IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2006-CA-02126-SCT
GWENDOLYN E. BALL, J. NEIL VARNELL AND
SARGE PRESTON
v.
MAYOR AND BOARD OF ALDERMEN OF THE
CITY OF NATCHEZ, MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/17/2006
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. FORREST A. JOHNSON, JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ADAMS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: JAMES A. BOBO
MICHAEL E. D’ANTONIO, JR.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: WALTER BROWN
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY
DISPOSITION: ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED; ON
CROSS-APPEAL: AFFIRMED - 04/10/2008
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE SMITH, C.J., EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ.
EASLEY, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This appeal stems from the sale of surplus land in the City of Natchez (City). The City
sold the surplus land, known as the Natchez Pecan Factory Site, to Worley Brown LLC,
pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 57-7-1, for the development of a portion of
the Waterfront Development District. Gwendolyn E. Ball, J. Neil Varnell, and Sarge Preston
(collectively the “appellants”), City residents, appealed the January 24, 2006, and May 30,
2006, actions taken by the mayor and the board of aldermen to the Circuit Court of Adams
County, Mississippi, in regard to the extension of an option contract and the execution on the
special warranty deed to Worley Brown. The two appeals were consolidated by the trial
court. The trial court determined that: (1) it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal; (2) the
appellants had standing to pursue the appeal; (3) the actions of the mayor and board were
authorized by Mississippi Code Annotated Section 57-7-1; (4) the development was
commercial within the meaning of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 57-7-1; (5) the
extensions of the option agreement were reasonable and necessary and did not violate any
statutory or constitutional rights; (6) all of the meetings conducted by the mayor and board
were legal; (7) the sale price of the property was reasonable; (8) any restriction of access by
the general public of the existing sidewalk and walkway was unreasonable; and (9) any
remaining issues were resolved against the appellants. Following the trial court’s ruling, the
appellants filed a notice of appeal, and the City filed a notice of cross-appeal on the issues of
jurisdiction, standing, and sidewalk access.
FACTS
¶2. In 1995, the City received a donation of 2.88 acres of land located on the bluff-top area
of Broadway Street. The property was known as the Natchez Pecan Factory Site. In 2005,
the mayor and the board received requests from various developers concerning the sale and
development of the Natchez Pecan Factory Site. In April 2005, the city council prepared a
“Request for Proposals” for fourteen prospective developers. The City received five
proposals, with proposed sale prices between $275,000 and $650,000. Notices concerning
the solicitation process, and the receipt and consideration of the proposals were published in
2
The Natchez Democrat six times over the course of six weeks. The board chose the
development proposal of Worley Brown on June 28, 2005.
¶3. On August 9, 2005, the city council unanimously adopted a resolution to enter into a
option/development agreement with Worley Brown. In addition, the resolution provided, in
part, that (1) the City determined the property to be surplus, (2) the property was to be sold
pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 57-7-1, and (3) the mayor had authority to
execute a deed of conveyance, transferring the property to Worley Brown. There was no
appeal by any party of the city council’s actions.
¶4. The option agreement adopted at the August 9, 2005, meeting provided that the option
would expire on February 9, 2006, at 5 p.m. The option agreement further provided that the
City and Worley Brown had to comply with all city, state, and federal statutes, rules, and
regulations, including the regulations of the Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
The option agreement stated that the purchaser would develop seventy-five residential, luxury
condominium units with a clubhouse, swimming pool, and other facilities. The purchase price
for the property was $500,000.
¶5. On January 23, 2006, Worley Brown requested an extension of the option agreement
due to a delay in receiving a permit from the Department of Archives and History. On
January 24, 2006, at a regular meeting, the city council adopted a resolution to extend the
option agreement for thirty days. The appellants filed a notice of appeal and bill of exceptions
on February 3, 2006, concerning the option agreement. On March 9, 2006, the Department
of Archives and History gave approval for the project via its permit committee. The city
council granted further extensions of the option agreement at the request of Worley Brown.
3
On May 22, 2006, Worley Brown gave notice to the mayor that it wished to exercise the
option, requesting a closing date. On May 30, 2006, the mayor executed and delivered a
special warranty deed to Worley Brown for the Natchez Pecan Factory Site property. The
appellants filed a notice of appeal on June 8, 2006, concerning the actions taken by the mayor
and the board at the May 30, 2006, meeting. Thereafter, the trial court consolidated the two
appeals filed on February 3 and June 8, 2006, and issued its ruling.
DISCUSSION
¶6. On cross-appeal, the City raises a number of issues, two of which are jurisdiction and
standing. Since these two issues are fundamental barriers for any appeal to be considered by
this Court, they will be addressed before any issue raised by the appellants.
1. Jurisdiction.
¶7. The City argues that the circuit court and this Court have no jurisdiction to hear this
case. At the August 9, 2005, city council meeting, the mayor and board unanimously adopted
a resolution to enter into an option development agreement with Worley Brown for the sale
and development of the Natchez Pecan Factory Site. At the May 30, 2006, city council
meeting, the mayor executed and delivered the deed of conveyance to Worley Brown. The
City concedes that the appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the May 30, 2006, city
council meeting. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (Rev. 2002). However, the City contends
that the circuit court and this Court have no jurisdiction, as the council took no action at its
May 30, 2006, meeting in regard to the sale of the Natchez Pecan Factory Site. The City
contends that the mayor had prior authority to execute and deliver the deed pursuant to the
August 9, 2005, resolution. Further, the City argues that no appeal was taken from the actions
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taken at the August 9, 2005, city council meeting. The City contends that the circuit court and
this Court have no jurisdiction because the August 9, 2005, meeting gave the mayor authority
to execute and deliver the deed on May 30, and no action was taken by the city council.
¶8. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-51-75 provides for ten days to appeal from the
date of adjournment of a session in which a board of supervisors or municipal authorities
render a judgment or decision. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (Rev. 2002); see Newell v. Jones
County, 731 So. 2d 580 (Miss. 1999). The ten-day appeal period from the actions of a board
or municipal authority is mandatory and jurisdictional. Bowen v. DeSoto County Bd. of
Supervisors, 852 So. 2d 21, 23 (Miss. 2003); City of Madison v. Shanks, 793 So. 2d 576, 581
(Miss. 2000).
¶9. In effect, the City argues that the unanimous adoption of the resolution provided the
mayor with authority to execute and deliver the deed to Worley Brown. Therefore, any
objection to the sale of the land should have been made in an appeal within ten days of the
August 9 adoption of the resolution. In order to determine whether the August 9 adoption of
the resolution was a final, appealable act by the mayor and the board, this Court must examine
what constitutes a final act.
¶10. This Court has considered when the actions of a municipality become final. In
Sanford v. Board of Supervisors, Covington County, 421 So. 2d 488, 490 (Miss. 1982), this
Court found that an order by the board was not a final decision. The order stated, in part, that
two members of a committee were appointed to lay out a road and report their findings at the
next board meeting. Id. at 489. This Court found that the language of the order required only
a “finding” and failed to show that a final decision was made to construct the road. Id. at 490.
5
In City of Madison, this Court held that a mayor’s veto was final when the board decided not
to override the veto at a later session. City of Madison, 793 So. 2d at 581.
¶11. Indeed, this Court also has addressed the period for appeal of the sale of municipal
properties. In Coast Materials Co. v. Harrison County Development Commission, 730 So.
2d 1128, 1131 (Miss. 1998), this Court held that appellants timely appealed the sale of
municipal land. The Harrison County Board of Supervisors ratified the sale of a parcel of
land in an industrial district by the Harrison County Development Commission to Delta
Industries. Id. Later, the Board substituted and sold a second parcel of land in the same
industrial district in lieu of the first parcel of land. Id. The Court found that the sale of the
second piece of property was the final, appealable act of the municipality, not the initial sale
of the first parcel of land. Id.
¶12. In Garrard v. City of Ocean Springs, 672 So. 2d 736, 739 (Miss. 1996), this Court
considered the language of a motion to determine whether the actions of the city council
constituted a final disposition. This Court held that the clear and unambiguous language of
the city council’s motion to transfer was a final disposition of all issues. Id. at 738-39.
However, the Court also found that, had the language of the motion been similar to the first
motion, which contained conditional language concerning the removal of a hut, then the
motion would not have been a final disposition. Id.
¶13. However, in Hinds County Board of Supervisors v. Leggette, 833 So. 2d 586, 591
(Miss. Ct. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals determined that the circuit court had subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal where all actions by the zoning administrator were not
complete. The Court of Appeals determined that the actions of the board constituted a final
6
judgment or decision because it “‘RESOLVED AND ORDERED’ the Zoning Administrator
to take legal action in an appropriate court of law to seek the removal” of a horse arena on
Leggette’s property. Id. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals found that “[e]ven though the
Board did not actually arm the Zoning Administrator with a bulldozer and a hard hat,” the
board’s order was a final, appealable order. Id.
