This court, in June last, decided that Bill could not, on j his mere motion, dismiss the suit, to the prejudice of the parties interested in the trust, and that Shaw, as bondholder and stockholder, claiming rights under the decrees of this court, was entitled to be himself heard in support of those rights. And, in a certain sense, the questions now remaining are, whether he has made out in his petition a case for the equitable interposition of the court; and, what relief, if any, the court can give to him and others standing in like relation to the property.
The bill filed in this court was for a foreclosure of the mortgage and a sale of the property, because of the non payment of the interest. For all purposes contemplated by the bill, originally, the trustee properly represented the parties interested in the mortgages, and if the case had gone on in the ordinary way no other parties than the trustee and the company would have been brought in. But after the case had been some time pending, a compromise agreement was made, which was afterwards ratified by the court in the form of a decree. It may be conceded, though the decree of December, 1858, seems to have been drafted on a different hypothesis, as one of the terms of the decree in June was that bonds should be turned into stock, that even the order of the court could not make that effectual without the consent of the bondholders. That would be changing the contract without their assent. The decrees were taken by consent, and on the presumption that all would unite, as nearly all did. But, however this may be, it is certain that by the decrees of this court great changes had been made, with their acquiescence, in the original rights of many of the bond and stockholders. On the faith of ’the decrees, bonds had been surrendered and stock taken, debts and liabilities had been incurred, and the property pledged to secure them. It had been placed in the hands of a trustee to carry out the orders of the court. It is true the decrees had undertaken to go too far, that is, to order certain things to be done depending upon conditions which might never be complied with, a very common error made by counsel when drafting uncontested decrees to which the attention of the court is not particularly called. .In point of fact in this case, if the claims referred to in the decrees were paid in 1804, and by their terms the property could be surrendered by the trustee, there seem to have been no directors of the company to whom to surrender it. They had ceased to exist, the entire control and management of the road being then in the hands of Williamson. Although it is said he kept possession of the road at the request of the bondholders, yet no formal act appears to have been done. There can be no doubt it was the imperative duty of the trustee to report the facts to this court, and ask for its direction. And. notwithstanding the opinion of the state court on this point, it is *383equally clear that, under the circumstances .of the case, if any bondholder under the mortgage, who had not become a party to the agreement in this court, wished for a foreclosure of the mortgage, or any relief, this was the proper forum to approach for that purpose. The rights of the parties were adjudicated here. The property, for certain purposes, was here. It was not possible that the cause could be divided into fragments, and, in the actual state of affairs, one party in interest go to one court, and another to a different court, for the enforcement of his equitable rights. If the understanding of the parties and the terms of the •decree were entirely carried out, there would be no difficulty; but if in that way their expectations were not realized, and there should be ¿1 failure to satisfy the claims of the creditors, there would seem to be no question that this court was the proper tribunal to do equity, because it was only by ■control over the orders of the court, already made, that this could be accomplished. The decree did not require the trustee to report his acts and doings to this court, but the implication is strong that he should have so done. The interests of the company, as well as of the bondholders and creditors represented in the compromise agreement and decree, very much depended upon the management of the road by the trustee. It was their right to know through this court whether the trustee had fulfilled the duties of his trust. The evidence shows that he misappropriated the funds of the road. If Williamson were living, can there be a doubt that any party to the decree of this court would have the right to insist that he should report his doings as trustee to this court?
It would be impracticable for the court to adjust the equities of the parties without knowing the manner in which the duties of the trust had been performed, if it became necessary to act on an application. For example, how can the court settle the equities of Shaw without knowing what has been done by his trustee? And certainly the court of common pleas of White county could not enter a proper decree without the same knowledge. Williamson had been in possession operating the road for ten years. The rights of all parties were seriously affected by the disposition he made of the earnings of the road during that time, and by the manner In which he performed the duties of his trust Any adjudication of the rights of the parties under these five mortgages, without regard to what had been done in this court, would necessarily be imperfect, and therefore inequitable, and for the simple reason that interests had been acquired here which could not be changed or modified elsewhere without the consent of the parties. In any controversy thereafter it was not possible to treat the decrees of this court as though they had never been made. That is what the court of common pleas of White county seems, in one sense, to have done. In fact, nowhere in the bill or in the decree in that court is there any intimation of the decrees of this court.
