Appellant Ball’s home, the state court auditor filed the

auditor’s report pursuant to Md. Rule 14-305. (J.A. 236, 245-

46.) The report set forth, among other things, the distribution

of the proceeds from the sale, including the fees charged by

Appellee Shapiro & Burson. (J.A. 245-46.) Appellant Ball filed

an exception to this report by way of a “Motion for Exception to

the Audit.” (J.A. 247-48.) On January 12, 2009, the state

court issued a final order of ratification of the audit and

closed the case. (J.A. 249.)

Appellant Ball subsequently appealed the order of the state

court ratifying the auditor’s report. (See J.A. 251.) The

Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that Appellant Ball’s

appeal was procedurally premature because her January 21, 2009,

Motion to Nullify the Judgment operated as a motion to alter or

amend that judgment and, because that motion had not been ruled

upon, the appeal was premature. (See J.A. 255.) The Court of

Special Appeals additionally held, however, that the principles

5
of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Appellant Ball’s

allegations of wrongdoing related to the report of sale because

that judgment became final when the appellate court issued its

mandate dismissing the appeal. (Id.)

On remand, following a March 4, 2011, hearing on

Appellant’s Ball’s outstanding motions, the state court denied

the audit motion and ratified the audit. (See J.A. 258.) No

appeal was filed. (J.A. 234-41.) Appellant Ball did file a

“Motion for Emergency Hearing,” claiming that the state court

should not have ratified the audit because it never ruled on

several motions. She sought to re-open the case and filed an

“Amendment to the Open Motion Dated January 21, 2009.” (J.A.

259-62.) In that motion, Appellant Ball re-asserted allegations

related to the Lost Note Affidavit. (See id.) Following a

hearing, the state court denied the motion. (See J.A. 240.)

Appellant Ball appealed, but the state court was affirmed. (See

Br. of Appellee Addendum 1.)

Charles Smalley

On May 21, 2009, Appellees filed an Order to Docket

Foreclosure against Appellant Charles Smalley. (J.A. 159.)

Appellee Jason Murphy allegedly signed the Order, but Shapiro &

Burson employees had prepared the affidavit. The Order included

an affidavit that asserted that the substitute trustee had

verified that the party ordering the foreclosure was “the owner

6
of the Note that is the subject of this foreclosure action and

that the copy of the Note filed in this foreclosure case is a

true and accurate copy of said Note.” (J.A. 159-60.) Although

the affidavit certified that Barclays Capital Real Estate, Inc.,

(“Barclays”) was the noteholder, the Note itself indicated on

its face that it was payable to Fremont Investment & Loan.

(J.A. 160.) Appellees did not produce any record of a transfer

of ownership of the mortgage prior to the filing of the Order to

Docket Foreclosure. (See id.) Appellant Smalley alleges that

Appellees did not take any steps to confirm that Barclays was

actually the noteholder. (See id.)

The substitute trustees ultimately sold Appellant Smalley’s

property at a foreclosure sale in April 2010. (Id.) Prior to

the sale, Appellant Smalley did not seek an injunction to stop

the sale, nor did he move to dismiss the foreclosure action

pursuant to the applicable state rules. (See J.A. 263-64.) The

state court ratified the sale on October 21, 2010. Just as in

Appellant Ball’s case, Appellees received a commission on the

sale. In addition, the legal fees Appellees charged were passed

on to Appellants from their respective foreclosures.

On June 25, 2010, Appellant Smalley filed a “Memorandum of

Law—Bank Fraud,” in which he challenged the foreclosure. (See

J.A. 264.) The substitute trustees filed a Motion to Strike,

arguing that the time for filing exceptions has lapsed. (See

7
id.) The state court granted the Motion to Strike on October

20, 2010. (Id.) The next day, the state court ratified the

foreclosure sale. (See J.A. 264-65.) On January 14, 2011, the

state court ratified the audit, which included the distribution

from the sale, as well as all fees charged by Appellee Shapiro &

Burson. (See J.A. 269-70.) Appellant Smalley never appealed

the ratification of the sale or the ratification of the

auditor’s report. (See J.A. 263-66.)

On January 24, 2011, Appellant Smalley filed a 15-count

declaratory judgment complaint in the state court against his

mortgage lender, Barclays, and the purchaser, 50 by 50 REO, LLC.

(See J.A. 271-89.) In that lawsuit, Appellant Smalley alleged,

among other things, that Barclays was not the holder of

Appellant Smalley’s promissory note and that the Smalley

foreclosure action was brought by entities that had no interest

in the Smalley property, the note, or the mortgage. (See J.A.

