United States v. Nathaniel Gaffney

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-6017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

NATHANIEL MAURICE GAFFNEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. J. Michelle Childs, District
Judge. (7:07-cr-00711-JMC-5)

Submitted: April 23, 2013 Decided: May 3, 2013

Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

Nathaniel Maurice Gaffney, Appellant Pro Se. Jimmie Ewing,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina;
Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

In 2008, Nathaniel Maurice Gaffney was sentenced to

135 months’ imprisonment following his conviction for conspiracy

to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five

kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine

base (“crack”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). In

2012, Gaffney filed a motion for reduction in sentence pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006), arguing that U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual App. C, Amends. 750 and 759 (2011), together

with the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), Pub. L. No. 111-

220, 124 Stat. 2372, reduced his advisory Guidelines range and

his mandatory minimum sentence. The district court denied the

motion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate

in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Under § 3582(c)(2), the district court may modify the

term of imprisonment “of a defendant who has been sentenced

. . . based on a sentencing [Guidelines] range that has

subsequently been lowered,” if the amendment is listed in the

Guidelines as retroactively applicable. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2);

see also USSG § 1B1.10(c), p.s. (2012). Even if a defendant

qualifies for a sentence reduction based on a Guidelines

amendment, the decision to grant such a modification is subject

to the discretion of the court. See USSG § 1B1.10, cmt.

(backg’d); United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 186 (4th Cir.

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2010). “A district court abuses its discretion if it fails

adequately to take into account judicially recognized factors

constraining its exercise, or if it bases its exercise of

discretion on an erroneous factual or legal premise.” DIRECTV,

Inc. v. Rawlins, 523 F.3d 318, 323 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Gaffney argued in the district court that his

Guidelines range was lowered both by Amendment 750 and by the

FSA. The FSA increased the threshold quantities of crack

required to trigger certain mandatory minimum sentences.

However, it is only retroactively applicable to defendants who

were sentenced after its effective date of August 3, 2010.

Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012); United

States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237, 246-49 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, 132 S. Ct. 356 (2011). Gaffney was sentenced in 2004,

well before the FSA’s effective date. In any event, in his

informal brief, Gaffney does not challenge the district court’s

conclusion that the FSA did not lower Gaffney’s statutory

mandatory minimum sentence. Therefore, Gaffney forfeited

appellate review of this claim. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b)

(providing that this court considers only issues raised in

briefs). For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s

order to the extent that it concluded that Gaffney’s statutory

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mandatory minimum sentence was not reduced by the FSA and that

he was not eligible for a sentence reduction based on the FSA.

However, the district court denied § 3582(c)(2) relief

without addressing Gaffney’s eligibility for a sentence

reduction under Amendment 750 independent of the FSA. Amendment

750 to the Guidelines lowered the offense levels for crimes

involving certain quantities of crack cocaine and is

retroactive. See USSG §§ 1B1.10(c); USSG App. C Amends. 750,

759. Because we conclude that Gaffney may have been eligible

for such a reduction, we vacate the district court’s order in

part and remand for further proceedings to enable the district

court to determine if Gaffney is eligible and, if so, whether to

grant such a reduction.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED