Although the damage is small which is sought to be recovered in this proceeding, the parties have thought the points of law sufficiently important to warrant a careful and learned discussion. They are not altogether new to me, and I have given them renewed attention in the light of the arguments. The cases cited appear to establish the proposition that the states may lawfully make regulations concerning the harbors within their limits, and not repugnant to any act of congress, which will be binding on all persons resorting to them for trade. The libellants having failed to comply with such a regulation are in the wrong, if their delinquency caused or aided in causing the collision. The words “so that the said jib-boom shall not annoy” other vessels, do not qualify the express command to rig in the jib-boom, but only explain its purpose, or at- most limit the law to those cases in which the jib-boom might possibly or probably interfere with navigation. The collision in this case, which was solely with the jib-boom, sufficiently shows that annoyance was to be apprehended, and that the fault of the libellants contributed to the result.
But the fault of the libellants does not excuse any want of due care and skill on the part of the tug. The doctrine of nuisance has little application here, because, in this case, the true mode of abating the nuisance, if it were one, would be to move the ship, which the evidence clearly proves could have been done in a few minutes and with great ease, by simply letting her drop down with the tide. The master of the tug testified that on former occasions a request for such a removal had somtimes been refused, but it is not fit that the rights of the libel-lants should be forfeited by the former misconduct of strangers. The tug, therefore, must share the loss, if the want of care or skill of her master contributed to the disaster. It was daylight, the state of the wind and tide, and the width of the dock were all patent, and no reason is given for the collision but the miscalculation of the master. Though he is a man of undoubted skill and prudence, yet it is plain that he did not, in this particular case, take all necessary and proper measures for safety. The theory of the defence is that the only mistake was in not keeping on at full speed; but this mistake would have been avoided hy having a competent lookout on board the Sarnia to report whether she was dangerously near the Lord Palmerston. Instead of this the master trusted to his own more distant observation, and ran into unnecessary danger. Two cases *1097in Judge Sprague’s Reports closely resemble this. See O’Neal v. Sears [Case No. 10,530], and The Marcia Tribou [supra]. The ground for bolding the libellants to bear a part of the loss is that by their illegal conduct they diminished the width of the dock; and the claimants are liable because, taking the dock as it was, they might by competent skill have taken the vessel out without damage to the Lord Palmerston, though not as easily as if the law had been complied with by the latter vessel. Decree accordingly.