Young v. Stevens

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2007-EC-00986-SCT

CARL W. YOUNG

v.

R. D. “DICKIE” STEVENS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/11/2007
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. BILLY JOE LANDRUM
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HUMPHREYS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: SAMUEL L. BEGLEY
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: WILLIE GRIFFIN
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - ELECTION CONTEST
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/15/2007
MANDATE ISSUED: 06/15/2007

EN BANC.

CARLSON, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Aggrieved by the Special Judge’s order declaring him to be disqualified to seek the

position of Beat Two Supervisor in Humphreys County, Carl W. Young seeks relief from us

via a Bill of Exceptions filed on June 13, 2007. By order entered on the same day, in light

of the looming deadlines for finalizing the ballots, and pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-

961(6) (Rev. 2001), this Court has expedited this appeal. Finding the Special Judge’s duly

entered Opinion and Order to be supported by the evidence and the law, we affirm.
 FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

¶2. Carl W. Young qualified to run in the Democratic Party primary for the office of

Supervisor for Beat Two in Humphreys County. R. D. “Dickie” Stevens, the incumbent

supervisor for Beat Two, filed an objection to Young’s candidacy. Stevens alleged that

Young is not a resident of Beat Two and is therefore not qualified to run. The Humphreys

County Democratic Executive Committee certified Young as a qualified candidate. Pursuant

to Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-961, Stevens sought judicial review of the Committee’s decision,

and the Chief Justice, pursuant to section 23-15-961(5), promptly appointed Circuit Judge

Billy Joe Landrum from the Eighteenth Judicial District as the special judge to hear this case.

After a hearing conducted on June 8, 2007, the special judge entered his Opinion and Order

of the Court declaring that Young was not a resident of Beat Two in Humphreys County and

directing Young’s name to be removed from the ballot. We now consider this expedited

appeal based on Young’s Bill of Exceptions, Stevens’s Amended Bill of Exceptions, the trial

court clerk’s papers, the court reporter’s transcript of the trial court proceedings, and the

briefs of the parties.

DISCUSSION

¶3. Having meticulously reviewed the record, we find Judge Landrum’s findings of fact

to be wholly supported by the record, and we thus set out here verbatim those findings:

The Petitioner, [R. D. “Dickie”] Stevens, is a candidate for the position of
Supervisor, Beat 2, Humphreys County, Mississippi. The Respondent, Carl
W. Young (“Young”) has been qualified by the Humphreys County
Democratic Executive Committee as a candidate for the position of Supervisor,
Beat 2, Humphreys County, Mississippi.

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Petitioner, Stevens, filed his appeal of the Humphreys County Democratic
Executive Committee’s decision to qualify the Respondent, Young, in the form
of a Petition for Judicial Review, and this Court was, thereafter, appointed to
hear same.

The Respondent, Young, lived in Humphreys County as a child and until the
time of his entry into Jackson State University in 1980, at which time he
relocated to Jackson, Mississippi but continued to use his parents’ residence
address as his own.

Between the time in 1980 that the Respondent, Young, attended Jackson State
University and the present time, he has purchased several homes outside of
Humphreys County, all of which have been located in Hinds County.

The Respondent, Young, registered to vote in Hinds County at some point
after 1980. In 1995, Young apparently changed his voter registration to
Humphreys County and was purged from the voter rolls in that county in 2002,
after it came to the attention of persons unknown to the Court that he was a
non-resident of Humphreys County. Sometime thereafter, Young voted in
Humphreys County by affidavit ballot, and his name was added back to the
voter rolls in that county for reasons unknown to the Court.

In 1996, the Respondent, Young, purchased a home at 855 Cherry Ridge,
Clinton, Hinds County, Mississippi, MS, where he lived until he and his ex-
wife separated on or about February 1, 1996. Respondent’s divorced (sic) was
filed and granted in Hinds County.

Since 1996, Respondent, Young, has purchased two or three other homes in
Hinds County, and as recently as January, 2007, Young purchased a vehicle
tag in Hinds County, continuing to show the Clinton, MS, address.

In December, 2001, Young purchased a home at 1211 Winterview Drive,
Jackson, Hinds County, MS, where he admitted, under oath, he continues to
reside with his wife and three children. Additionally, Young’s children attend
a private school in Hinds County.

In January, 2007, Young changed the address on his driver’s license to his
parents’ residence address in Humphreys County, and in April of 2007, he had
the utilities at his parents’ home transferred into his name.

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 Young is employed with Information Technology Systems in Jackson, Hinds
County, and his wife is employed in Ridgeland, Madison County.