Then as to the action of Williamson, the trustee: He had never fully reported to this court what he had done as to the expenses and earnings of the road, or as to the road itself — whether he still held it or had turned it over to the bondholders. In November, 1861, he stated in a supplemental bill that the action was still pending in this court, and that no final decree of sale had ever been rendered, and submitted to the court, among other things, the question whether the whole road should be sold, and the court made a rule to show cause why this should not be done, on which rule there was no action. In 1865 he applied for an order to sell the Gos-port branch, which was granted. Under these circumstances, if a sale of the road was desired either by the trustee or those bondholders who> were connected with the decree of this court by appearance here, it would seem that application should be made to the same court for the sale of the property. It could hardly be said then to be fair dealing, while the case was thus proceeding here, for the trustee and some of the bondholders to turn over to another jurisdiction rights which had been partially adjudicated, thus ignoring everything that occurred here. It is true that they seem to have had the opinion of a state court to justify their action, but as this court was the one in which the controversy was originally commenced, and in which, for certain purposes, it was yet pending, it is the only tribunal whose decision was _ binding upon the parties in this court. Before he adopted so grave a measure, therefore, and one calculated so much to complicate and embarrass matters in dispute, he should have come to this court for directions and relief. One litigation should have been disposed of before another on the same subject-matter was begun. The fact appears to be that the trustee and the first bondholders thought that the last bondholders had ceased to have any interest in the road, because of the inadequacy of the property to respond to inferior liens, and acted accordingly — a conclusion which could only be reached under the authority of this court. Inasmuch, therefore, as the case was still here, as for certain purposes the property was subject to the control of the court, in the interests of the parties before it, to appeal to another court to foreclose the mortgages and sell the road was unwarranted, and not consistent with the obligations due to all. The trustee was responsible just as much to others as he was to those who demanded he should foreclose, and whose instructions he obeyed. If, then, it was a breach of duty for Williamson to proceed in the court of common pleas of White county, as I think it was, what is the effect upon the right of this court to retain jurisdiction of the cause and of the subject-matter? There can be no doubt it has *384created great confusion in the position of those claiming under the mortgages, and embarrassment in the court to deal properly with their interests. It has thus brought about an apparent conflict between courts, state and federal, which should always be avoided. But the conflict arises from acts done after this court had obtained jurisdiction of the cause, and for which, therefore, it cannot be justly held accountable, and when a party affected by an order or decree entered in a pending cause asks for relief, it is no answer to say that another jurisdiction has attempted to seize the property, and thus place it beyond the power of the court to give relief. The question always must be, is it competent for the court to act? If so, its duty is plain, and it necessarily follows from what has been said that, in my opinion, the property is still within the control of this court to adjudicate upon the equitable rights of all who have ever been before it It is said that those interested delayed in making application to call on the trustee to account. But he was a trustee, who could not, therefore, complain of laches. And, besides, they had the right to presume that the trustee would protect their interests, acting under the sanction of the court. It may not be out of place to refer to the practical result of the wrongful act of the trustee, though if on any other ground it could stand, it might not be material. At the sale under the decree of the court of common pleas of White county, the entire road from New Albany to Michigan City, 288 miles, a property worth some millions, was pin-chased by seven persons, some of whom say they were acting for bondholders, for the sum of $100,000. If that purchase is unassailable, then these seven bondholders, or those they represent, acquired it absolutely, and any other creditor is without remedy. If they have allowed other bondholders, not connected with them, to convert their bonds into stock, that was a matter of favor and not of right. In April, 1809, the property was sold, and in November of the same year the petitioner made his application to this court. It has been said that admitting the decree of the state court was rendered without reference to authority of this court, yet that a just result was reached. The answer is — even if that might change the aspect of the case — this court cannot know that to be so. The data on which to arrive at a true result is not before it, and cannot be until it is made acquainted in a proper way with what the trustee has done.
