I cannot concur with the defendants’ counsel in his *1102construction of the import of the judge's charge, hut consider it as expressing an opinion that, as matter of law, the liability of the sureties in the first bond ceased upon the giving of the second bond for all defaults thereafter incurred. If the circumstances in evidence were such as to warrant the conclusion, as matter of fact, that there was a waiver of the continued responsibility of the first sureties, it was for the jury, and not for the court, to weigh these circumstances, and draw conclusions from them; and I cannot but think the manner in which the case would have been submitted to the jury would have been very different, if the question had been considered by the court as a question of fact. That it was not so considered by the defendants’ counsel, on the trial of the cause, is evident from the manner in which the bill of exceptions states the question to have been put to the court, viz.: the counsel for the defendants insisted to the court, that the taking of said last-mentioned bond by the postmaster-general was a waiver in law of all right to proceed on the first bond for postages received subsequent to the date of the second bond; that the sureties in the first bond ceased to be liable at and from that date for any defalcation or neglect of duty of the postmaster. No circumstances are referred to and relied upon from which a waiver could be inferred as matter of fact; but that the second bond was such waiver, resulted as a conclusion of law from the mere fact of accepting the bond. And I the more readily conclude that such was the understanding of the question upon the trial, as I cannot discover, from the bill of exceptions, any circumstances tending to warrant a conclusion of any waiver in point of fact.
How far mere parol evidence of a waiver would be admissible and available, is a point that does not arise here. The only question is, as to the legal operation of the second bond upon the liability of the sureties in the first; and I am unable to discover any principle upon which it can bo considered as exonerating them from their responsibility. There is no limitation as to time in the bond, the breaches assigned and proved are within the condition of the bond, and Nott, the postmaster, continued in office under the same appointment originally given him. It certainly cannot be pretended that the taking of a second bond could, in any sense whatever, be considered a new appointment. The second bond does not purport to be a substitute for the first; nor is there anything tending to show that such was the intention or understanding of the parties; and it can be viewed in no other light than as additional security, to the taking of which no possible objection could exist — -it was for the benefit and not to the prejudice of the first sureties. As to the defaults incurred before the taking of the see-ond bond, the defendants were alone responsible; and for those afterwards incurred, equity would probably consider the two sets of sureties as jointly responsible.
The second bond was not taken for any antecedent default, and was not, therefore, for any existing debt or claim; and if it had been, it would not have operated as a discharge or extinguishment of the first. A new security, of an equal or inferior degree, is not an extinguishment of a prior debt. This is a principle too familiar to require any authority in its support. The cases, however, here referred to, may serve to illustrate and show the extent and application of the principle. 8 Johns. 54; 11 Johns. 512; 13 Johns. 240; 14 Johns. 404; Cro. Car. 86; Cro. Eliz. 716, 727; 1 Burrows, 9. And these cases also show, that if the second bond had been plead as a discharge of the first, the plea would have been bad on demurrer. The omission of the postmaster-general to remove Nott from office, did not draw after it a discharge of the sureties. The doctrine of the supreme court, in the cases of U. S. v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. [22 U. S.] 720, and U. S. v. Van Zant, 11 Wheat. [24 U. S.] 184, is entirely applicable, and settles this question. Although it might have been the duty of the postmaster-general to remove Nott, yet his neglect did not operate as a removal; this provision is only directory to the postmaster-general, and intended for the security and protection of the government, by insuring punctuality and responsibility, but forms no part of the contract with the surety. So long as the officer remains in the legal exercise of the powers and duties of the office, the responsibilty of the sureties continues.
The case of U. S. v. Nicoll, 12 Wheat. [25 U. S.] 505, decided at the last term of the supreme court, has a strong bearing upon this case. In that case, an act of congress had required new sureties to be given by the officer, by a certain day therein mentioned. None were, however, given; and the responsibility of the old sureties was held to continue. The court say. the act nowhere directs the principals to be discharged from office, upon failure to give new sureties; and if the act had so directed, they would have remained in office until actually removed. The law does not in terms declare the existing sureties- shall be discharged after that day; it would require a very strained construction of the statute to discharge them by implication, while their principals were permitted to remain in office. Such construction would be against the manifest intention of the legislature.
It was urged on the argument that the defendants were discharged from their responsibility, by reason of the increase of the rate of postages subsequent to their having become sureties, and acts of congress were referred to for the purpose of showing sueh increase. It is not perceived how this can be made a question here; it does not arise upon the bill *1103of exceptions, nor is it in any shape or manner whatever presented by the record. But was it properly before this court? It appears to me that it forms no objection to the right of recovery against the sureties. The undertaking of the sureties is general, that Nott shall pay over to the postmaster-general all moneys that shall come to his hand for the postages of whatever is by law chargeable with postage. It refers to no particular act explaining - or limiting the rate of postage; and all moneys received as postage come as well within the letter as the spirit and intention of the bond. Nor was the bond taken under any particular law defining its extent and operation; and must, therefore, be construed according to the fair and reasonable import of the language employed by the parties. The undertaking of the sureties is, from its nature, prospective, and is limited only by the terms of the bond, that the money for which they are called upon to account, must have been received by their principal, as postages established by law. Had the acts of congress referred to, enlarged the powers of the postmaster, or superadded any new duties, whereby he was made the receiver of other moneys than for postages, the sureties in this bond would not have been responsible therefor. The defendants’ counsel has supposed that the case of U. S. v. Kirkpatrick [supra], sustains this objection. But in this I think he is mistaken. The court then considered the bond in question to have been given in reference to the objects of a particular act of congress, and that the condition of the bond referred principally to assessment of direct taxes; and that the subsequent acts of congress laying internal duties, contained provisions enlarging the authority of the collectors; and that the sureties did not undertake for the faithful execution of such enlarged powers. The court say there is nothing in the original act under which the appointment was made, which contemplates a permanent and continuing liability for all duties under all laws "which might be subsequently passed; that the condition of the bond, in its terms as expounded by the other parts of the act, had a principal reference to ihe assessment of direct taxes. But there is nothing in this case to warrant a conclusion, that if the subsequent acts of congress referred to, had simply increased this direct tax, the sureties would not have been held responsible.
Upon the whole. I think the district court erred, in the opinion given to the jury, as to the legal effect and operation of the second bond upon the liability of the sureties in the first.4 The judgment must, accordingly, be reversed, and a venire de novo issued returnable in this court.
As to effect of misdirection of the court upon point of law, see 2 Grab. & W. New Trials, p. 768 et *eq.