I dissent from the opinion of the court, as delivered in this cause. I part with my associates on the threshold, on the point of jurisdiction; and, therefore, in the brief opinion which I shall give for the grounds of my disagreement, I shall not find it necessary, or even proper, to touch the other points which have been raised and so ingeniously and elaborately argued. Obsta prineipiis, is a maxim dear to the lovers of sound government. I shall endeavor on this, as on all other occasions, to manifest my appreciation of its value. By the treaty negotiated by the United States, in 1S03, with the French republic, for the acquisition of Louisiana, our government became bound, in good faith, to perfect certain obligations which the previous governments, Spanish and French, had contracted with their citizens or subjects. But this treaty guarantee had no stipulation as to mode, and the government does not recognize in the citizen a right to sue without its consent. This consent was given by the act of congress of May, 1824. Tribunals were created in the state of Missouri and territory of Arkansas to adjudicate claims to land founded on French and Spanish grants, of which tribunals this is one; a special and extraordinary tribunal, created by the law referred to. Under this law, and before this tribunal, the claimant instituted his suit, which, at its maturity, ripened to a decree in his favor.
The bill of review has been instituted to annul and reverse the decree, on the ground that the grant is a forgery, and the claimant a supposititious character. It is foreign to my purpose to inquire into the well-found-edness of these allegations, for, whatever the decision, in the view I take of the subject, it could lead to no practical result. I assume it as a postulate not to be questioned, that the government going into the courts, is to be tried only by the same rules, and have the same measure of justice meted out to it, that the law secures to ordinary parties litigant. The law of 1824 gave to the party against whom the final decree of this court should be given the right of appeal within one year from the time of its rendition. The appeal not applied for, the decree became final and conclusive. More than a year had elapsed before the filing of the bill of review in this case. I will not moot the point, whether a bill of review would lie at all: it is rendered more than superfluous from the obvious fact, that no revision of the decree, of any kind, was sought for within the year. But it is said that the congressional legislation of May, 1830, puts this question at rest, cures all defects, gives jurisdiction,—gives it, too, to defeat rights and destroy vested interests growing out of, and based on, a former act of- congress. Such, it is true, is the import of the language of the law; but is it so? Can it be that the federal legislature has the constitutional competency so to do? We could expect to find such a doctrine prevailing only in the worst days of the most tyrannical governments. It is a language that- Sejanus may have-whispered to Tiberius. It is a language that may hold at this day in the meridian of Constantinople and St. Petersburg, where the mandate of the sultan, or the ukase of the emperor, supersedes reason, subverts right, and abrogates law. It is a language repudiated even in constitutional monarchies; and it is a language which, if received here as orthodox, goes convincingly to prove-that the liberty, of which we have so proudly boasted, has an existence rather in name than in essence. Yet, highly objectionable as I deem this law, I couple with that objection no ascription of motives. It was-probably a work of much haste,—the principles it involves not pushed to their conclusions, and not seen in their practical results. I think I heard in argument that the -principles of this act might be inoperative when sought to be brought to bear on the property and rights of the citizens of the states, but that congress had unlimited and illimitable power over the territories. This proposition scarcely requires the show of refutation; it is incompatible with the genius of our government, and is, as it regards this territory, palpably in violation of treaty stipulations. I cannot resist the conclusion that we have not cognizance of this case, and that the bill of review should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Decree reversed and annulled.
NOTE. From the decree in the foregoing case, the defendants appealed to the supreme . court of the United States, and the case was argued at the January term, 1833, by Mr. Prentiss and Mr. White, for the appellants, and by Mr. Taney, attorney-general, and Mr. Fulton, for the United States, and will be found fully reported in 7 Pet. [32 U. S.] 222. At the same term, after stating the facts and pleadings, Mr. Justice Thompson' delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:—
The objections which have been taken at the bar to this decree, may be considered under the following points:—(1) Whether, under the act of 3824, the court had authority to entertain the bill of review; and if not, then, (2) whether the act of 1830 is a constitutional law, and confers such authority. (3) Whether the proceedings on this bill of review can be sustained under the act of 1830. (4) Whether, admitting Stewart to be a bona fide purchaser of the claim of Samperyac, he is protected against the title set up by the United States.