It is a necessary conclusion from what has been said, that the petitioner is entitled to the equitable interposition of the court, to protect his rights under its decrees, and to demand an account from those who represent the former trustee.
The thirty-eight miles of road from Michigan City to the east line of Illinois has been operated by the Michigan Central Railroad, a corporation of the state of Michigan, which constructed, it is said, at its own expense, that portion of the road, under a contract made with the New Albany and Salem Bail-road Company in 1851. No part of the earnings of that section has ever been accounted for to the defendant or to its successors. And though that line was not included in any of the mortgages, yet there can be no doubt that as the defendant is insolvent the creditors of the defendant may be entitled under certain circumstances to an account of the earnings, expenses and cost of the construction of that part of the road; but as to that part no order will be made.
Whether a receiver should be appointed, is a question often attended with difficulty, and to answer it properly is one of the most embarrassing duties a court of chancery has to perform. The difficulty is increased by the peculiar situation of the property in this case, claimed under a decree of a state court, but it would seem to follow, if the principles heretofore stated are sound, that this court has not lost control of the subject matter of the suit, and that the interference of the state court in dealing with and disposing of property at the time within the jurisdiction of this court, was unauthorized. The only inquiry, therefore, is whether there is any necessity for the appointment of a receiver while the court is settling the rights of the parties. The company is insolvent, the former trustee is dead, having made no reports to this court of the manner in which he performed his trust; the present trustee caused himself to be made a party to the litigation in the state court. After the death of Williamson he sought to dismiss the proceedings in this court. The parties at present in possession of the -oad are acting in hostility to the ‘decrees of this court, and the interests thereby adjudicated. It would appear to be impossible to give any relief to the petitioner and others in similar relations, unless the court shall take control and possession of the property.
The parties now in possession can hardly claim to be bona fide purchasers, without notice, for they and their counsel had knowledge of what had occurred in this court. The road seems to have been operated by Williamson at first in the name of the defendant, and then as the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Co., and since the sale and organization under the decree of the state court the present possessors have called it the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company, keeping the name and business distinct in each case.
Very possibly difficult questions may arise out of the sale under the decree of the state court, where the interests of third parties may be affected, but it is to be hoped rights may be adjusted so as to give proper protection to all who ought to have it.
It is claimed that those who are now in possession of the road have not been made parties to this proceeding, and have not been *385impleaded so that they could answer. Due notice has been given of this motion to the trustee and to the superintendent of the present company, which professes to represent those who purchased under the decree of the state court. The application has been pending since November, 1S69. The purchasers themselves have filed an affidavit in court, and there can be no question but all parties have had ample opportunity to be heard. The motion of the petitioner has been fully and ably argued by the counsel on both sides, and the court has had all the assistance in the investigation of the case which their zeal and ability could furnish.
NOTE, [from original report.] For the opinion of the court in this case, on motion for appointment of a receiver, and construction of Sowers of the trustee, consult Williamson v. iew Albany, etc., R. Co., [Case No. 17,753.] [After the appointment of the receiver in the principal cause, Charles E. Bill, the successor of the original trustee, filed a supplemental bill for the foreclosure of mortgages remaining in force, the questions arising under which were subsequently appealed to the supreme court, and determined in Shaw v. Bill, 95 U. S. 10.]My Brother GRESHAM did not hear the argument at the present term, but the questions were, more or less, fully discussed before him at the November term last year, when the petitioner made his application, and he has been consulted in the case, and concurs in this opinion.
We think, therefore, a receiver should be appointed.