¶14. On August 9, 2005, the mayor and board unanimously adopted a resolution for the sale
and development of the Natchez Pecan Factory Site. The minutes of the regular meeting on
that date stated:
A motion was made by Alderman West and seconded by Alderman Pollard to
adopt a resolution to enter into an option development agreement with Worley
Brown, LLC for the sale and development of the city-owned Pecan Shelling
Factory Site on Broadway Street. The motion carried unanimously.
The resolution was for the sale of the property for $500,000. Further, the resolution stated,
in part:
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that Mayor Phillip West and City Clerk Donnie
Holloway of the City of Natchez are hereby authorized, empowered and
directed to execute all documents required to consummate the transaction
including that Option/Development Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit “A”
and upon the proper and timely exercise of the notice required under the
Option/Development Agreement to execute a deed of conveyance transferring
the City’s interest in the aforesaid real property in accordance with the Special
Warranty Deed with Declaration of Covenants incorporating the terms and
conditions of the aforesaid Option/Development Agreement, which terms and
conditions are incorporated herein and made a part hereof for any and all
purposes.
¶15. Based on our precedent, while the vote for the resolution to extend an option agreement
for the sale and development of the property was a final disposition of the resolution, it was
not a final disposition of all the issues for various reasons. First, the language of the option
7
agreement may be interpreted to be conditional in nature, and therefore, not a final disposition
of the issues.1 Garrard, 672 So. 2d at 738-39. The terms of the resolution stated that the
mayor may convey the property “upon the proper and timely exercise of the notice required
under the Option/Development Agreement to execute a deed of conveyance transferring the
City’s interest in the aforesaid real property.” The option agreement provided for a February
9, 2006, deadline to accept the option agreement and for closing within fifteen days of the
exercise of the option. The agreement contained no provision for an extension of the option
agreement.
¶16. Worley Brown did not sign the option agreement prior to February 9, 2006. Rather
than accept the option within 180 days pursuant to the terms of the option agreement, Worley
Brown requested an extension of the option agreement period on January 23, 2006. The City
granted a thirty-day extension for the option agreement on January 24, 2006. This extension
was outside the terms of the option agreement, and thus, was akin to a new agreement with
Worley Brown.
¶17. In addition, the execution of the deed on May 30, 2006, by the mayor to Worley Brown
was an appealable action. The board and the mayor voted for numerous extensions of the
option agreement between January and May 2006. The option agreement never provided for
these extensions. Therefore, the extensions by the city council acted as renewals of the option
agreement. Furthermore, the mayor and the board had a closed-door meeting at the May 30
meeting, concerning potential litigation with the property. This meeting occurred prior to the
1
The record contains an unsigned option agreement.
8
mayor conveying the property to Worley Brown. The minutes reflected that the city council
considered the possibility of litigation by the appellants, yet decided to have the mayor convey
the land to Worley Brown. Therefore, the city council made a decision on the conveyance at
the May 30 meeting. The City’s argument is without merit. The August 9, 2005, resolution
was not the final disposition of the issues. The January 24 extension of the option agreement
and the May 30 conveyance of the property were both acts that extended beyond the August
9 resolution and option agreement.
2. Standing.
¶18. The City argues that the appellants have no standing to appeal the actions of the City.
The City relies upon Burgess v. City of Gulfport, 814 So. 2d 149 (Miss. 2002) and City of
Madison v. Bryan, 763 So. 2d 162 (Miss. 2000) to support its argument.
¶19. This Court set forth the standard of review for issues of standing in Burgess as follows:
It is well settled that "Mississippi's standing requirements are quite liberal."
This Court has explained that while federal courts adhere to a stringent
definition of standing, limited by Art. 3, § 2 of the United States Constitution
to a review of actual cases and controversies, the Mississippi Constitution
contains no such restrictive language. Therefore, this Court has been "more
permissive in granting standing to parties who seek review of governmental
actions." In Mississippi, parties have standing to sue "when they assert a
colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experience an adverse
effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise provided by law."
State v. Quitman County, 807 So. 2d 401, 405 (Miss. 2001) (citations omitted).
