Hallett v. Collins

51 U.S. 174 (____) 10 How. 174

WILLIAM R. HALLETT AND ROBERT L. WALKER, EXECUTORS OF JOSHUA KENNEDY, DECEASED, JOHN G. AIKIN AND CLARISSA HIS WIFE, JOHN H. HASTIE AND HIS WIFE SECLUDA, AUGUSTUS R. MESLIER AND HIS WIFE, MARY AUGUSTA KENNEDY, JOSHUA KENNEDY, JAMES INERARITY, SAMUEL KITCHEN, WILLIAM KITCHEN, JAMES CAMPBELL, AND THE BRANCH BANK OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA AT MOBILE, APPELLANTS,
v.
SIDNEY E. COLLINS.

Supreme Court of United States.

It was argued by Mr. Hopkins, and Mr. Reverdy Johnson, for the appellants, and Mr. J.A. Campbell, for the appellee.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

It will not be necessary, in the consideration of this case, to notice particularly the great mass of documents and testimony spread upon the record, further than to state the results as they affect the several points raised by the pleadings and argued by the counsel.

1. The first of these in order is that which relates to the sufficiency of the probate of the will of Joseph Collins, under whom the complainant claims. But as his claim to two thirds of the property in dispute is through his deceased brothers, he is compelled to remove the objection which has been urged to his and their legitimacy; and if he can succeed in this, and thus establish his right by descent, the decision of the question as to his title by devise will be unnecessary. We shall therefore proceed to examine the second point, as to the legitimacy of the complainant.

2. It is not denied that the complainant and his deceased brothers Joseph and George were the children of Joseph Collins by Elizabeth Wilson, but it is contended that the parents were never legally married.

The evidence on this subject is as follows. Joseph Collins resided in the country south of the 31st degree of north latitude, between the Iberville and Perdido, and died there about the year 1811 or 1812, while that country was still in the actual possession of the Spanish government. In the year 1805 he resided in Pascagoula. Elizabeth Wilson resided also in the same place, and in the family of Dr. White, who was a syndic or chief public officer in that place. A contract of marriage was entered into by Joseph Collins and Elizabeth Wilson before Dr. White, who performed the marriage ceremony. The parties continued to live together as man and wife, and were so reputed, till the death of Collins. It is true that some persons did not consider their marriage as valid, because it was not celebrated in presence of a priest, while others entertained a contrary opinion. It is in proof also, that Collins himself, when he made his will, entertained doubts on the subject.

It is a matter of history, that many marriages were contracted in the presence of civil magistrates, and without the sanction of a priest, in the Spanish colonies which have since been ceded to the United States. Whether such marriages are to be treated as valid by courts of law is a question of some importance, as it may affect the titles and legitimacy of many of the descendants of the early settlers. It is not the first time that it has arisen, as may be seen by the cases of Patton v. Philadelphia, 1 Louisiana Annual Reports, 98, and Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts, 158.

The question, then, will be, whether an actual contract of marriage, made before a civil magistrate, and followed by cohabitation and acknowledgment, but without the presence of a priest, was valid, and the offspring thereof legitimate, according to the laws in force in the Spanish colonies previous to their cession.

That marriage might be validly contracted by mutual promises alone, or what were called sponsalia de presenti, without the presence or benediction of a priest, was an established principle of civil and canon law antecedent to the Council of Trent. (See Pothier du Contrat de Mariage, Part II. ch. 1; Zouch, Sanchez, &c.; and Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Haggard's Consistory Reports, 54, where all the learning on this subject is collected.)

Whether such a marriage was sufficient by the common law in England, previous to the marriage act, has been disputed of late years, in that country, though never doubted here. (See the case of The Queen v. Millis, 10 Clark & Fin. 534.)

On the Continent, clandestine marriages, although they subjected the parties to the censures of the Church, were not only held valid by the civil and canon law, but were pronounced by the Council of Trent to be "vera matrimonia." But a different rule was established for the future by that council, in their decree of the 11th of November, 1563. This decree makes null and void every marriage not celebrated before the parish or other priest, or by license of the ordinary, and before two or three witnesses.

