11-5132
Jin v. Holder
BIA
Bain, IJ
A089 266 763
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
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ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 1st day of May, two thousand thirteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
Circuit Judges.
_______________________________________
HUA JIN,
Petitioner,
v. 11-5132
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Holly M. Smith,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Rachel
Browning, Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Hua Jin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic
of China, seeks review of a November 16, 2011, decision of
the BIA affirming the June 1, 2010, decision of Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) Quynh Bain, which denied her application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Hua Jin, No. A089
266 763 (B.I.A. Nov. 16, 2011), aff’g No. A089 266 763
(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 1, 2010). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have
considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the
sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237
(2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam)(internal quotation marks
omitted). The applicable standards of review are well
established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin
Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
For asylum applications such as Jin’s, governed by the
amendments made to the Immigration and Nationality Act by
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the REAL ID Act of 2005, “[i]t is well settled that, in
assessing the credibility of an asylum applicant’s
testimony, an IJ is entitled to consider whether the
applicant’s story is inherently plausible.” Wensheng Yan v.
Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); accord
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). This Court defers to an IJ’s
credibility determination unless “it is plain that no
reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse
credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,
167 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
The agency found several aspects of Jin’s testimony to
be implausible, including her testimony that she decided to
have a second child because her financial situation had
improved, despite other testimony that her husband had lost
his job the previous year and that his new business started
slowly. Jin argues that the agency improperly speculated
about her financial situation, given her testimony that she
had been saving money and had received financial assistance
from her family. Initially, while petitioners must raise to
the BIA the specific issues they later raise in this Court,
Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam),
the government’s contention that Jin failed to exhaust this
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argument fails because it is subsidiary to the general
argument she raised in her BIA brief, Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d
82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, in consideration of
the totality of the circumstances, a “definite and firm
conviction” cannot be formed that the implausibility
findings were erroneous, given Jin’s failure to compellingly
explain her motivation for wanting more children. See Ming
Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (applying “definite
and firm conviction” standard).
Jin also contends that despite her failure to provide
her passport and the receipt for the fine imposed for
avoiding her required gynecological exams, she sufficiently
corroborated her claim with her household registration and
employment termination notice. However, the agency
reasonably determined that her failure to provide the fee
receipt undermined her claim because it could have
corroborated testimony that was called into question. See
Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 197 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[A]n IJ,
weighing the evidence to determine if the alien has met his
burden, may rely on the absence of corroborating evidence
adduced by an otherwise credible applicant unless such
evidence cannot be reasonably obtained.”).
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Finally, Jin argues that the agency erred by failing to
consider evidence favorable to her claim, such as her
evidence of her alleged forced abortion. However, where, as
here, the agency has given “reasoned consideration to the
petition,” it need not “expressly parse or refute on the
record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered
by the petitioner.” Wei Guang Wang v. Bd. of Immigration
Appeals, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
As the only evidence of a threat to Jin’s life or
freedom depended upon her credibility, the adverse
credibility determination in this case is dispositive of her
claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.
See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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