IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-10514
(Summary Calendar)
GUADALUPE LOPEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ROBERT B. REICH,
Secretary of Labor,
Defendants-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(3:93-CV-584-G)
March 1, 1996
Before WIENER, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM*:
Plaintiff-Appellant Guadalupe Lopez was injured on the job.
Despite several decisions to the contrary, he continues to urge,
inter alia, that he was discriminated against by Department of
Labor (Department) both when he was terminated and when he was not
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
rehired. We, like the Merit Protection Review Board (Board), the
Directorate of Civil Rights (DCR), and the district court before
us, conclude that Lopez's discrimination claim is barred by res
judicata and by the terms of a valid settlement agreement, and
therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. THE TERMINATION
Lopez worked for the Department as a Senior Equal Opportunity
Employment Specialist, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. In a work-
related traffic accident in July of 1987, Lopez incurred injuries
which prevented him from performing his job. On February 27, 1989,
the Department discharged Lopez on the ground that he was
physically unable to return to his job.
B. THE FIRST BOARD APPEAL
The next day, Lopez appealed to the Board, alleging that the
Department had failed to accommodate his handicap and discharged
him without cause. In June 1989, before the Board held a hearing,
the parties entered in to a settlement agreement (Settlement). In
the Settlement, Lopez agreed to dismiss his appeal and acknowledged
that he had not achieved full recovery at the time of his
discharge. Additionally, he waived any rights to appeal to the
Board or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In
return, the Department agreed to give Lopez "priority
consideration" for a position within thirty days following his full
recovery. Both parties acknowledged that the Settlement resolved
2
all issues arising out of the discharge.
C. THE EEOC COMPLAINT
Approximately one and one-half years later, in November 1990,
Lopez filed a complaint with the DCR, alleging that the Department
had (1) discriminated against him on the basis of race, (2) failed
to accommodate his handicap, and (3) discharged him in retaliation
for previous EEOC activity.1 In May 1991, the DCR dismissed this
complaint stating that these three issues had been resolved by the
Settlement. Lopez appealed this ruling to the EEOC and the
complaint was reinstated. In March 1992, DCR issued a preliminary
decision in which it found that Lopez had not been a victim of
discrimination. In December 1992, a final DCR decision was issued,
finding that, as the case had not been timely filed, it had been
improperly accepted for investigation.
D. LOPEZ SEEKS REEMPLOYMENT
Meanwhile, in October 1990, Lopez had applied to be rehired as
a Veteran's Program Specialist (Specialist Position) with the
Department's Dallas, Texas office. The Specialist Position had a
two-year residency requirement, which Lopez failed to meet because
he was a resident of New Mexico. As a result, Lopez was informed
by the Veterans' Affairs Office that he was ineligible for the
Specialist Position.
1
He also made several allegations regarding his Federal
Employees' Compensation Act benefits and the actions of the Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, which administers those
benefits. These allegations are beyond the scope of this appeal.
3
E. THE DCR COMPLAINT
In December 1990, Lopez had filed a complaint with the DCR,
alleging that he had been discriminated against because of his
handicap when he was not offered the Specialist Position. In
September 1991, DCR issued a proposed decision, finding that the
two-year residency requirement of the Specialist Position was not
discriminatory and that it had not been applied in a discriminatory
manner. In December 1992, the final agency decision affirmed these
conclusions.
F. THE SECOND BOARD APPEAL
Lopez had filed a second appeal with the Board in March 1991,
alleging that he should have received priority consideration for
jobs both inside and outside his commuting area. He also alleged
that he had recovered fully. The Board judge disagreed with both
allegations, observing that Lopez had conceded that he was still
receiving worker's compensation benefits and finding that he was
not capable of performing the work that the position for which he
claimed entitlement required. The Board judge concluded that the
Department had not arbitrarily or capriciously denied Lopez's
restoration. In July 1991, Lopez petitioned the full Board for
review. In October 1991, the Board denied his petition, and Lopez
did not appeal.