But it was not within the power of an ecclesiastical decree, proprio vigore, to affect the status or civil relations of persons. This could only be effected by the supreme civil power. The Church might punish by her censures those who disregarded her ordinances. But until the decree of the council was adopted and confirmed by the civil power, the offspring of a clandestine marriage, which was ecclesiastically void, would be held as canonically legitimate. In France the decree of the council was not promulgated, but a more stringent system of law was established by the Ordonnance de Blois, and others which followed it. In Spain it was received and promulgated by Philip the Second in his European dominions. But the laws applicable to the colonies consisted of a code issued by the Council of the Indies antecedent to the Council of Trent, and are to be found in the code or treatise called Las Siete Partidas and the Laws of Toro. The law of marriage as contained in the Partidas is the same as that which we have stated to be the general law of Europe antecedent to the council; namely, "that consent alone, joined with the will to marry, constitutes marriage." We have no evidence, historical or traditional, that any portion of this code was ever authoritatively changed in any of the American colonies; nor has it been shown, that in the "Recopilacion de los Indies," digested for the government of the colonies by the order of Philip the Fourth, and published in 1661, nearly a century after the Council of Trent, any change was made in the doctrine of the Partidas on the subject of marriage, in order to accommodate it to that of the council. It may be supposed, that, as a matter of conscience and subjection to ecclesiastical superiors, a Catholic population would in general conform to the usages of the Church. But such conformity would be no evidence of the change of the law by the civil power. Indeed, the fact that the civil magistrates of Louisiana had always been accustomed to perform marriage ceremonies, where the parties were Protestants, or where no priest was within reach, is conclusive evidence that the law of the Partidas had never been changed, nor the decree of the Council of Trent promulgated, so as to have the effect of law on this subject in the colony. The case of Patton v. Philadelphia, already referred to, shows the opinion of the Supreme Court of Louisiana on this subject, which, on a question relating to the early history and institutions of that country, should be held conclusive.

3. These preliminary questions being thus disposed of, our next subject of inquiry must be, whether Joseph Collins had any right or title to the land in dispute which descended to and vested in his heirs.

On the 3d of January, 1803, Joseph Collins, who was captain of dragoons and surveyor of the district, made application to Don Joaquim de Osorno, military commandant of Mobile, and obtained a permit, in the usual form, to take possession of a certain lot of marshy ground therein described, near to or in the city of Mobile. The permit was dated on the 26th of April, 1803. This, though merely an inception of a title, was capable of being ripened into a legal title by possession and improvement, which would give him a right to call on the Intendant-General to perfect his grant by a complete title. In order to keep up his possession and improvement on this lot, Collins entered into agreement under seal, dated the 21st of November, 1806, with William E. Kennedy, by which Kennedy covenanted to improve the lot, "so that, by fencing and ditching, the said lot may not be forfeited, and that he will begin to improve said lots immediately. By this agreement, Collins was to have the south half of the lot, and the north half was to be conveyed to Kennedy.

Whether Kennedy was at this time the owner of the Baudain claim to the same lot, and the compromise of their conflicting claims was in part the consideration of this contract, or whether the Baudain claim was first purchased by Kennedy in 1814, when its transfer bears date, is a question of no importance in the case. For it is clearly proved that Kennedy took and held possession of the lot, and made the improvements in pursuance and under his contract with Collins. And whether we consider him as agent, partner, or tenant of Collins, his purchase of another claim would enure to their joint benefit. He could not use the possession and improvement made for Collins to complete an imperfect and abandoned grant to Baudain, as was done, and by such act exclude Collins from his half of the lot. The deed which Kennedy afterwards gave to Inerarity shows clearly that he entertained no such dishonest intention. For after acknowledging by this deed his contract with Collins, and stating his intention to complete the title under the Baudain permit or grant, he proceeded to substantiate his title before the commissioners by proving the possession and improvements made by him under his contract with Collins as the meritorious foundation of his claim; and thus obtained a favorable report from the commissioners under the Baudain grant, which had been before rejected for want of such proof.

