UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2252
LAURE ANN KEFFER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District
Judge. (7:11-cv-00478-SGW-RSB)
Submitted: April 8, 2013 Decided: April 23, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark A. Black, BRUMBERG, MACKEY & WALL, P.L.C., Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellant. Eric P. Kressman, Regional Chief
Counsel, Victor J. Pane, Supervisory Attorney, Timothy Reiley,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Timothy J. Heaphy,
United States Attorney, Rick Mountcastle, Assistant United
States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Laure Ann Keffer appeals the district court’s order
adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and upholding the
Commissioner of Social Security’s decision to deny her a period
of disability insurance benefits. We have reviewed the record
and affirm.
Our review of the Commissioner’s disability
determination is limited to evaluating whether the findings are
supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law
was applied. See Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006)).
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). We do not reweigh evidence
or make credibility determinations in evaluating whether a
decision is supported by substantial evidence; “[w]here
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ,” we
defer to the Commissioner’s decision. Id.
On appeal, Keffer asserts that the administrative law
judge’s (“ALJ”) residual functional capacity finding was not
supported by substantial evidence. According to Keffer, the ALJ
mischaracterized Keffer’s evidence relating to her daily
activities, ignored the fact that her subjective complaints of
pain were supported by the objective medical record, and
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improperly rejected a clinical assessment of pain completed by
Dr. Bayliss, who was Keffer’s treating physician. Our review of
the record convinces us otherwise. Contrary to Keffer’s
contentions, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s
construction of the record, including his decision to partially
discredit Keffer’s subjective complaints of pain in light of the
objective medical evidence. See Johnson, 434 F.3d at 658. Nor
do we discern any reversible error in the ALJ’s decision to give
only limited weight to the terse and heavily-qualified opinion
rendered by Dr. Bayliss. See Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178
(4th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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