UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4759
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARL EUGENE MCPHAUL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (7:12-cr-00010-H-1)
Submitted: April 15, 2013 Decided: April 25, 2013
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Devon L. Donahue,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carl E. McPhaul appeals the district court’s judgment
imposing a 262-month career offender sentence following his
guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute a quantity
of cocaine and a quantity of marijuana, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and to possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). McPhaul argues that his sentence is
procedurally unreasonable because the district court ignored his
nonfrivolous arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence and
failed to adequately explain the sentence imposed. We affirm.
Because McPhaul preserved his challenge to the
adequacy of the district court’s explanation, we review for
abuse of discretion and must reverse if we find error, unless we
determine that it was harmless. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d
572, 578-79 (4th Cir. 2010). “Regardless of whether the
district court imposes an above, below, or within-Guidelines
sentence, it must place on the record an individualized
assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it.”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, “it is not
necessary that a court issue a comprehensive, detailed opinion,”
but the explanation must be sufficient to allow for “meaningful
appellate review.” United States v. Allmendinger, 706 F.3d 330,
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343 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, the sentencing court “need not robotically tick through
§ 3553(a)’s every subsection;” it only must provide “some
indication” that it considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors with respect to the defendant before it and also
considered any nonfrivolous arguments raised by the parties at
sentencing. United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 380
(4th Cir. 2006); see Carter, 564 F.3d at 328.
McPhaul first claims that the sentence imposed by the
district court is procedurally unreasonable because the court
did not specifically address any of counsel’s arguments other
than merely noting McPhaul’s status as a career offender. Here,
the district court listened to defense counsel’s arguments for a
downward variance based on the § 3553(a) factors — specifically,
that McPhaul had a history of abuse, poverty, and drug addiction
and that McPhaul’s actions during the instant offense did not
warrant a 262-month sentence. Although the district court
acknowledged that the instant conduct would not have normally
warranted a 262-month sentence, the court stated that
“[McPhaul]’s paying the price for the career offender status”
(J.A. 51) ∗ and declined to vary from the Guidelines range,
emphasizing that McPhaul had amassed an average of about one
∗
“J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties.
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conviction a year for seventeen years. We conclude that,
although the district court did not specifically address each of
defense counsel’s arguments, the court’s comments demonstrated
that it found the arguments unpersuasive in light of McPhaul’s
lengthy criminal history and his status as a career offender.
McPhaul also argues that the district court did not
adequately explain its sentence and that his case is similar to
one of the defendants in Lynn, see 592 F.3d at 583-85. We
disagree. In imposing the 262-month sentence, the district
court stated that the findings in the presentence report were
“credible and reliable” (J.A. 60), that it calculated the
Guidelines range from those findings, and that it considered the
§ 3553(a) factors as well. The court mentioned McPhaul’s
extensive criminal history and status as a career offender
during defense counsel’s arguments for a downward variance. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court also stated that it
considered McPhaul’s background and the nature of the instant
offense. See id. The court further recommended that McPhaul be
“exposed to the most intense drug treatment possible during the
term of his incarceration.” (J.A. 62); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(D). While the district court did not cite to
specific § 3553(a) factors in explaining the sentence, it was
not required to do so. See United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 658 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that reasons articulated for
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given sentence need not be “couched in the precise language of
§ 3553(a),” so long as “reasons can be matched to a factor
appropriate for consideration . . . and [are] clearly tied to
[defendant’s] particular situation”). We therefore conclude
that the district court provided “some indication” that it
considered the § 3553(a) factors and defense counsel’s
nonfrivolous arguments and that McPhaul’s sentence is
procedurally reasonable. See Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 380.
Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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