By the act of Congress of the 8th of May, 1822, § 2, all claims to lots in the town of Mobile, on which favorable reports had been made by the commissioners, "founded on orders of survey, requettes, permissions to settle, or other written evidence of claims, derived from either the French, British, or Spanish authorities, and bearing date before the 20th of December, 1803, and which ought in the opinion of the commissioners to be confirmed, were confirmed in the same manner as if the title had been completed."

By this act, the legal title to this lot became vested in William E. Kennedy. A patent would be but further evidence of a title which was conferred and vested by force of the act itself. Having thus obtained the legal title in his own name, Kennedy required no deed from Collins or his representatives, but became seized thereof for his own use as to the northern half, and for the use of Collins, or in trust for his heirs, as to the southern. Inerarity might have maintained an action of covenant on his deed, and compelled him to transfer the legal title by a further assurance. There might be some question, perhaps, whether the legal estate did not immediately vest in Inerarity by estoppel. But as the conveyance is a deed poll, in the nature of a quitclaim and release, without a warranty, and with a covenant for further assurance to Inerarity, or the heirs of Collins, it most probably would not. But for the purposes of this case the question is wholly immaterial. Inerarity, as a creditor of the estate of Collins, would have a right to demand the payment of his debt, before he should make a transfer to the heirs. But whether as holder of the legal or equitable estate in trust, his beneficial interest amounted to no more.

Some objections have been urged to the view we have taken of this transaction, on the ground that the contract made in 1806 with Collins was not binding. But although we cannot perceive the right of persons, who have purchased the legal title from Kennedy, with full notice of the trust, to object to a contract which Kennedy has executed, we shall proceed to notice them. The first objection is, that Collins did not sign the indenture or articles of agreement of 21st November, 1806, and was therefore not bound to convey to Kennedy; and there was therefore no consideration which could make the deed binding on him. But the deed on its face purports to be an indenture, of which Collins, from the nature of the transaction, would be holder of the counterpart, signed by Kennedy. The original, which is signed by the grantor, would be in possession of Kennedy the grantee, who cannot object to the validity of his covenant, because a paper is not produced which, if in existence, is in his own possession. Much less could he be heard to make this allegation after the contract has been executed by his own deed sealed and delivered in pursuance of it.

It has been objected, also, that the original contract with Collins was void as against the policy of the law. But it was certainly not against the policy of the laws of Spain, under which it was made; for it was a fulfilment of the conditions of the grant made to Collins. And it cannot well be said to be contrary to the policy of the laws of the United States, who have confirmed the land to Kennedy in virtue of the very possession and improvements made in pursuance of the contract.

Thus far, then, we have in 1822 the legal title to the whole lot vested in W.E. Kennedy, in trust, as to the southern half, for the heirs of Collins.

4. What, then, was the effect of the deed made to Samuel Kitchen, dated, or antedated, some two months before the deed to Inerarity?

The circumstances which tend to show that this deed was made after that to Inerarity, and for the purpose, if possible, of defeating it, are very strong and convincing.

1st. Joshua Kennedy, who acted as the agent for Kitchen, or used Kitchen's name for his own purposes, was a witness to the deed to Inerarity, and made no objections nor suggestions that he had bought and paid for this lot a few days before as agent of Kitchen, — a circumstance not easily accounted for, if such had been the fact. 2d. The deed to Kitchen was acknowledged after that to Inerarity, at the same time with another deed from W.E. Kennedy to Joshua Kennedy, containing property previously sold to Inerarity, and having the same witness, Diego McBoy. "And 3dly. The frequent declarations of Joshua Kennedy that the object of the deed made to Kitchen, through his intervention, was to defeat Inerarity's claim to that property." And lastly, the fact that Samuel Kitchen gave Joshua Kennedy an obligation to convey the lot to him on request; which was afterwards fulfilled by giving his deed to William Kitchen for a nominal consideration; and that William's name was used by Kennedy for the purpose of covering and complicating the transaction.

But it is a question of no importance in the case, whether the deed to Samuel Kitchen was delivered on the day it bears date, or that on which it was acknowledged. He was not the purchaser of a legal title without notice of a secret equity. The rule with regard to purchasers of a mere equity is, Prior in tempore potior in jure.

