IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-CT-01223-SCT
DONALD WADE MILLER
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/27/2001
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. GEORGE B. READY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: DeSOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JAMES W. AMOS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W.
GLENN WATTS
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ANN H. LAMAR
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN
PART, AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED -
06/17/2004
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
CARLSON, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Donald Wade Miller was accused of intentionally setting fire to his trailer and was convicted of
arson in the DeSoto County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to a term of one year in the custody of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections followed by ten years of supervised probation. Aggrieved by his
conviction, Miller appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but reversed and remanded for
the limited purpose of correcting that portion of the sentence which requires post-release supervision for
a period of excess of five years. Miller v. State, 856 So. 2d 420, 425 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).1
¶2. Miller's motion for rehearing was denied on June 10, 2003, and he timely filed the instant petition
for certiorari on June 23, 2003. This Court granted certiorari by an order entered September 25, 2003.
Miller v. State, 859 So. 2d 392 (Miss. 2003). Finding no error in the conviction and sentence, we affirm
in part, and reverse in part, the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate and affirm in toto the
judgment of the Circuit Court of DeSoto County.
FACTS
¶3. The following factual background was recited by the Court of Appeals:
At approximately 2:49 p.m. on February 29, 2000, the Love Volunteer Fire
Department received a report of a fire at 3789 Jaybird Road, Hernando, Mississippi, the
residence of Donald Wade Miller. Upon arrival, Sam Witt of the Hernando Fire
Department observed smoke coming from the roof on the right front side of the trailer
home.
DeSoto County Deputy Fire Marshall Mike Hancock was called to investigate the
matter and arrived at approximately 4:00 p.m. with a canine trained to sign for accelerants
or flammable liquids. Shortly thereafter, Miller returned home, and at the request of Officer
Hancock consented to a search of the property. Officer Hancock allowed his trained
canine to search the property for accelerants. The canine signaled the presence of an
accelerant in the center of the couch. Photographs were entered into evidence of the couch
and the canine's search.
At trial, Mike Lynchard, a custodian of records at BellSouth Telecommunications,
testified that a two minute call from Miller's unlisted number at the trailer home was made
at 2:38 p.m. on the day of the incident to a Memphis phone number. Lynchard stated that
he did not know to whom the Memphis number was listed nor who made the call to that
number.
John Anderson, an acquaintance of Miller, testified that when he drove by Miller's
trailer, he "noticed smoke coming from the trailer." He slowed down and noticed fire
1
As will be revealed later in this opinion, the Court of Appeals mistakenly used the terms “supervised
probation” and “post-release supervision” interchangeably.
2
"through the window of the trailer." Anderson stopped, called 911 to report the fire at
approximately 2:49 p.m., and moved Miller's dog from the yard.
Geniene Bowdre, who lived across the street from Miller, testified that on the day
of the incident, she saw a vehicle coming out of one of the driveways, either Miller's or the
one next to him, but she was not sure. Then, she saw smoke coming from the trailer.
Sam Lauderdale, a State Farm Insurance agent, testified that Miller's mother is an
employee of his and that he "got a telephone call that Donnie's home was on fire. And a
few minutes later, he (Miller) pulled into the parking lot and came into the office or came
up the office steps, and I walked out and said, '[w]e've gotten a call that your home is on
fire.' And he turned around and left."
Bradley Schinker, the State's fire investigator expert, testified that when he came
to the east side of the living room, he noticed that the couch was almost burned out in the
center and that "the fire started in this area." Schinker also indicated that he found no faulty
wiring after inspecting the trailer. He testified that smoking was ruled out and that he
determined this was some type of intentional act.
Lee James, a claims representative for State Farm Insurance, testified that she
interviewed Miller, who admitted that he was a smoker but denied being on his couch
smoking the day of the fire.
At the conclusion of the State's case, Miller moved for a directed verdict claiming
that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed arson.
This motion was denied.
Miller testified that he did not intentionally start the fire. He stated that he might
have accidentally started the fire, but did not state how it may have accidentally occurred.
Miller's sister, Darlene Ellis, testified that she owned the couch prior to giving it to
her brother. She stated that her boys spilled gun cleaning solvent on the couch
approximately three months prior to it being given to Miller.
Miller requested a peremptory instruction which was denied by the trial court.