Burgess v. City of Gulfport, 814 So. 2d at 152-153. This Court also has held that “to have
standing in this matter, [a claimant] must demonstrate that the City's action had an adverse
effect on property in which he has an interest.” Bryan, 763 So. 2d at 166.
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¶20. We find these cases to be distinguishable. In Burgess, a company sought a permit to
remove a tree from its property. Burgess, 814 So. 2d at 150-51. This Court held that
residents opposing the tree removal had no standing because they did not own the property
at issue and never “alleged that they own[ed] the land around the property in question, or that
the land [had] been affected in an adverse manner.” Id. at 153. Likewise, in Bryan, this
Court held that Bryan had no standing since he had did not have title to the property, a valid
option to purchase the property, or a mortgage or other encumbrance on the land. Bryan, 763
So. 2d at 166.
¶21. Here, the appellants were property owners in the City, and their property was located
near the Natchez Pecan Factory Site. Furthermore, the appellants alleged that the project
would adversely impact their properties. We find that the City’s argument is without merit.
3. January 24, 2006, Meeting.
¶22. The City argues that the appellants failed to perfect an appeal after the January 24,
2006, meeting. The appellants contend that there was no presiding officer at the January 24,
2006, meeting, therefore, the option agreement expired on February 9, 2006. Further, the
appellants argue that the City had no jurisdiction subsequently to modify the option contract,
because the appeal filed after the January 24, 2006, meeting effectively divested the mayor
and board of jurisdiction to grant further extensions.
A. Perfected Appeal.
¶23. The City argues that the appellants failed to perfect an appeal from the January 24,
2006, meeting. The City contends that the appellants only gave notice of an appeal and never
perfected the appeal, since they did not submit a bill of exceptions and failed to have the
10
mayor sign the bill of exceptions. However, the record reflects that the appellants filed a
notice of appeal and bill of exceptions on February 3, 2006. The notice included a service-of-
process form and a receipt-of-service from the City, indicating timely delivery to the mayor.
At the hearing, the City acknowledged that the mayor did not sign the bill of exceptions due
to a disagreement with the facts presented by the appellants. In Reed v. Adams, 236 Miss.
333, 341, 111 So. 2d 222, 225 (1959), this Court addressed the proper procedure for signing
a bill of exceptions pursuant to Mississippi Code of 1942 Section 1195, which was the
precursor of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 57-7-1. This Court held that if a mayor
“deemed incorrect the bill of exceptions presented to him, he was under an implied duty to
point out wherein he deemed the same incorrect so that the aggrieved parties might have an
opportunity to amend the same, and then to sign the same as corrected.” Id. at 225. The
judge ordered the parties to work out an agreement for the contents of the record, and the
record contains a final amended and consolidated bill of exceptions signed by the mayor. This
bill of exceptions included the objections to the January 24, 2006, meeting. This issue is
without merit.
B. No Presiding Officer.
¶24. At the January 23 meeting, the appellants objected to a lack of quorum and objected
that the mayor unlawfully “presided” over the meeting by telephone. The mayor allegedly
was in Jackson at the time of the meeting. The appellants contend that Mississippi Code
Annotated Section 25-41-5 prohibits a mayor from presiding over a meeting by
11
teleconference. Further, the appellants argue that no thirty-day advance notice of the
teleconference was provided pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 25-41-5.2
2
In 2007, the Legislature modified the language of Mississippi Code Annotated
Section 25-41-5. See 2007 Miss. Laws, ch. 591, § 1, eff. from and after July 1, 2007.
However, at the time of the 2006 proceeding, Mississippi Code Annotated Section § 25-41-5
provided:
(1) All official meetings of any public body, unless otherwise provided in this
chapter or in the Constitutions of the United States of America or the State of
Mississippi, are declared to be public meetings and shall be open to the public
at all times unless declared an executive session as provided in Section
25-41-7.
(2) A public body may conduct any meeting, other than an executive session
called pursuant to Section 25-41-7, wherein public business is discussed or
transacted, through teleconference or video means. If a quorum of the public
body is physically assembled at one (1) location for the purpose of
conducting a meeting, additional members of the public body may
participate in the meeting through teleconference or video means
provided their participation is available to the general public. A quorum
of the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning as prescribed
in Section 37-101-9 and the State Board for Community and Junior Colleges
as prescribed in Sections 37-4-3 and 37-4-4 may be at different locations for
the purpose of conducting a meeting through teleconference or video means
provided their participation is available to the general public.