274.) Appellant Smalley further alleged that Barclay’s

representation of an ownership interest as a basis for

instituting the foreclosure, the foreclosure action itself, and

“all of the representations and activities undertaken to

commence, execute, and finalize the sale” constituted unfair and

deceptive trade practices under the Maryland Consumer Protection

Act. (See J.A. 276-77.) The state court dismissed the action

8
on res judicata grounds, and the Maryland Court of Special

Appeals affirmed. (See J.A. 268; Appellee’s Rule 28(j) filing.)

In March of 2011, state prosecutors launched an

investigation into the alleged “robo-signing” practices of

Appellee Shapiro & Burson. (J.A. 156.) In cooperation with the

criminal investigation, José Portillo, a paralegal who worked at

Shapiro & Burson from April 2008 until February 2011, came

forward with details regarding practices Appellees allegedly

directed him to undertake. (See J.A. 44-47, 153.) Portillo

detailed how he and other paralegals were directed to prepare

deeds and affidavits for Appellee William Savage to sign. A

different attorney who did not work for Shapiro & Burson,

however, routinely signed Appellee Savage’s names to trustee’s

deeds that “transferr[ed] the foreclosed property back to the

lender who purchased the property at auction.” (J.A. 44.) In

an affidavit, Portillo included several deeds that were

purportedly signed by Appellee Savage but were not, in fact,

signed by him, as well as several deeds which actually were

signed by Appellee Savage. (See J.A. 45, 48-102.) Notaries,

such as Portillo, were then instructed to notarize the deeds.

None of the allegedly fraudulent documents included with the

Portillo affidavit, however, concerned any Appellant’s

foreclosure.

9
 On April 7, 2011, shortly after Appellees’ “robo-signing”

practices came to light, Appellants sought to bring a class

action in the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland. (See J.A. 147-182.) In the federal complaint,

Appellants contended that the fees imposed were “excessive,

unreasonable, and inappropriate in light of the lack of due

diligence and the pattern of unlawful, fraudulent conduct

[Appellees] undertook in reporting that those fees were actually

earned.” (J.A. 157.) Although they did not claim any aspect of

the affidavits submitted to the state court were “false,” they

alleged that Appellants’ lack of diligence in confirming the

facts to which they attested was “unfair and unconscionable” and

that the signatures on the affidavits were the result of

“rampant forgery.” (J.A. 173-74.) They contended that the

imposition of excessive and unearned fees, as well as the

submission of false affidavits to the state court, violated

their federal rights. (See, e.g., J.A. 167.) Appellants

asserted claims for fraud, violations of the Maryland Consumer

Protection Act, and violations of the federal RICO statute, Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act, Fair Housing Act, and Civil

Rights Act. (See J.A. 166-180.) Appellees filed a motion to

dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6), arguing that Appellants’ claims were barred by the

doctrine of claim preclusion. The District Court granted the

10
motion and dismissed the action. Appellants then instituted

this appeal.

II.

The dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is reviewed under the de novo standard

of review. See Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134

(4th Cir. 1993). In its review, the Court “construes the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant,”

E.E.O.C. v. Seafarers Int’l Union, 394 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir.

2005), and “should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations

and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the

plaintiff,” Mylan Labs., 7 F.3d at 1134. Additionally, although

Appellants bring this action on behalf of a purported class, “if

none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class

establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the

defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any

other member of the class.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,

493-95 (1974).

Although the district court dismissed this action on claim

preclusion grounds, Appellees have raised a jurisdictional issue

that we are required to address before reaching the merits. See

Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir.

1999). Appellees argue that this case is barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, which precludes a federal court from deciding

11
what is, in essence, an appeal of a state court judgment. See

Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994).

III.

This Court has consistently treated the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine as jurisdictional, and “[b]ecause the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine is jurisdictional, we are obliged to address it before

proceeding further in our analysis.” Friedman’s, Inc. v.

Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 195-96 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Am.

Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir.

2003); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198-99

(4th Cir. 2000); Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d

192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a

“party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in

substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a

United States district court.” Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1005-06.

This is so because Congress has vested the power to entertain an

appeal of a state court judgment only with the Supreme Court.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); Brown & Root, Inc., 211 F.3d at 198-99.

“A litigant may not circumvent these jurisdictional mandates by

instituting a federal action which, although not styled as an

appeal, ‘amounts to nothing more than an attempt to seek review

of [the state court’s] decision by a lower federal court.’”

Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 316 (quoting Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d

728, 733 (4th Cir. 1997)). “The controlling question in the

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Rooker-Feldman analysis is whether a party seeks the federal

district court to review a state court decision and pass upon

the merits of that state court decision, not whether the state

court judgment is presently subject to reversal or modification.

Put another way, if ‘in order to grant the federal plaintiff the

relief sought, the federal court must determine that the [state]

court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that

would render the judgment ineffectual,’ Rooker-Feldman is

implicated.” Jordahl, 122 F.3d at 202 (quoting Ernst v. Child &

Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997)). The doctrine

applies not only to matters directly addressed by the state

court, but also to “claims which are ‘inextricably intertwined’

with state court decisions.” Brown & Root, Inc., 211 F.3d at

198 (quoting District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983)).

Although Appellants do not seek to “undo” the state court

judgment foreclosing on their homes, permitting their case to go

forward would, in essence, hold that the state court judgments

which affirmed the legal fees and commissions and held the

allegedly false affidavits sufficient to warrant foreclosure was

in error. This is not proper under Rooker-Feldman because their

federal causes of action are “inextricably intertwined” with the

state court foreclosure actions. This prong of the doctrine

“bars a claim that was not actually decided by the state court

13
but where ‘success on the federal claim depends upon a

determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues

before it.’” Brown & Root, Inc., 211 F.3d at 198 (quoting

Plyler, 129 F.3d at 731). If Appellants are not seeking a

review of the state court’s judgment, their success on the

merits would necessitate a finding that the state court “wrongly

decided the issues before it.” Id. Accord Harper v. Chase

Manhattan Bank, 138 F. App’x 130, 133 (11th Cir. 2008)

(unpublished) (“Harper’s claims under the . . . FDCPA [Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act] . . . were inextricably intertwined

with the foreclosure proceeding in state court . . . .”). Here,

the alleged source of Appellants’ harm is shielded by state

court judgments that necessarily rested on a decision about

which Appellants now complain; therefore, Appellants are limited

to whatever relief they are afforded in the state court system.

Other courts have relied on Rooker-Feldman to bar the same

or similar causes of action Appellants asserted below. See

Harper, 138 F. App’x at 132-33 (dismissing Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act claims); Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., 766 F. Supp.

2d 1305, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (dismissing a RICO claim under

Rooker-Feldman); Distant v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 09-

61460-CIV, 2010 WL 1249129, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010)

(unpublished)(“Although plead as conspiracy claims . . . ,

Plaintiff is clearly asking this Court to invalidate the state

14
court action by ruling that the state court foreclosure judgment

is somehow void. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, . . . this

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, as Plaintiff seeks a de

facto appeal of a previously litigated state court matter.”);

Simpson v. Putnam Cnty. Nat’l Bank of Carmel, 20 F. Supp. 2d

630, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a foreclosure judgment

was not subject to federal review under Rooker-Feldman, and

noting that “the fact that plaintiff alleges that the . . .

foreclosure judgment was procured by fraud and conspiracy [does

not] change that result.”); Smith v. Wayne Weinberger, P.C., 994

F. Supp. 418, 424 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (rejecting a plaintiff’s

“thinly-veiled effort to invalidate the State Court’s

foreclosure judgment, in contravention of Rooker-Feldman,” by

alleging fraud).

Moreover, Appellants admit that the state court decision is

the source of their harm. In their brief, Appellants state: “In

the present case, Plaintiffs’ causes of action under the FDCPA

[Fair Debt Collection Practices Act], MCPA [Maryland Consumer

Protection Act], FHA [Fair Housing Act], and CRA [Civil Rights

Act] did not accrue until the foreclosure actions were

completed.” (Br. for Appellants pg. 15.) If Appellants allege

they did not possess a cognizable legal injury until the state

court entered its judgment, it follows that they allege that the

state court judgment was the source of their harm, as no

15
relevant conduct occurred after the judgments were entered.

Thus, because Appellants allege that the state court’s judgment

caused their injury, 2 their actions are clearly barred under

Rooker-Feldman. See Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1005-06 (“[A] party

losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance

would be an appellate review of the state judgment in a United

States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that

the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”

(emphasis added)).

In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., the

Supreme Court sought to refocus lower courts that had extended

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “far beyond the contours of the

Rooker and Feldman cases . . . .” 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005).