1. We think it unnecessary to go into an examination of the questions which have been made under the first point. Although the act of 1824 directs, that every petition which shall be presented under its provisions shall be conducted according to the rules of a court of equity. it may admit of doubt whether all the powers of a court of chancery, in relation to bills of review, are vested in that court. And as the view taken by this court upon the other points renders a decision upon this unnecessary, we pass it over without expressing any opinion upon it.
2. The ground, upon which it has been argued that the act of 1830 is unconstitutional, is, that a right had become vested in Stewart before the act was passed; and that the effect and operation of the law is to deprive him of a vested right. To determine the force and application of this objection, it becomes necessary to look at the claim as it now appears before the court. It is found, by the decree oí the court below, and is admitted at the bar, that Samperyac is a fictitious person. That the petition, purporting to have been presented by him to Miro, governor of the province of Louisiana, and the order of survey, alleged to have been made thereupon, are forgeries. These are the only evidence of title upon which the original claim rests. And it is proved and admitted that the deed, purporting to have been given by Samperyac to Bowie, under whom Stewart claims, is also a forgery. The bill or petition filed in the original cause, alleges that the claim is secured by the treaty between the United States and the French republic, of the 30th April, 1803. This, however, has not been insisted upon on the argument here; and there is certainly no color for pretending that a claim, founded in fraud and forgery, is sanctioned by the treaty. The title to the land in question passed by the treaty, and became vested in the United States; and there has been no act, on the part of the United States, by which they have parted with the title. It is contended, however, that this right of title has been taken away by the original decree in this case, under the act of 1824. By the fourteenth section of that act, all its provisions are extended to the territory of Arkansas; and it is declared that the superior court of that territory shall have, hold, and exercise jurisdiction in all cases, in the same manner, and under the • same restrictions and regulations in all respects, as is given by the said act to the district court of the state of Missouri. And by the second section of the act, it is declared that in all cases the party, against whom the judgment or decree of the court may be finally given, shall be entitled to appeal within one year from its rendition, to the supreme court of the United States, the decision of which court shall be final and conclusive between the parties; and should no appeal be taken, the judgment or decree of the district court shall in like manner be final and conclusive. No appeal was taken within the year; and the question is, whether the United States, by neglecting to appeal, have lost their right, and if not, whether the remedy provided by the act of 1830, to assert that right, is in violation of the constitution.
If Samperyac was a real person, and appeared here setting up this objection, it might present a different question, although it is not admitted, even in that case, that the United States would be concluded as to the right. But the original decree in this case was a mere nullity; it gave no right to any one. The title still remained in the United States, and the most that can be said, is, that by omitting to appeal within the time limited by the act, the remedy thereby provided was gone, and the decree became final and conclusive with respect to such remedy.
But the act of 1830 provides a new remedy; and it may be added that the act of 1804 declares the decree to be final and conclusive between the parties. And as Samperyac was a fictitious person, he was no party to the decree, and the act, in strictness, does not apply to the case. But, considering the act of 1830 as providing a remedy only, it is entirely unexceptionable. It has been repeatedly decided in this court, that .the retrospective operation of such a law forms no objection to it. Almost every law, providing a new remedy, affects and operates upon causes of action existing at the time the law is passed. The law of 1830 is in no respect the exercise of judicial powers. It only organizes a tribunal with powers to entertain judicial proceedings. When the original decree was entered, there was no person in existence whose claim could be ripened into a right against the United States by omitting to appeal; Stewart was not only no party to the decree, but his purchase from Bowie was nearly a year after the decree was entered.