G. THE SECOND DCR COMPLAINT
Lopez had filed another complaint in August 1991, alleging
that he was not rehired because of discrimination based on race and
handicap, and in retaliation for his participation in the EEOC
4
process. In April 1992, DCR issued its proposed decision, finding
no evidence of any type of discrimination. A final DCR decision in
December confirmed the proposed opinion. Apparently, Lopez did not
appeal.
H. THE THIRD BOARD APPEAL
In April 1992, Lopez appealed to the Board for yet a third
time, alleging that the Department had failed to (1) re-employ or
restore him according to his "one-year rights," (2) place him in
another "qualified" position, and (3) inform him that it considered
his medical condition a physical disqualification. In May 1992,
the Board judge issued an Order to Show Cause why the Settlement
and prior litigation did not bar these claims. The Board judge
found Lopez's response inadequate and dismissed his appeal as
barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the Settlement.
In April 1993, the full Board affirmed this decision, and again
Lopez did not appeal.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT COMPLAINT
In March 1993, Lopez filed the instant complaint in federal
district court, alleging that the Department had violated Title
VII, the Rehabilitation Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and asserting additional
claims arising under state law. The Department filed a motion for
a judgment of dismissal on all claims, which the district court
subsequently granted.
Lopez timely appealed to us. Construing his pro se brief
5
liberally,2 we understand Lopez to contest the district court's
dismissal on two grounds: First, the terms of the Settlement are
oppressive; second, his claims are not barred by res judicata or
collateral estoppel.
II
DISCUSSION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court's grant of a motion for summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court
applied.3 Questions of law are decided just as they are outside of
the summary judgment context: de novo.4
B. WAS THE SETTLEMENT OPPRESSIVE?
Although many aspects of this case have been litigated ad
nauseam, Lopez argues for the first time in this appeal that the
Settlement is oppressive or unconscionable. We are unable to
address this contention for two reasons: First, we will not
address issues raised for the first time on appeal; second, even
if we were to address it, the evidence in the record is
insufficient to allow us to decide the issue. Accordingly, we
neither express nor imply an opinion on Lopez's "oppressive"
2
Although Lopez did not begin this litigation representing
himself, in the process of this litigation, two different attorneys
representing Lopez have withdrawn from representing Lopez.
3
Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 989 F.2d 822, 824 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1067 (1994); Fraire v. City of
Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir.)(citations omitted), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 462 (1992).
4
Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir.
1988).
6
argument; we simply do not address the issue.
C. RES JUDICATA
Lopez argues that the issues raised in the district court are
not barred by either res judicata or collateral estoppel. We
disagree. The doctrine of res judicata teaches that a judgment in
a prior action prohibits the relitigation of the same claims in a
subsequent action if (1) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered
the prior judgment; (2) the court entered a final judgment on the
merits; (3) both actions involved identical parties or those in
privity with them; and (4) both actions involved the same cause of
action.5 Moreover, res judicata "bars all claims that were or
could have been advanced in support of the cause of action . . .
not merely those that were adjudicated."6 Res judicata will also
bar the subsequent litigation of claims even though the original
action was brought before an administrative agency if the agency
acted in a judicial capacity and the parties had an adequate
opportunity to litigate the claims.7
Lopez has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate before
the Board his claims of discrimination--both those arising from his
discharge and from his failure to be rehired. First, the
5
Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., Inc v. Mont Boat Rental
Services, Inc., 799 F.2d 213, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1986).
6
Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Mississippi, 701 F.2d 556, 560
(5th Cir. 1983)(en banc)(emphasis in original and citation
omitted).
7
United States v. Utah Const. & Min. Co., 384 U.S. 394
(1966); see also Medina v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
993 F.2d 499, 503-04 (5th Cir. 1993).
7
Settlement that he executed was valid, fully disposing of all
claims arising from the discharge decision. Second, the Board has
repeatedly considered and rejected Lopez's claims that he was
discriminated against when the Department declared him ineligible
for the Specialist Position. Lopez did not appeal these decisions.
Accordingly, we hold that the Settlement and the Board decision
constitute final decisions on the merits of Lopez's claims, and
thus bar any subsequent relitigation of these claims.
For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.
8