The equitable title of Collins, of which the deed to Inerarity contained a new acknowledgment, had its origin at least as far back as 1806. So that, even if we could bring ourselves to believe that Joshua Kennedy, whether acting for Kitchen or himself, had purchased and paid his money without notice of the title of Collins's heirs, it would not enable him to defeat their claim. The legal title first became vested in W.E. Kennedy in 1822, and passed by his deed of 1824 to Joshua Kennedy, with full knowledge of the trust. His attempt to defeat it, by covering the land with the vagrant and probably fraudulent claim under Price, after he had obtained the legal title from the United States, was as unsuccessful as the first, and wholly inoperative, except to show the shifts and contrivances resorted to, in order "to defeat Inerarity's claim."

5. We come now to the consideration of the validity of the deeds of release obtained from George and Sidney E. Collins, in 1829 and 1830.

At this time the property had risen in value, with a prospect of a much greater increase; and the frailty of the title was but too transparent to a man of the judgment and shrewdness of Joshua Kennedy, notwithstanding the means used to obscure it. The heirs had just come of age. They were ignorant of the nature or value of their title. Kennedy is not only in possession of their land, but of the legal title. He persuades them to release their title to William Kitchen for the sum of one thousand dollars each; a sum which, to young men just out of their apprenticeship, poor, and ignorant of their rights, would appear large and attractive. Kennedy is well acquainted with the nature and value of their claim; they are wholly ignorant of it. He informs them that their claim is worthless, but that Kitchen was willing to give them this sum for the sake of peace and quieting his title. Besides, he had so complicated and covered up the title, that it was impossible that they could comprehend it, or know the value of their claim, if the documents had been laid before them. Under such circumstances should a chancellor hesitate in setting aside the releases, if it appeared that the title thus obtained was for a consideration much below the value of the property? It needs no citation of authorities to show that deeds obtained under such circumstances would be held void.

6. The transfer by Inerarity of the equitable trust title held by him, can add nothing to the validity of Kennedy's title. Whether transferred by him voluntarily, or through the medium of a decree in chancery, can make no difference in this case. Nor is Inerarity liable to any imputations of collusion or improper conduct in the matter. He was bound to transfer his title to the heirs on payment of his debt. And when their releases to Kitchen were produced, by which he appeared to be substituted to their rights, Inerarity, who was ignorant of the means used to obtain them, might justly believe that he was bound to convey to him. He did so, after consulting counsel, and after a decree in equity. Such a decree would be made as a matter of course. But its effect would only be to substitute Kitchen or Kennedy to the rights of Inerarity. The title would be still subject to the trust for Collins's heirs, and unless their title was vested in Kennedy by these releases, he held the land still subject to their rights. But when the releases to the heirs are set aside, Kennedy is entitled to recover the money paid to Inerarity, as there is no allegation that the debt claimed by Forbes & Co. against Collins's estate was not justly due.

But before leaving this part of the case, it will be proper to notice an objection urged with some plausibility in the argument. The record exhibits much contradictory testimony as to the value of this property at the time the releases were executed, and it has been contended that Kennedy paid the full value for it, being altogether over $4,000. After such a length of time, it may be expected that the estimates of witnesses from recollection will differ widely. But when we look at the public assessments, and the sales of contiguous property about the same time, which are the best tests, it would seem that the boast of Joshua Kennedy himself, that "he had bought for $4,000 property worth $40,000," was not an exaggeration of the truth. But assuming the true value to have been one half that sum, and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances already stated, we think the Circuit Court was fully justified in setting aside these conveyances, and decreeing that the defendants should account.

7. The absence of the complainant from the State, and the late discovery of the fraud, fully account for the delay and apparent laches in prosecuting his claim, which have been objected to, on the argument.

The decree of the court below is therefore affirmed, but with this addition: "that the master, in taking the account of rents, profits, sales, &c., shall allow to the defendants the sum paid to James Inerarity for his claim against the estate of Joseph Collins."

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs, and with this addition: "that the master, in taking the account of rents, profits, sales, &c., shall allow to the defendants the sum paid to James Inerarity for his claim against the estate of Joseph Collins"; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said Circuit Court, to be proceeded with in conformity to the opinion of this court.