(3) (a) Notice of any meetings held pursuant to subsection (2) of this section
shall be provided at least thirty (30) days in advance of the date scheduled
for the meeting. The notice shall include the date, time, place and
purpose for the meeting and shall identify the locations for the meeting. All
locations for the meeting shall be made accessible to the public. All persons
attending the meeting at any of the meeting locations shall be afforded the
same opportunity to address the public body as persons attending the primary
or central location. Any interruption in the teleconference or video broadcast
of the meeting shall result in the suspension of action at the meeting until
repairs are made and public access restored.
See Miss. Code Ann. § 25-41-5, 2006 Miss. Laws, ch. 596, § 2. (emphasis added).
12
¶25. Section 19 of the Charter of Natchez provides that the mayor is the presiding officer.
The appellants contend that Mississippi Code Annotated Section 25-41-5 forbids a mayor
from presiding over a meeting through a teleconference. A review of the statute in effect at
the time of the meeting fails to locate any prohibition of a mayor presiding over a meeting via
teleconference. See Miss. Code Ann. § 25-41-5 (Rev. 2006).
¶26. However, the statute does require thirty days’ advance notice for a teleconference of
a scheduled meeting. See Miss. Code Ann. § 25-41-5(3)(a) (Rev. 2006). The record is silent
concerning notice of the teleconference. Nonetheless, no prejudice was alleged or
demonstrated by the appellants for the alleged lack of notice. The intent of the statute is to
ensure that the meetings are open to the public and to give notice and opportunity for the
public to participate in the process. See Miss. Code Ann. § 25-41-5(3)(a) (Rev. 2006). Here,
the appellants attended the January 24 meeting, objected to the City’s actions at the meeting,
filed a notice of appeal and a bill of exceptions concerning the actions of the City at the
meeting, argued their case before the circuit court, and have appealed the circuit court
decision to this Court. Therefore, the appellants have had ample opportunity to participate
in the process. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
C. Caselaw on Pending Appeal.
¶27. The appellants contend that their February 3, 2006, appeal, filed after the January 24,
2006, meeting, prohibited the City from extending the option agreement at subsequent
meetings while the appeal was pending before the circuit court. The appellants rely upon
South Central Turf, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 526 So. 2d 558 (Miss. 1988), and Gatlin v.
Cook, 380 So. 2d 236 (Miss. 1980), for authority.
13
¶28. However, we find that the appellants’ argument is misplaced. The City’s final decision
was the conveyance of the property to Worley Brown, not the extension of the option
agreement. Unlike the extension at the January 24 meeting, Gatlin and South Central Turf
considered the final decisions of the municipalities. This Court in South Central Turf held:
As in Gatlin v. Cook, the City of Jackson was without authority to reconsider
the matter which it had already finally decided on April 8, 1986, when the
Mayor signed the minutes of the April 1 meeting, thereby giving effect to the
Council's decision to award the contract to E-Z-Go. Mississippi Code
Annotated § 21-8-17(2) (Supp. 1987); City of Oxford v. Inman, 405 So. 2d 111
(Miss. 1981).
South Central Turf, 526 So. 2d at 562-63. This Court finds that the final conveyance of the
property to Worley Brown at the May 30, 2006, meeting, not the extensions of the option
agreement, was the final, appealable decision of the City.
4. May 30 Meeting and Sale.
¶29. The appellants contend that the trial court erred by failing to determine that the sale of
the Natchez Pecan Factory Site was arbitrary, capricious, illegal, and unsupported by the
evidence. The appellants claim that the City conducted the sale of the property pursuant to
an incorrect statute. Further, the appellants contend that the City failed to follow the
requirements of the statute. Finally, the appellants argue that the sale was an unlawful
donation by the City to Worley Brown.
¶30. This Court has set forth the standard of review as follows:
We apply the same standard of review to the Board's legislative act as we apply
in our review of administrative agency decisions. Barnes v. Bd. of
Supervisors, DeSoto County, 553 So. 2d 508, 511 (Miss. 1989). Such
decisions or orders are to be upheld unless "the agency order was unsupported
by substantial evidence; was arbitrary or capricious; was beyond the agency's
scope or powers; or violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the
14
aggrieved party." Bd. of Law Enforcement Officers Standards & Training v.
Butler, 672 So. 2d 1196, 1199 (Miss. 1996).