Miller was found guilty and sentenced to one year in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections followed by ten years of post-release supervision for the
purpose of insuring payment of restitution in the amount of $51,255.91 to State Farm.
Miller filed a motion for JNOV, or in the alternative, a motion for a new trial, which
was denied.
Miller, 856 So.2d at 421-22.
¶4. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that although the evidence presented in Miller's case was
purely circumstantial, "the record contain[ed] substantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that
Miller was guilty of arson." Id. at 425. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed Miller's conviction. The
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Court of Appeals, however, reversed and remanded the sentence, finding that the trial court improperly
exceeded the maximum years allowed by statute for supervised probation.
DISCUSSION
¶5. Miller asserts that the trial court erred in (1) failing to sustain his motions for directed verdict made
both at the close of the State’s case-in-chief and at the conclusion of the trial; (2) failing to give a
peremptory instruction in his favor; and, (3) failing to find via post-trial motions that the verdict of the jury
was contrary to the law and the weight of the evidence.
¶6. When considering claims of trial court error in the denial of a motion for a directed verdict or a
denial of a peremptory instruction, our standard of review is the same. We must judge the sufficiency of
the evidence by accepting as true all evidence, as well as all reasonable inferences which may drawn from
the evidence, in the light most favorable to the State (the non-moving party), and in so doing, if there exists
in the record evidence sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict, we are constrained as a matter of well-
established law to uphold the trial court’s denial of a motion for directed verdict and/or peremptory
instruction. Robert v. State, 821 So.2d 812, 817 (Miss. 2002); Isaac v. State, 645 So.2d 903, 907
(Miss. 1994); Clemons v. State, 460 So.2d 835, 839 (Miss. 1984).
¶7. In addressing Miller’s challenge to the weight of the evidence, our standard of review is likewise
clear.
Our scope of review is well established regarding challenges to the weight of the evidence
issue. Procedurally, such challenges contend that defendant’s motion for new trial should
have been granted. Miss. Unif. Crim. R. of Cir. Ct. Prac. 5.16.[2] The decision to
grant a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the motion should not
2
This rule is now cited as URCCC 10.05.
4
be granted except to prevent “an unconscionable injustice.” Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d
803, 812 (Miss. 1987).
Jones v. State, 635 So.2d 884, 886 (Miss. 1994).
¶8. The Court of Appeals found the following evidence to be consistent with the guilty verdict of arson:
(1) Miller was the sole occupant of the trailer, (2) a telephone call was made from the
trailer approximately ten minutes before the fire was reported, (3) Miller was the last
person known to be at the trailer, (4) a car was seen leaving the vicinity of Miller's trailer
shortly before the fire, (5) the fire was started deliberately, (6) Miller was at home between
2:38 p.m. and 2:40 p.m., (7) the fire was reported at approximately 2:49 p.m., and (8) a
call was made from Miller's trailer at approximately 2:38 p.m.
Miller, 856 So. 2d at 423. While the evidence of guilt in the case sub judice was no doubt purely
circumstantial, this does not vitiate an otherwise lawful verdict. Walton v. State, 642 So.2d 930, 932
(Miss. 1994). There were conflicts in the evidence which unquestionably had to be resolved by the jury.
Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 301 (Miss. 1983). Therefore, the Court of Appeals and the trial
court were correct in determining that the verdict rendered by the jury was not contrary to law nor was it
against the weight of the evidence.
¶9. Regarding the sentence imposed by the trial court, the Court of Appeals has mistakenly used the
terms “supervised probation” and “post-release supervision” interchangeably. Note by way of example
the following excerpts from the opinion of the Court of Appeals: “[Miller] was sentenced to a term of one
year in the custody of the [MDOC] followed by supervised probation of ten years.” 856 So. 2d at 420
(emphasis added). “Miller was found guilty and sentenced to one year in the custody of the [MDOC]
followed by ten years of post-release supervision...” Id. at 422 (emphasis added). The Court of
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Appeals sua sponte determined that the trial judge had imposed an illegal sentence as evidenced by the
following language:
However, this Court notes that in addition to serving one year in the custody of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections, the trial court sentenced Miller to a term of ten
years supervised probation. Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. Section 47-7-37 (Rev.
2000), a period of post-release supervision shall not exceed five years. Ellis v.
State, 748 So.2d 130 (¶ 12) (Miss. 1999).[3] This Court therefore notes as plain error
that portion of the sentence which imposes a period of post-release supervision of ten
years.