In 2006, Young attempted to file homestead exemption using his parents’
residence address; said homestead exemption application was denied, as his
mother had already claimed the exemption on the property.

Young claims that he has lived in a small “cottage” or “shed” next to his
parents’ house but admitted under oath that the “cottage” or “shed” is currently
uninhabitable. Young claims he has always considered Humphreys County his
home and that he still has many social connections there and has contributed
financially to a church there. Young also claims that he owns some property
in Humphreys County, although the Court does not believe this is a fact that
was proven in the hearing of this matter.

¶4. In a candidate qualification challenge, the standard of review for questions of law is

de novo. Ladner v. Necaise, 771 So. 2d 353, 355 (Miss. 2000) (citing Saliba v. Saliba, 753

So. 2d 1095, 1098 (Miss. 2000)). Further, we review findings of fact by a trial judge sitting

without a jury for manifest error, including whether the findings were the product of

prejudice, bias, or fraud, or manifestly against the weight of the credible evidence. Boyd v.

Tishomingo Co. Democratic Exec. Comm., 912 So. 2d 124, 128 (Miss. 2005) (citing Miss.

Dep’t of Transp. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 108, 111 (Miss. 2004)).

¶5. Article 6, Section 176 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 sets out the residency

requirements for a member of a county board of supervisors. Section 176 provides that in

order to be eligible for that office, a person must be a resident of the district which he or she

represents.1 Similarly, Miss. Code Ann. § 19-3-3 (Rev. 2003) requires residency within the

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Article 6, Section 170, Mississippi Constitution of 1890 provides that “[e]ach county
shall be divided into five districts, a resident freeholder of each district shall be selected, in
the manner prescribed by law, and the five so chosen shall constitute the board of

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county supervisor’s district. Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-299(7) (Supp. 2006) mandates that

the proper executive committees of the political parties shall determine the qualifications of

the candidates seeking office. The primary qualification requirement is “whether each

candidate is a qualified elector of the state, state district, county or county district which they

[sic] seek to serve. . . .” In making the qualification determination, the committee is required

to find that the candidate is a resident of the district or has shown by “absolute proof that he

will, subject to no contingencies, meet all qualifications on or before the date of the general

or special election at which he could be elected to office.” Id. See also Miss. Code Ann. §

23-15-359(9) (Supp. 2006).

¶6. In Mississippi, residence and domicile are synonymous for election purposes. Hinds

County Election Comm'n v. Brinston, 671 So. 2d 667, 668 (Miss. 1996). A person’s

domicile in election matters is the place:

where he has his true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and
to which whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. . . . A
domicile continues until another is acquired; before a domicile can be
considered lost or changed, a new domicile must be acquired by removal to a
new locality with intent to remain there, and the old domicile must be
abandoned without intent to return thereto.

Smith v. Deere, 195 Miss. 502, 505-06, 16 So. 2d 33, 34 (1943) (internal citations omitted).

¶7. After reviewing all of the evidence, we find that Young’s residence for election

qualification purposes is his home in Jackson. He and his wife work in the Jackson area. His

children attend school in Jackson. He has registered vehicles in Hinds County. Until very

supervisors of the county, a majority of whom may transact business.”

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recently, his driver’s license listed a Jackson address. Though Young grew up in Humphreys

County, claims ownership of property in Isola, regularly visits his mother there, has

registered to vote and has in fact voted in Humphreys County, and has other contacts to the

county, we find that the proof does not show that he maintains a permanent residence there.

We find that the special judge was not manifestly wrong in determining that Young is a

Hinds County resident.

¶8. Young claims that the special judge failed to give adequate weight to his decision to

forego homestead on the houses he has owned in Hinds County. The general rule in this state

is that there is a rebuttable presumption that one’s domicile and residence are where his

homestead exemption is filed. See Hinds County Election Comm’n v. Brinston, 671 So. 2d

667 (Miss. 1996). Young’s attempt to file for homestead on the shed in Humphreys County

was rejected. There is no presumption of residency in Humphreys County. Young now

argues that since he never filed homestead in Hinds County, he therefore has not established

residency in Hinds County. This Court recently held that a potential candidate’s decision to

forego homestead exemption in the county of his apparent residence is not definitive for

purposes of determining his legal residence. In Garner v. State Democratic Executive

Comm., 2007 Miss. LEXIS 327 (Miss. 2007) (mandate issued, June 14, 2007), we held that

even though a candidate had declined to file for homestead in Hinds County, he was still a

resident of Hinds County, given the overwhelming proof of his actual living arrangements.

This Court has never held that a decision to forego homestead negates the otherwise obvious

establishment of a domicile. We decline to do so today.

