FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 18 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SALVADOR M. RENTERIA, No. 11-15367
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-05325-CRB
v.
MEMORANDUM *
DERRAL G. ADAMS, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 16, 2013 **
San Francisco, California
Before: GOODWIN, O’SCANNLAIN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1. Absent a defendant’s consent, a trial court may permissibly declare a
mistrial only in cases where “‘manifest necessity’ justifies a discharge of the jury.”
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978). However, a “mistrial premised
upon the trial judge’s belief that the jury is unable to reach a verdict
[is] . . . considered the classic basis for a proper mistrial.” Id. While a trial judge
may not act “irrationally or irresponsibly” in declaring a mistrial, the declaration
will be upheld so long as it is the result of the trial judge’s exercise of “sound
discretion.” Id. at 514.
Here, the California Court of Appeal reasonably applied clearly established
federal law when it denied Petitioner’s claim that the trial court improperly
declared a mistrial. We note that the Supreme Court has never “overturned a trial
court’s declaration of a mistrial after a jury was unable to reach a verdict on the
ground that the manifest necessity standard had not been met.” Renico v. Lett, 130
S. Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither has it
required “‘mechanical application’ of any ‘rigid formula’ when trial judges decide
whether jury deadlock warrants a mistrial.” Id. at 1863. Applying appropriate
deference, we conclude that the trial judge exercised its “sound discretion” when it
declared a mistrial after the jury stated that it could not reach a verdict. See id. at
1860, 1863-66.
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2. We decline to reach the issue of whether trying Petitioner for first
degree murder a second time violated the Double Jeopardy Clause under Blueford
v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044 (2012). Even assuming a violation, the California
Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that Petitioner’s acquittal for first degree
murder rendered the alleged violation “moot” or harmless. Clearly established
federal law does not impose “an automatic retrial rule whenever a defendant is
tried for a jeopardy-barred crime and is convicted of a lesser included offense.”
Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 245 (1986). Rather, “a new trial is required only
when the defendant shows a reliable inference of prejudice.” Id. at 246. The
California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that Petitioner failed to show
prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that the court would not have convicted him
for second degree murder absent the first degree murder charge. See id. at 246-47.
3. We reject Petitioner’s claim that the California Court of Appeal
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it concluded that
Petitioner knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.
As the California Court of Appeal noted, Renteria challenged retrial of the first
degree murder charge, showing that he knew that there was a “substantial question
whether the . . . charge was constitutional.” Thus, the question of whether retrial of
the first degree murder charge violated the Double Jeopardy Clause did not deprive
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Petitioner of “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him.” See Bousley
v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998).
For these reasons, the district court correctly denied relief.
AFFIRMED.
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