856 So.2d at 425 (emphasis added).
¶10. Supervised probation and post-release supervision are totally different statutory creatures. Miss.
Code Ann. § 47-7-33 provides for supervised probation, while Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-34 provides for
post-release supervision. At least two major differences in these two statutes are (1) supervised probation
may not be imposed on a convicted felon while post-release supervision may be imposed on a convicted
felon; and, (2) supervised probation is limited to five years while post-release supervision is not. Section
47-7-34 states inter alia that “the total number of years of incarceration plus the total number of years of
post-release supervision shall not exceed the maximum sentence authorized to be imposed by law for the
felony committed.” While the statute unquestionably limits to five years the period of time that the MDOC
may supervise an offender who is on post-release supervision, the clear language of the statute does not
limit the total number of years of post-release supervision to five years.
¶11. That having been said, we note that the trial court in the case sub judice sentenced Miller, inter alia,
as follows:
3
Ellis involved a supervised probation sentence imposed by the trial judge in 1990, prior to the passage
of Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-34. Ellis thus did not involve post-release supervision.
6
The Defendant is hereby sentenced to a term of one (1) year in the
Mississippi Department of Corrections followed by supervised probation
under the supervision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections for a
period of ten (10) years or until the court in term time or the Judge in
vacation shall alter, extend, terminate or direct the execution of the above
sentence.
*************************************************
The Defendant is only required to meet with [the] probation officer at the
statutory minimum guidelines.
Thus, it is clear that the trial judge was placing Miller on probation, but only five (5) years of which would
be served under the supervision of the MDOC with the remaining five years being in essence “unsupervised
probation.” There is no doubt that Miller could not be required to serve more than five years by way of
reporting to a MDOC probation officer (supervised probation), but upon release from the reporting
requirements by the MDOC officer and/or the trial court, Miller no doubt could serve the remainder of his
sentence by way of unsupervised probation. The sentence was not violative of Sections 47-7-33, 47-7-34
or 47-7-37. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the sentence imposed by the trial court.
CONCLUSION
¶12. Finding that both the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court of DeSoto County were correct in
holding that the jury properly concluded from substantial evidence as revealed in the record, that Donald
Wade Miller was guilty of arson, we affirm Miller's conviction. We also find that the trial court was
authorized by the applicable statutes to sentence Miller to one year in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections followed by ten years of supervised probation limited by the clear language of
the sentencing order to the maximum five-year period for MDOC supervision.4 Therefore, we affirm in
4
There is no doubt that the better practice in this situation would have been to sentence the defendant
to ten years of post-release supervision as opposed to supervised probation.
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part, and reverse in part, the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate and affirm in toto the judgment
of the DeSoto County Circuit Court.
¶13. Finally, we suggest to our learned trial judges that when sentencing a defendant to a period of
incarceration followed by a period of supervision by the MDOC, post-release supervision under the
provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-34, is the better procedure. Additionally, we suggest to our trial
judges that when sentencing a defendant to either supervised probation or post-release supervision, it
should be made clear in the sentencing order that any MDOC supervision is limited to no more than the
statutory maximum of five years.
¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND
REVERSED IN PART, AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE DESOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., GRAVES AND RANDOLPH, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J.,
CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. WALLER, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY COBB, P.J., AND DICKINSON, J. DIAZ, J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.
WALLER, PRESIDING JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶15. Because the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Donald Wade
Miller was guilty of arson, I respectfully dissent.
¶16. The plurality relies on the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the following evidence was consistent
with the guilty verdict rendered against Miller:
(1) Miller was the sole occupant of the trailer, (2) a telephone call was
made from the trailer approximately ten minutes before the fire was
reported, (3) Miller was the last person known to be at the trailer, (4) a
car was seen leaving the vicinity of Miller's trailer shortly before the fire,
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(5) the fire was started deliberately, (6) Miller was at home between 2:38
p.m. and 2:40 p.m., (7) the fire was reported at approximately 2:49 p.m.,
and (8) a call was made from Miller's trailer at approximately 2:38 p.m.
Miller v. State, 856 So. 2d 420, 423 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
¶17. The fact that Miller lives alone does not, in my view, weigh in favor of either a verdict of guilty or
innocent. Further, Miller does not dispute that he was in the trailer in the minutes prior to the fire starting
or that he was the last person known to be in the trailer. Miller admits that he had been on the internet and
departed just prior to the fire starting.