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¶9. Young admits that he and his family do not physically reside in Humphreys County

and that he has not lived there since approximately 1989. Yet he claims that he has always

considered himself to be a resident of Humphreys County and that he has never established

an official residence elsewhere. The proof clearly shows that Young has in fact established

Hinds County as his domicile and residence. He has owned three houses in Hinds County.

Prior to that, he lived in an apartment in Hinds County. He and his wife work in the Jackson

area. Their three children live and go to school in Jackson. Before he changed his voter

registration to Humphreys County in 1995, he was registered in Hinds County. He signed

divorce papers in 1996 in which he swore that his marital residence was in Hinds County.

¶10. The Court recently considered a very similar residency qualification contest in which

the candidate in question claimed that for the preceding two years, he had been a resident of

a Holmes County legislative district despite overwhelming evidence that he had actually

resided elsewhere. He claimed that it was always his intent to return to the district. We held

that the candidate had not shown that he was a resident of the district and his candidacy was

prohibited. Edwards v. Stevens, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 314 (Miss. 2007) (mandate issued, June

6, 2007). In the case sub judice, we find that Young’s claims that he has always considered

himself to be a resident of Humphreys County are not sufficient to overcome the

overwhelming proof that he lives in Jackson, Hinds County, Mississippi. The determination

of a person’s “permanent home and principal establishment” turns on actual proof of a

person’s living arrangements. It is not satisfied with a simple declaration that one intends

to be a resident of a particular county when the overwhelming proof shows that he actually

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resides elsewhere. It is not enough that Young considers himself an official resident of

Humphreys County. He must actually reside there permanently.

¶11. Young also claims that, after his father’s death, he owns an interest in his mother’s

homestead property through descent and distribution and that he is entitled to the

presumption of residency in Humphreys County on that basis. The homestead statutes define

the homestead as the dwelling “actually occupied as the primary home of a family group.”

Miss. Code Ann. § 27-33-19 (Rev. 2006). The primary home actually occupied by Young

and his family is clearly the Jackson house and not the house where his mother lives. Again,

we find that Young’s true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment are in Jackson

where he resides with his wife and children, and not in Humphreys County where his mother

lives.

¶12. Finally, Young claims that as an employee of the State of Mississippi, he is a public

officer and thus entitled to claim residency in Humphreys County. Young relies on Miss.

Code Ann. § 25-1-61 (Rev. 2006) which provides:

All public officers of this state who are required to, or who for official reasons,
remove from the county of their actual household and residence to another
county of this state for the purpose of performing the duties of their office shall
be deemed in law in all respects to be householders and residents of the county
from which they so remove, unless such officer elects to become an actual
householder and resident of the county to which he removed for official
causes.

We find that Young is merely employed by the state and is clearly not a state officer. Miss.

Code Ann. § 5-8-3(p) and (q) (Rev. 2002) provide definitions for state officials and state

employees:

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 (p) "Public employee" means an individual appointed to a position, including
a position created by statute, whether compensated or not, in state or local
government and includes any employee of the public employee. The term
includes a member of the board of trustees, chancellor, vice-chancellor or the
equivalent thereof in the state university system or the state community and
junior college system, and a president of a state college or university.

(q) "Public official" means an individual elected to a state or local office, or an
individual who is appointed to fill a vacancy in the office.

While those definitions are provided in a chapter of the code dealing with lobbying reform

and do not directly relate to election or residence matters, we find the definitions to be

instructive here. Young is not a public officer or official and is not entitled to evade the

residency requirements simply because he works for the State.

CONCLUSION

¶13. We find from the record before us that the special judge’s findings of fact were not

manifestly in error inasmuch as his findings were not the product of prejudice, bias, or fraud,

or manifestly against the weight of the credible evidence. Boyd, 912 So. 2d at 128. Thus we

unquestionably are compelled as a matter of well-established law to affirm Judge Landrum’s

judgment finding Carl W. Young to be disqualified as a candidate and directing his name be

removed from the ballot for Supervisor of Beat Two in Humphreys County, Mississippi.

¶14. In light of imminent ballot printing deadlines, under this Court’s authority to suspend

the rules pursuant to M.R.A.P. 2(c), the Court finds that no motion for rehearing will be

allowed and that this opinion shall be deemed final in all respects. The Court finds that the

mandate in this matter should issue immediately.

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¶15. The Court further finds that the Motion to Strike Bill of Exceptions filed by the

appellee should be dismissed as moot.

¶16. AFFIRMED.

WALLER AND DIAZ, P.JJ., EASLEY, GRAVES, DICKINSON, RANDOLPH
AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. SMITH, C.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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