Falco Lime, Inc. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Vicksburg, 836 So. 2d 711, 721 (Miss. 2002).
A. The applicable statute.
¶31. The appellants argue that the City improperly used Mississippi Code Annotated
Section 57-7-1 to bypass the bid process in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 21-17-1.
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 21-17-1(13) (Rev. 2007) provides the following:
The powers conferred by this section shall be in addition and supplemental
to the powers conferred by any other law, and nothing contained in this
section shall be construed to prohibit, or to prescribe conditions concerning, any
practice or practices authorized under any other laws.
(Emphasis added). Mississippi Code Annotated Section 57-7-1 (Rev. 2003) provides:
In the event that any municipality, county, supervisors district, municipal
airport authority, regional airport authority or other governmental subdivision
shall have surplus airport land or other lands which are not needed for airport
purposes or for other governmental purposes, then such property so
designated and described may be set aside and improved for industrial and
commercial purposes and the same may thereafter be operated or the same may
be leased or sold upon such terms and conditions as a municipality, county,
municipal airport authority, regional airport authority or governmental
subdivision shall prescribe.
In order to provide for the improvement of such property for industrial and
commercial purposes, the municipality or other authority shall be authorized to
provide all necessary utilities therefor and to lay out, construct and/or improve
and hard-surface roadways, streets, driveways and access roads, railroads and
spur tracks, and provide for the grading, drainage, sewer, lights and water, and
all other necessary or proper utilities as may be necessary or proper to make
such land desirable or useful as a site or sites for industrial and commercial
enterprises. The cost and expense of such improvements to said real estate shall
be paid for from funds made available from the lease or sale of such lands to the
extent such funds are available.
15
¶32. The provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 21-17-1(13) clearly and
unambiguously state that the powers conferred by Section 13 are “in addition and
supplemental” to other laws and “nothing contained in this section shall be construed to
prohibit, or to prescribe conditions concerning, any practice or practices authorized under any
other laws.” 3 Therefore, the City had authority to proceed pursuant to Mississippi Code
Annotated Section 57-7-1.
B. The Statutory Language.
¶33. The appellants also contend that the City failed to apply the statute correctly. First, the
appellants contend that the City failed to set aside and improve the land and “thereafter” sell
the land. Secondly, the appellants contend that the statute requires the development to be for
commercial use, not residential development of condominiums.
1. The “Thereafter” Provision.
¶34. The appellants argue that the City failed to comply with Mississippi Code Annotated
57-7-1. Specifically, the appellants contend that the statute requires that the surplus lands
3
While opinions by the Attorney General are not binding on this Court, they
nevertheless provide guidance. See Op. Att’y Gen., O’Neal (September 1, 2006)
(“Therefore, it is the opinion of this office that, pursuant to either Sections 19-7-3 and/or
57-7-1, Waste Services may sell the building at issue to Oktibbeha County for good and
valuable consideration, without necessity of advertising for bids, so long as the Board of
Commissioners makes the appropriate findings in their minutes.”); Op. Att’y Gen., Wagner
(May 5, 2006) (“Additional authority to dispose of surplus municipal real property for
commercial or industrial purposes is found in Miss. Code Ann. Section 57-7-1.”); Op. Att’y
Gen., Wagner (March 31, 2006) (The Attorney General has opined that in disposing of
surplus property under the authority of this section, the governing authorities need not
comply with the provisions of Section 21-17-1 for the disposal of surplus real property. MS
AG Op., Carnathan (November 29, 2005); MS AG Op., Carnathan (November 21, 2003);
MS AG Op., Campbell (October 24, 2003).”)
16
must be set aside and improved for industrial and commercial purposes and “thereafter” be
sold pursuant to the terms and conditions prescribed by the municipality. The statute
provides, in part, that the property “may be set aside and improved for industrial and
commercial purposes and the same may thereafter be operated or the same may be leased
or sold upon such terms and conditions as” a municipality or governmental subdivision shall
prescribe. See Miss. Code Ann. § 57-7-1 (Rev. 2003).