¶18. Additionally, the fact that a car was seen leaving the vicinity shortly before the fire does not strongly
support the guilty verdict when considering the testimony of Gemenie Bowdre. Bowdre lived adjacent to
Miller. She testified that she was at her mailbox when she saw "a car, . . .coming out of one of the
driveways north of me. And I'm not sure which driveway it was coming out of, but it was the Miller
driveway or the other drive." Further, when asked what kind of vehicle she saw, Bowdre stated, "I don't
know vehicles unless I really see the name on them." Bowdre testified that after seeing the car leave, she
noticed smoke coming from Miller's home.
¶19. The only evidence of a fire being deliberately started came from Mike Hancock, the fire investigator
with the DeSoto County Fire Department, who testified that the trained canine used in his investigation
indicated that a flammable liquid was present on the middle of Miller's couch. This was confirmed by Brad
Schinker, a fire investigator with Unified Investigations and Sciences, who eliminated all of the accidental
ignition sources and concluded that Miller's sofa was the fire's origin. Schinker concluded that the fire
started by "introduction of an ignition source by some type of human action. I mean, human action, by
9
someone physically coming in and bringing it into the area, an ignition source." This alone does not show
that the fire was started deliberately.
¶20. Arson requires that the fire be set "willfully and maliciously." Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-1(1) (Rev.
2000). Darlene Ellis, Miller's sister, testified that she previously owned the couch. At the end of November
or December, she saw her children spill gun cleaning solvents on the couch while they were cleaning their
guns. She further testified that she gave the couch to Miller because he did not have any furniture. At trial,
Miller testified that he placed his mail on the couch when he got home, that later he went back to the couch
to look through his mail and that it was possible he was smoking at that time. Miller testified that he may
have accidentally started the fire but did not intentionally.
¶21. The record here reflects no physical evidence linking Miller to the fire. The State attempted to
show that Miller had motive because of his financial troubles. However, Miller's insurance coverage was
for approximately $31,000.00, and Miller testified that he owed $43,000.00-$44,000.00 as of the date
of the fire. Additionally, there is no significant evidence that Miller attempted to remove any personal
property from his home prior to the fire, including guns, the computer and all furnishings. In fact, a friend
of Miller's noticed the fire and removed Miller's dog from a fenced area directly behind the burning trailer.
¶22. The facts here are no more damaging than those in Gatlin v. State, 754 So.2d 1157 (Miss.
1999). Gatlin was at the scene of a fire at a time when he could have started the fire, but Gatlin did not
admit that he actually started the fire. Id. at 1159. Gatlin had domestic trouble with a girlfriend as a motive.
Id. The fire marshal testified that an accelerant had been used in such an amount that it was no accident.
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Id. Further, no physical evidence was found to connect Gatlin with the fire. Id. Gatlin was reversed by
this Court for insufficient evidence.
¶23. This Court has reversed several other arson convictions due to insufficient evidence. See Isaac
v. State, 645 So.2d 903 (Miss. 1994) (Isaac stated that he may have started the fire at his girlfriend's
apartment, but did not do so intentionally; Isaac was father of girlfriend's children and girlfriend had put him
out of apartment a week before the fire); White v. State, 441 So.2d 1380 (Miss. 1983) (witness stated
that White asked him to assist in burning of car to defraud insurer; reversed and rendered on plain error);
Moody v. State, 371 So.2d 408 (Miss. 1979) (this Court found two prosecution witnesses not credible
and reversed and rendered); Holloman v. State, 151 Miss. 202, 117 So. 532 (1928) (trouble existed
between defendant and owner of barn; defendant's father's property, normally stored in barn, had been
moved before fire; witness stated that defendant told him he would burn the barn and tried to get witness
to help; tracks similar to defendant's were found near point of origin of fire). Likewise, this Court reversed
Gatlin's conviction because there was no more evidence supporting Gatlin's conviction than in Isaac,
White, Moody, and Holloman. Gatlin, 754 So.2d at 1159.
¶24. Viewing the evidence here in the light most favorable to the verdict, I fail to see how a reasonable,
hypothetical juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller was guilty of arson. For this reason,
I would reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment and reverse and render Miller's conviction and sentence.
COBB, P.J., AND DICKINSON, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.
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