The Court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is confined to

cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name:

2
We recognize that Appellants are placed in a precarious
position. They argue their claims did not exist until the state
court action was finalized, which they contend precludes a
finding that their claims could have been raised in the state
court proceedings. See Anyanwutaku v. Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc.,
85 F. Supp. 2d 566, 570 (D. Md. 2000) (noting that the doctrine
of res judicata, or claim preclusion, applies to “relitigation
of matters previously litigated between the parties and their
privies, as well as those claims that could have been asserted
and litigated in the original suits.”). In an effort to avoid a
ruling that their claims were precluded by res judicata because
they did not exist at the time of the state foreclosure action,
however, they have essentially admitted that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars their actions.

16
cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries by

state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and

rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 284. That is exactly

what Appellants seek here. Their primary complaints are: the

imposition of attorneys’ fees; the award of a commission; and

the allegedly fraudulent, but not false, affidavits. By

affirming the foreclosures, the Maryland state court necessarily

passed judgment on the amount of the attorneys’ fees and

commissions and the content of the affidavits. Permitting this

action to proceed would necessarily invite the District Court to

“review and reject[] those judgments.” Id. Because Rooker-

Feldman prohibits this, the District Court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction.

At oral argument, Appellants pointed us to two Sixth

Circuit Court of Appeals cases which they maintain establish

that their actions are not barred by Rooker-Feldman. We are not

swayed by the facts or conclusions of Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg

& Reis Co., LPA, 434 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2006), or Brown v. First

Nationwide Mortgage Corporation, 206 F. App’x 436, 437 (6th Cir.

2006) (unpublished).

We are, however, persuaded by the logic espoused by the

Southern District of Florida in Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., 766

F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fl. 2011), a post-Exxon Mobil decision

17
addressing a foreclosed party’s attempt to hold their lender

accountable under the federal RICO statute. Like Appellants

here, Figueroa filed a purported class action months after the

defendants foreclosed on his home. Id. at 1310. The defendants

moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),

arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under

Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 1315. After a lengthy discussion of the

doctrine and Exxon Mobil, see id. at 1315-20, the district court

concluded that the plaintiff’s action was barred because it was

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court foreclosure

judgment. Id. at 1321-22. The district court held that the

suit was barred “because Plaintiff’s claims can only succeed if

the Court implicitly or explicitly determines the Florida state

court wrongly decided the foreclosure issue. . . . The only way

Plaintiff (and putative class members) could have been ‘damaged’

by the loss . . . of their homes is if those foreclosures were

wrongful. In fact, Figueroa concedes as much in his Opposition,

acknowledging he suffered no damages until the Florida state

court entered foreclosure judgment.” Id. at 1323-24. The same

is true here; Appellants explicitly argue that they were not

damaged until the state court entered its foreclosure judgments

and the Orders adopting the auditors’ reports. Moreover, like

Appellants, “Figeuroa’s federal claims can only succeed to the

extent the [state] court erred, and the Court cannot grant

18
Figueroa his requested relief without disturbing the [state]

foreclosure judgment. It is for the state appeals court and the

U.S. Supreme Court to tell the state court it was wrong. This

Court has no such role.” Id. at 1324.

Examining Appellants’ contentions, it is clear that the

injuries they complain of, regardless of when they accrued, stem

from the state court judgments. The “unfair” but truthful

affidavits only have relevance or effect once adopted by the

state court; the fees and commissions were only imposed on

Appellants when the state court adopted the auditors’ reports

that accepted them. “The injur[ies] alleged by [Appellants] in

all of these allegations [are] a direct result of the judicial

order and fail[] to assert an ‘independent claim’ that would

bring the case outside the ambit of Rooker-Feldman.” Reguli v.

Guffee, 371 F. App’x 590, 596 (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)

(citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293).

Because we conclude that the district court did not have

subject matter jurisdiction, we are compelled to conclude that

the judgment of the district court must be vacated. The court

below held Appellants’ actions were barred by res judicata.

Such a decision amounts to a dismissal on the merits. See,

e.g., Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Co., 380 F.2d 69, 80 (4th

Cir. 1967). The district court did not have jurisdiction to

enter a judgment on the merits, so the matter must be vacated

19
and remanded to the district court with instructions that it be

dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction. Accord

Durbin v. Dubuque, 348 F. App’x 294, 295 (9th Cir. 2009)

(unpublished); Beth-El All Nations Church v. City of Chicago,

486 F.3d 286, 294 (7th Cir. 2007).

IV.

Appellants seek to re-litigate matters that are

“inextricably intertwined” with judgments entered by the state

court in the foreclosure actions. Such actions are barred by

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. For this reason, the district

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellants’

actions, and thus lacked the authority to reach the merits of

the case and dismiss the action with prejudice. We therefore

vacate the judgment of the district court and remand this case

with instructions that it be dismissed without prejudice for

lack of jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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