¶35. The clear and unambiguous language of the statute does not mandate that the surplus
land must be set aside and improved by the municipality. The language of the statute states
that the municipality “may” set aside and improve the land “for industrial and commercial
purposes and the same may thereafter be operated or the same may be leased or sold upon
such terms and conditions as” prescribed by the municipality. Miss. Code Ann. § 57-7-1
(Rev. 2003). Additionally, Mississippi Code Annotated Section 57-7-1 does not mandate that
the property can be sold only after improvements are made by the municipality. The statute
does not mandate that improvements must be made on surplus land, therefore, the sale of the
land is not dependent on whether improvements have been made to the land prior to its
conveyance.4 The second paragraph of Section 57-7-1 provides that if improvements are
made, then “[t]he cost and expense of such improvements to said real estate shall be paid for
from funds made available from the lease or sale of such lands to the extent such funds are
4
See Op. Att’y Gen., Wagner (March 31, 2006) (“Pursuant to the second paragraph
of Section 57-7-1, a municipality may undertake work necessary to make the site or structure
suitable for the commercial or industrial purposes, which may include repairs to the
structure. MS AG Op., Carnathan (November 29, 2005).”) (emphasis added).
17
available.” Miss. Code Ann. § 57-7-1 (Rev. 2003). This language implies that the monies for
the improvements would be available after a lease or sale is finalized unless there is an
unusual arrangement for prepayment of all or a portion of the lease payments or sale of the
property. Therefore, a municipality would begin the improvements after it received payments
for the lease or sale. In addition, should a municipality make improvements before a lease or
sale is finalized, then the municipality would place its funds at risk in the event that the lease
or sale should fail to be consummated.5 Accordingly, we find that this issue is without merit.
2. Classification of the Property.
¶36. The appellants contend that the trial court erred by classifying the proposed
development of condominiums as commercial property. The City argues that the property
is not zoned as residential, industrial, or commercial property. The property is zoned as
“Waterfront Development District” property, which is intended to be a mixed-use district of
property. The City contends that the condominiums would be similar to resort condominiums
in Gulf Shores, Alabama, and Destin, Florida. Furthermore, the City cites attorney general
opinions concerning Mississippi Code Annotated Section 57-7-1 for authority.
5
See Op. Att’y Gen., Lanford (January 19, 2007) (“The question of the chronological
order of the execution of the lease and the construction of improvements on surplus lands
under Section 57-7-1 has apparently never before been addressed by the courts or by
Attorney General's opinions, so the question is one of first impression. To allow the
execution of the lease to go forward and then carry out the Improvements on the Site would,
in this instance, do no violence to the statute and would enable Rentech to secure the
necessary private financing and so construct the Plant and complete the Project,” and “It is
our opinion that the terms of the lease to be prescribed by the county in its agreement with
the developer may provide for construction of the improvements after execution of the lease
agreement.”).
18
¶37. While attorney general opinions are not binding on Mississippi courts, they can be
persuasive authority for consideration by our courts. DuPree v. Carroll, 967 So. 2d 27, 31
(Miss. 2007). The City of Tupelo intended to develop a portion of the City with a “master
plan” that “call[ed] for the development of office buildings, townhouses, parks and innovative
downtown uses.” Op. Att’y Gen., Cofer (June 19, 1998). The opinion by the Attorney
General’s Office provided that Mississippi Code Annotated Section 57-7-1 permitted the
disposal of surplus property for industrial and commercial purposes. Id.
¶38. The trial court did not err by finding that the proposed development of the
condominiums was commercial in nature. This issue is without merit.
C. Donation.
¶39. The appellants argue that the City effectively has donated the property to Worley
Brown. The City proposed to sell the property to Worley Brown for $500,000, to make some
improvements on the property, and to provide some tax incentives. This Court has not
addressed this issue in prior rulings. The statutory language of Mississippi Code Annotated
Section 57-7-1 does not address whether the proceeds from a lease or sale are for valuable
consideration versus a donation. In contrast, Mississippi Code Annotated Section 21-17-1
provides, in part, that the lease or sale of property is awarded to the highest bidder or for a fair
market price determined by an average of three appraisals. See Miss. Code Ann. 21-17-1
(2)(a) and (b) (Rev. 2007). However, Mississippi Code Annotated Section 57-7-1 is an
economic development statute. Therefore, the objective of the City’s sale or lease of surplus
property may not be to receive the highest purchase price. In other words, the lease or sale
may be tied to a vision for a city development plan. The City had a Riverfront Development
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Plan. In addition, numerous opinions by the Attorney General’s Office have opined that a
lease or sale should be for “good and valuable consideration” and not necessarily fair market
value. See Op. Att’y Gen., O’Neal (September 1, 2006); Op. Att’y Gen., Wagner (March 31,
2006). The goal of economic development may be more than the immediate receipt of the
highest bid or appraisal value offered for surplus property. Indeed, other factors impact
economic development plans, such as increased tourism, creation of jobs, increased support
industries, increased need for housing, and collection of property taxes. See Op. Att’y Gen.,
Wagner (March 31, 2006). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding that the price
of the property accepted by the City was reasonable for the sale of the Natchez Pecan Factory
Site.