Had Samperyac been a real person, having a decree in his favor, and Stewart had after-wards purchased of Bowie the right which that decree established, it might have given him some equitable claim; but it would have been subject to all prior equitable, as well as legal rights. Nor would it be available in any respect in the present case, for Stewart, in no manner whatever, connects himself with Sam-peryae. As it is admitted that the deed purporting to have been given by Samperyac to Bowie is a forgery, Stewart is therefore a mere stranger to this decree, and can derive no benefit from it. It is said, that if this bill of review was filed under the act of 1830, the court had no jurisdiction, the bill having been filed in April, and the law not passed until the May following. But the act, in terms, applies to bills filed or to be filed, and of course cures this defect, if any existed. Such retrospection is no unusual course in laws providing new remedies.
The act of 1803, amending the judicial system of the United States (3 Bior. & D. Laws, 560 [2 Stat. 244]), declares, that from all final judgments, or decrees, rendered or to be rendered. in any circuit court, &c., an appeal shall be allowed to the supreme court, &c. It therefore forms no objection to the law, that the cause of action existed antecedent to its passage; so far as it applies to the remedy, and does not affect the right.
3. But it is objected, in the next place, that this bill of review cannot be sustained under the act of 1830; that it was not filed and prosecuted under limitations and restrictions, and according to the course and practice of a court of chancery in such a proceeding. We think it unnecessary to examine, whether all the technical rules required in the ordinary course of chancery proceedings, on a bill of review, have been pursued in the present case. The act, clearly, does not require it. It authorizes bills of review to be filed on the part of the United States, for the purpose of revising all or any of the decrees of the said court, in cases wherein it shall appear to the said court, or be alleged in such bills of review, that the jurisdiction of the same was assumed, in any case, on any forged warrant, concession, .grant, order of survey, or other evidence of title.
If congress had a right to provide a tribunal in which the remedy might be prosecuted, they clearly had a right to prescribe the manner in which it should be pursued. The great and leading object was, to provide for revising the original decree, or granting a new trial. The material allegation required is, that the original decree was founded upon some forged evidence of title; and this is very fully set out in the bill. • That it was not the intention of the law, that the court should be confined to the technical rules of a court of chancery, on bills of review, is evident from the provision in the last clause of the first section of the act, which directs the court to proceed on such bills of review, by such rules of practice and regulations as they may adopt, for the execution of the powers vested or confirmed in them by the act.
4. The next inquiry is. whether the appellant, Stewart, has acquired a right to the land, by reason of his standing in the character of a bona fide purchaser. The record contains an admission on the part of the United States, that he purchased the claims of John J. Bowie, by deed, for a valuable consideration, in good •faith, some time in November or December, 3828. But this gave him no right to be let in as a party in the bill of review; he was not a party to the original bill, nor could he connect himself with Samperyac, the only party to the bill, he being a fictitious person; and the interest of Stewart, whatever it might be, was acquired long after the original decree was entered. He was, therefore, a perfect stranger to that decree. The deed purporting to have been given by Samperyac to Bowie, is admitted to be a forgery. Bowie, of course, had. no interest, legal or equitable, which he could convey to Stewart. But, admitting Stewart to have been properly let in, as a party in the bill of review, the only colorable equity which he showed was the certificate of entry given by the register of the land-office, December 13, 1828; and this certificate, founded on a decree in favor of Samperyac, a fictitious person, obtained by fraud, and upon forged evidence of title.
This certificate' is entirely unavailable to Stewart. He can obtain no patent under it if the original decree should remain unreversed; for the act of 1830 forbids any patent thereafter to be issued, except in the name of the original party to the decree, and on proof to the satisfaction of the officers, that the party applying is such original party, or is duly authorized by such original party, or his heirs, to receive such patent. The original party to the decree being a fictitious person, no title would pass under the patent, if issued. It would still remain in the United States. But Stewart acquired no right whatever under the deed from Bowie; the latter having no interest that he could convey. In the case of Polk’s Lessee v. Wendall, 5 Wheat. [18 U. S.] 308, it is said by this court, that on general principles, it is incontestable that a grantee can convey no more than he possesses. Hence, those who come in under the holder of a void grant can acquire nothing.
Upon the whole, we think Stewart was improperly admitted to become a party; but considering him a proper party, he has shown no ground upon which he can sustain a right to the land in question.
The decree of the court below is accordingly affirmed, with costs.