5. Walkway.
¶40. On cross-appeal, the City contends that the trial court erred by finding that any
restriction of access by the general public of the existing sidewalk and walkway was
unreasonable. The City has devoted limited argument to this issue, and the appellants do not
address the issue at all. Notwithstanding the limited argument by the City, the trial court did
not err by prohibiting access to the sidewalk and walkways, as the option agreement provided
for such access by the general public. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶41. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Adams County Circuit Court is affirmed
on direct appeal and affirmed on cross-appeal.
¶42. ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED. ON CROSS-APPEAL: AFFIRMED.
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SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND DIAZ, P.JJ., AND GRAVES, J., CONCUR.
DICKINSON, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY
CARLSON, RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ.
DICKINSON, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶43. Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the sale of property should not be
set aside, I disagree with its conclusion that this Court has jurisdiction to review the matter.
The appellants clearly did not comply with the statute Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (Rev.
2002), which required them to timely appeal a “judgment or decision” of the Natchez Board
of Aldermen. Rather than appealing the Aldermen’s May 9, 2006, decision to enter into the
binding contract to sell the property, appellants purported to appeal the closing of the sale of
the property, which took place on May 30. By that time, it was too late to appeal the decision
to sell the property. I therefore respectfully dissent to the majority’s finding of jurisdiction,
and would dismiss this appeal.
¶44. The following statutory language controls this case:
Any person aggrieved by a judgment or decision of the board of supervisors,
or municipal authorities of a city, town, or village, may appeal within ten (10)
days from the date of adjournment at which session the board of supervisors or
municipal authorities rendered such judgment or decision . . . .
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (Rev. 2002) (emphasis added).
¶45. On May 9, 2006, the aldermen voted to enter into a binding contract6 to sell the subject
property. Appellants did not appeal this decision within ten days, as required by the statute.
Instead, appellants purported to appeal the closing, which occurred twenty-one days later.
6
The option agreement had expired, and the decision to extend it was tantamount to
entering a new, binding contract.
21
Neither the City of Natchez nor its aldermen made an appealable decision at the closing.
They simply complied with their contractual obligations. Stated another way, the purpose of
the May 30 meeting was merely to consummate the sale and execute the deed, which the City
of Natchez was bound to do as a result of its previous grant of the option.
¶46. It is worth noting that, under its option contract with the City of Natchez, Worley-
Brown had the legal power of acceptance by tendering the required money. By doing so,
Worley-Brown had the right to immediate conveyance of the property, and the City of
Natchez had the legal duty to make the conveyance. See generally 3-11 Matthew Bender
and Company, Inc., Corbin on Contracts § 11.1 (2007). When the aldermen voted on May
9 to renew the option agreement, they limited the City’s power to revoke the sale. At that
point, the City of Natchez’ decision to sell the land was final. Once Worley-Brown exercised
the option within the deadline, the City was legally bound to convey the property and the sale
was inevitable.
¶47. The majority curiously and erroneously finds the aldermen’s May 30 “closed-door”
meeting to discuss potential litigation somehow led a final appealable decision. The
aldermen’s discussions had nothing to do with the City’s legal obligation to convey the
property.
¶48. Accepting (as I must) the majority’s finding that the May 30 closing of the sale was
an appealable decision, it is worth pondering how appellants could possibly have prevailed
in their appeal to the circuit court. It seems to me they would have to have successfully
attacked the decision to enter the option contract, since one can hardly attack a closing. Thus,
what is really being appealed is the sale, not the closing.
22
¶49. Some of the majority who often allow public policy to guide their decisions should, in
my view, consider the disastrous potential of today’s decision. A party desiring to purchase
property from a city must now worry that, even after paying the purchase price, receiving a
deed of closing, and filing it of record, some citizen may appeal the sale ) which may have
occurred a year prior to the closing. I predict the title insurance companies will have fun with
this one. Appellants should have appealed within ten days of the May 9 decision. Because
they did not, this Court lacks jurisdiction, and this appeal should be dismissed.
CARLSON, RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.
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